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Many developing countries are experiencing a food system transformation with a rapid 
growth of supermarkets. This supermarket growth can be attributed to demand-side factors 
such as rising incomes, urbanization, and changing lifestyles, as well as supply-side factors, 
such as market liberalization in the food industry and greater openness for foreign direct 
investment. The retail revolution has also caused structural changes along the supply chains. 
Supermarkets try to offer their customers a consistent variety of high-quality products. To 
ensure continuous supply, supermarkets have established their own procurement systems, 
involving centralized buying points and contractual arrangements with farmers and traders. 
Several studies have analyzed determinants and impacts of farmer participation in these new 
supermarket channels, or in other emerging high-value supply chains in general, but various 
issues still remain under-researched.  
First, past research shows that access to market information can help speed up the 
diffusion of technical and institutional innovations. In most rural areas of developing 
countries, however, smallholders have limited access to market information. Due to 
infrastructure and institutional constraints, the cost of searching and processing formal 
market information tends to be high. Informal information networks could possibly be used 
as an avenue to reduce transaction costs. However, so far little is known about the role of 
information networks for high-value market (HVM) participation.  
Second, the nutrition impacts of supplying supermarkets and other emerging high-
value markets remain unexplored. This is despite high rates of undernourishment among the 
rural population of developing countries. Given positive income effects observed in previous 
research, it is conceivable that supplying supermarkets can have profound impacts on the 
nutrition of smallholder farm households.  
Third, past studies that analyzed welfare effects of participation in high-value markets 
used cross-sectional data, which may lead to bias in impact assessment, especially if 
unobserved factors affect participation, or if valid instruments cannot be found. With panel 
data, unobserved heterogeneity can be controlled for much better. Furthermore, panel data 




This dissertation consists of three essays. In the first essay we investigate the role of 
informal information networks for HVM participation. We focus on informal farmer 
interactions to exchange information, what we call ‘information links’. Specifically, we 
analyze the determinants of the existence of information links between individual farmers 
and effects of having information links with other farmers that previously supplied HVM on 
own HVM participation and participation dynamics. In the second essay, we analyze impacts 
and impact pathways of participation in supermarket channels on rural household nutrition. 
In the third essay, we analyze impacts and impact dynamics of supplying HVM on household 
income. All three essays utilize data from smallholder vegetable farmers in Kenya. Panel 
data for 2008 and 2012 are available.  
Kenya is an interesting example for this type of research, because supermarkets have 
rapidly gained in importance there in recent years. Supermarkets in Kenya now account for 
about 10% of national grocery sales and over 20% of food retailing in major cities.  
In the first essay, we use social network data at individual level and dyadic 
regressions to analyze determinants of the existence of information links between farmers. In 
our definition, an information link exists if farmers exchange information on possible 
vegetable marketing options. We find a higher likelihood of exchange of vegetable market 
information among farmers supplying HVM, as compared to traditional market (TM) 
farmers. Also, farmers supplying HVM are more likely to obtain market information from 
those supplying TM. Further, using household level data and probit models, we find that 
having an information link with at least one farmer who previously supplied HVM increases 
farmers’ own probability of participation in HVM by at least 10 percentage points. Finally, 
using multinomial logit models we analyze the effect of having information links with HVM 
farmers on the dynamics of participation in HVM (joining and also dropping out from these 
markets) over two time periods. We find that having an information link with at least one 
farmer who previously supplied HVM increases farmer’s own probability of participation in 
HVM in both periods by 5 percentage points or more, at the same time decreasing the 
probability of supplying TM in both periods by at least 9 percentage points. 
In the second essay, we use household level data to analyze impacts of participation 
in supermarket channels on farm household nutrition. Using an instrumental variable (IV) 




participation in supermarket channels has sizeable positive impacts: calorie, vitamin A, iron, 
and zinc consumption are all increased by 15% or more. We also analyze possible impact 
pathways, using simultaneous equation models and find that supermarket-supplying 
households have higher incomes, a higher share of land under vegetables, and a higher 
likelihood of male control of revenues. Furthermore, income and the share of land under 
vegetables have positive impacts, while male control of revenues has negative impacts on 
dietary quality.  
In the third essay, we use panel data to analyze welfare effects of participation in high 
value markets. Employing differencing techniques and IV models, we show that participation 
in HVM is associated with a 59% increase in household income. On the other hand, dropping 
out of HVM is associated with a significant decrease in household income. Finally, we find 
that the difference in income between farmers supplying HVM and those supplying TM is 
diverging over time.  
We derive a few general conclusions from the three essays. It is certainly important 
that market information is disseminated to smallholders, as it increases the probability of 
participation and continued supply to HVM. However, farmers already supplying HVM seem 
to be the ones using informal social networks to assess market information. Further 
development of these farmers alone may create even larger disparities between farmers 
supplying HVM and those supplying TM. Therefore, there is need for inclusive involvement 
of farmers supplying both channels whenever market information is being disseminated to 
smallholders, as this is likely to increase participation hence improving household welfare in 
general. Participation in HVM has a significant effect on the dietary quality of the 
participating households. The effect could however, be even larger if women are supported to 
keep control of revenue from crops sold in HVM. Finally, participation in HVM has a 
positive income effect that is growing over time, whereas dropping out leads to huge income 
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Agricultural food systems have been undergoing tremendous structural changes over the 
past decades, affecting wholesaling, processing and retailing sectors (Minten et al., 2010; 
Reardon & Timmer, 2012). Over the years, global food trade has sharply increased with 
notable changes in the structure and products being traded. High-value products such as 
fruits, vegetables, meat and dairy products have been gaining in importance (Maertens & 
Swinnen, 2009; Reardon et al., 2009). At the same time, food production and trade are 
increasingly being regulated through strict requirements on food quality, food safety, and 
environmental aspects (Henson & Reardon, 2005; Maertens & Swinnen, 2009). 
Investment in food processing and retail sectors is also increasing rapidly, leading to 
growth and modernization of supply chains in developed and developing countries. In 
developing countries, modern supply chains are increasing their market shares in food 
retailing at the expense of spot markets and traditional shops (Reardon et al., 2003). 
In developing countries, the growth of the retail sector including supermarkets has 
been massive and rapid over the past two decades. The speed has been so fast that it has 
been referred to as a “supermarket revolution”. Compared to developed countries, 
supermarkets have taken much shorter time to spread in developing countries. For 
example, what took the USA eight decades has taken Brazil only two decades (Reardon 
& Hopkins, 2006).  This growth has occurred in three waves (Reardon & Gulati, 2008). 
The first wave took off in the early-1990s to the mid-2000s in South America, East Asia 
(excluding China), and South Africa, raising the share of modern retail in food markets 
from about 10% to 50-60%. The second wave, in the mid-1990s, took place in Central 
America, Mexico, and parts of Southern Asia. The share of modern retail in these 
countries reached 30-50% by the mid-2000s, whereas the third wave countries (China, 
Vietnam, and India) attained a 2-20% modern retail share in the mid-2000s. Other parts 
of Africa, mainly Eastern and Southern Africa outside South Africa, have also begun to 
experience this revolution since the past decade (Reardon et al. 2008). Among them, 
Kenya has been on the forefront. Supermarkets in Kenya now account for about 10% of 
national grocery sales and 20% of food retailing in major cities (Planet Retail, 2015). 
Both demand and supply side factors have spurred the growth of modern retail in 
developing countries (Reardon et al., 2003; Mergenthaler et al., 2009). On the demand 
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side, increasing incomes, urbanization and increased number of women in the workforce 
are the driving factors. A substantial growth in real per capita income in developing 
countries has been experienced since the 1990s (World Bank, 2006; World Bank, 2014). 
This has led to the emergence of a large middle class, hence increased demand for 
processed foods (Reardon et al., 2004). In addition, increased urbanization since the 
1990s has led to an increase in the number of women working away from home. 
Consequently, the opportunity cost of their time has increased so that they look more for 
shopping convenience and increased purchase of processed convenience foods to save 
cooking time (Reardon & Berdegué, 2002). The modern retailers offer such types of 
products with greater variety and lower costs than traditional retailers and shops (Rischke 
et al., 2015). On the supply side, the market liberalization in the food industry and 
openness for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 1990s and 2000s significantly sparked 
the diffusion (Reardon et al., 2009). Foreign supermarkets and other modern retailers 
were opened in developing countries leading to their multi-nationalization. Their spread 
further accelerated as they sought to improve their competitive positioning.   
For modern retailers to meet the requirements of the consumers such as 
consistency in quality and continuous supply, they have modernized their procurement 
systems. This translates to a shift  from reliance on spot markets to sourcing from farmers 
through specialized and dedicated wholesalers using contractual arrangements and quality 
standards (Reardon et al., 2009; Reardon et al., 2010). These changes have far reaching 
effects on smallholders (Reardon & Berdegué, 2002; Weatherspoon & Reardon, 2003). 
Given the sheer size of the market, the retail revolution brings potentially lucrative 
market opportunities for small and poor farmers to access high-value markets (Maertens 
et al., 2007). Furthermore, the emerging high-value markets are often associated with 
more stable output prices and guaranteed market access. This can lead to higher incomes 
for the supplying households compared to those supplying traditional markets, which may 
also contribute to reduction in poverty (Rao & Qaim, 2011). Additionally, increase in 
income is associated with more diversified consumption patterns hence improved 
household nutrition (Babatunde & Qaim, 2010). Farmers may also benefit from supplying 
high-value markets (HVM) by attaining improved farm productivity. To meet the quality 
standards required by these HVM, farmers may have to change their production systems 
and their input mix, adopt new farm technology such as improved seed, or invest in new 
farm equipment. Such changes could lead to improved farm productivity for smallholders 
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(McCullough et al., 2008; Rao et al., 2012). Moreover, supplying HVM may benefit 
smallholders through creation of employment opportunities in the community. This may 
result from the high usage of farm labor in production, harvesting, cleaning, and 
packaging of produce supplied in these modern markets (Rao & Qaim, 2013). 
Despite the potential benefits of participation in the emerging HVM, there are also 
concerns that smallholders may be excluded from supplying these markets hence leading 
to further marginalization (Reardon & Barrett, 2000; Henson & Reardon, 2005). 
Supplying supermarkets and other HVM requires compliance with the associated quality, 
logistical, safety, and volume requirements (Reardon & Berdegué, 2002). However, 
smallholders are often poor and may lack the required resources to make changes in their 
production systems and investments that may be necessary to meet such requirements. 
Furthermore, the HVM often target farmers who have invested in non-land assets such as 
farm equipment and irrigation, those with access to good infrastructure, and also the 
farmers with larger sizes of land (Reardon & Gulati, 2008). Therefore, asset-poor 
smallholder farmers may face increasing challenges in accessing or continuing to supply 
HVM.   
Farmers may also be limited from supplying these markets due to high transaction 
costs, such as costs of searching for market information, negotiating contracts with the 
buyers, and transportation among others (Blandon et al., 2009). In terms of market 
information, participation in HVM requires access to more information than supplying 
traditional markets. Farmers need diverse information, for example, regarding buyer 
requirements, the appropriate production methods, and the benefits of participation. This 
may limit smallholder participation. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The transformation of agri-food systems and the increasing role of modern supply chains 
offer new opportunities and challenges for small farmers. Various studies have raised 
concerns that smallholders may be excluded from participating in these high-value 
markets (HVM) (Reardon & Barrett, 2000; Henson & Reardon, 2005). As a result, 
several studies have analyzed determinants of participation (Hernández et al., 2007; 
Blandon et al., 2009; Neven et al., 2009; Moustier et al., 2010; Rao & Qaim, 2011). Most 
of these studies show that farmer characteristics and physical capital including 
infrastructure, are the most important determinants of participation in HVM.  
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Having human and physical capital required for HVM participation does not 
suffice to participate in HVM: farmers may be lacking information on the existence of 
HVM opportunities or requirements for participation. Furthermore, before farmers can 
make investments that would qualify them to participate in the HVM, such as purchasing 
irrigation equipment, they may need to know the expected returns from participation. 
Such information is not always obtained from HVM buyers. Similarly, due to 
infrastructure and institutional constraints, smallholders are not always able to obtain 
such information from formal sources (Birner et al., 2009). In addition, some attributes of 
HVM may not be directly observed by non-participating farmers. For instance, the benefit 
of increased incomes that come from supplying HVM mainly results from stable prices 
and market assurance offered by HVM (Rao & Qaim, 2011; Michelson, 2013) and it may 
not necessarily be that HVM offer  higher prices than traditional markets. Therefore, 
farmers already supplying HVM are the ones likely to know the benefits of participation 
in terms of incomes. Thus, informal social networks may support the spread of relevant 
information among smallholders, but the role of such information networks for HVM 
participation has never been analyzed. Having farmers who previously supplied HVM in 
one’s informal social network could be beneficial. Farmers can learn from each other 
about the benefits of participation and also obtain information that one would require to 
participate in these HVM.  
Several studies have analyzed whether smallholders benefit from supplying HVM. 
Results indicate that such benefits are substantial. Farmers supplying HVM are gaining as 
much as 48% higher household incomes on average, compared to those supplying 
traditional markets (Rao & Qaim, 2011). Furthermore, HVM-supplying households 
benefit in terms of improved productivity and employment creation for the local 
community. Surprisingly, however, there is no study that has analyzed impacts of modern 
supply chains on farm household nutrition (Popkin, 2014). This is despite the high rates 
of undernourishment in developing countries. Out of the 805 million people estimated to 
have been chronically undernourished in 2012-2014 worldwide, 791 million live in 
developing countries, many of them in rural areas where they depend directly or 
indirectly on the small farm sector for their livelihoods (FAO, 2014). At the same time, 
deficiencies of various micronutrients are widespread (FAO, 2013; Gómez et al., 2013). 
Undernourishment and micronutrient deficiencies have far-reaching health and nutrition 
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consequences including growth retardation in children, impaired cognitive development, 
and low labor productivity (Kennedy et al., 2003; Black et al., 2008).  
The improved incomes resulting from supplying HVM shows that participation in 
these markets could have profound effects on nutrition of supplying households. For the 
previously undernourished households, higher household incomes may result in 
consumption of more calories. In addition, higher incomes are associated with 
consumption of more diversified diet hence leading to improved dietary quality (Ye & 
Taylor, 1995). Furthermore, producing crops for sale in HVM may lead to specialization 
(Rao et al., 2012). Specializing in a food crop, even though for commercial purpose, may 
lead to increased consumption of that crop by the producing household. For example, 
produce that does not meet the quality standards of HVM may be retained for home 
consumption hence increasing their intake at the household level. Supplying HVM may 
also affect household’s nutrition through changes in gender roles and household decision 
making. As crops get commercialized, males tend to take over control of the crops and 
revenues previously controlled by females (von Braun, 1994; Fischer & Qaim, 2012). 
Such changes in gender roles and household decision making may have important effects 
on nutrition in farm households.  
Most of the previous studies analyzing impacts of supplying HVM have used 
cross-sectional data which has some drawbacks. First, with cross-section data, only static 
analysis can be undertaken which does not give a complete story. Dynamic analysis with 
panel data would give a clearer picture of the impacts. Second, when using cross-section 
data, there are problems in controlling for heterogeneity arising from unobserved factors 
particularly if good instruments cannot be found. With panel data such heterogeneity, 
especially time-invariant one, can be controlled for. Empirical evidence of impacts of 
participation in HVM using panel data is scarce. One exception is Michelson (2013), who 
used a difference-in-difference estimator to analyze impacts of supplying supermarkets 
on household assets in Nicaragua. However, Michelson collected data only at one point in 
time, using recall data on past asset ownership among supermarket farmers for 
constructing the panel. Such data may be less accurate compared to actual data collected 
over two or more periods.  
This dissertation seeks to address the discussed research gaps using data from 
smallholder vegetable farmers in Kenya. The dissertation has three essays. In the first 
essay, we analyze the role of information networks for dissemination of market 
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information regarding supplying HVM. The second essay analyzes the impacts and 
impact pathways of supplying HVM on farm household nutrition. Both these essays 
primarily use cross-sectional data. In the third essay, we use panel data collected from the 
same smallholder farmers to analyze the impacts and impact dynamics of participation in 
HVM on household income.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives and Dissertation Outline 
The focus of this dissertation is to analyze the role of information networks for high-value 
market (HVM) participation and the impacts of supplying HVM on farm household 
nutrition and income.  Specifically, this dissertation has the following objectives: 
1. To analyze impacts and impact dynamics of information networks on 
dissemination of HVM information and hence participation in HVM, 
2. To analyze the impacts and impact pathways of supplying HVM on household 
nutrition, and 
3. To analyze impacts and impact dynamics of supplying HVM on household 
income. 
The analyses of these objectives are based on comprehensive data collected from 400 
smallholder vegetable farmers in rural Kenya, consisting of farmers supplying HVM or 
traditional markets (TM). The first objective uses individual level social network data and 
household level data. The second objective utilizes household level data. Both of these 
objectives primarily use cross-sectional data collected in 2012. The questionnaire used for 
data collection is attached in the Appendix at the end of the dissertation. The third 
objective uses panel data from the same smallholder farmers, collected over two rounds: 
2008 and 2012. The author of this dissertation was not involved in the 2008 data 
collection, but she planned and implemented the 2012 survey round. Kenya is an 
interesting case study for such an analysis because it is one of the countries in Africa 
where modern supply chains have rapidly gained in importance in recent years. 
Supermarkets in Kenya now account for about 10% of national grocery sales, and over 
20% of food retailing in major cities (Planet Retail, 2015). Also, smallholders in Kenya, 
like in other developing countries, are faced with challenges of inadequate market 
information.  
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the first 
essay analyzing the role of information networks for HVM participation using dyadic 
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regressions and probit models. The second essay analyzing impacts and impact pathways 
of supplying supermarkets on household nutrition is presented in the third chapter. We 
use an instrumental variable approach to control for endogeneity and simultaneous 
equations to analyze impact pathways. In chapter 4, we present the third essay that uses 
panel data to analyze impacts and impact dynamics of HVM participation on household 
income. We employ differencing techniques and treatment effect estimators to undertake 
the analysis. Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings of the dissertation, derives some 
policy recommendations, and discusses limitations of the study as well as important areas 
for further research. 
 
Chapter 2. Informal Information Networks and Smallholder Participation in High-
Value Markets  
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Abstract: This paper analyzes the determinants and role of informal information networks 
for high-value market (HVM) participation and participation dynamics, an area that has 
not been explored before. Using primary data collected from smallholder farmers in 
Kenya who supply HVM or traditional markets (TM), we find a higher likelihood of 
exchange of market information among farmers supplying HVM, as compared to TM 
farmers. We also find that farmers supplying HVM are more likely to obtain market 
information from those supplying TM, but we do not find evidence that TM farmers 
obtain market information from HVM farmers. In addition, our results show that 
obtaining market information from farmers who previously supplied HVM significantly 
increase farmers’ own probability of participation in HVM by 10% to 19%, and enhances 
farmers to join and continue supplying HVM. Some policy implications of these findings 
are also discussed. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Access to market information is fundamental for market participation, which in turn has 
important implications for the rural poor, and overall economic growth (Barrett, 2008). 
However, smallholders in developing countries have limited access to market information 
limiting optimal production and marketing choices. Smallholders may not be aware of the 
existence of some market opportunities, such as the emerging high-value markets (HVM) 
including supermarkets. Alternatively, they may be lacking information on the 
requirements for participation, or how to successfully supply these new high-value 
markets. 
Supermarkets in developing countries have been undergoing a massive and rapid 
growth since the past two decades (Reardon et al., 2004; Reardon & Timmer, 2007; 
Neven et al., 2009). Consequently, opportunities for participation in these emerging high-
value markets have increased. An emerging body of literature seeks to explain the 
                                                 
1
 This chapter is co-authored by Theda Gödecke, Camilla Andersson, and Matin Qaim. The following roles 
were performed by me: conceptualization and designing the study in cooperation with Camilla Andersson 
and Matin Qaim; implementing the survey in cooperation with Camilla Andersson; data analysis; 
interpretation of research results in cooperation with all co-authors; writing of the paper; and revision of the 
paper with all co-authors. 
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determinants of participation in such high-value markets (see for example, Hernández et 
al., 2007; Moustier et al., 2010; Rao & Qaim, 2011; Andersson et al., 2015). Most of 
these studies, however, emphasize on infrastructure, organizational support, physical, and 
social capital as important determinants of participation. No study has analyzed impacts 
of information networks on HVM participation. To successfully supply HVM, farmers 
require more information than to supply traditional markets (TM). Lack of access to 
market information may limit smallholders from HVM participation. Furthermore, if only 
a few farmers are supplying HVM, further development of the HVM could aggravate 
inequality between farmers supplying HVM and those supplying TM through differential 
access to information. 
Market information may be obtained from formal sources such as agricultural 
extension officers, media, or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO). However, due to 
infrastructure and institutional constraints, cost of searching and processing formal 
market information by smallholders tends to be high (Birner et al., 2009; Feder et al., 
2010). Informal information networks could possibly be used as an avenue to reduce 
transaction costs, but so far little is known about the role of information networks to 
spread market information
2
. This article addresses this research gap by analyzing effects 
of information networks on HVM participation, using the example of smallholder 
vegetable farmers in rural Kenya.  
Past research shows that informal information networks can help speed up the 
adoption of agricultural technologies through social learning (see for example, Munshi, 
2004; Matuschke & Qaim, 2009; Conley & Udry, 2010; van den Broeck & Dercon, 
2011). However, there are also findings showing that informal information networks 
could have negative effects. In their study on effect of social networks on adoption of 
sunflower (a new crop) in Mozambique, Bandiera and Rasul (2006) find that information 
networks measured by the number of adopters among relatives and friends has a negative 
effect on sunflower adoption when there are many adopters. They explain that the 
negative effect could arise from farmers strategically delaying to adopt the technology so 
that they free ride on the knowledge accumulated by others. These findings therefore 
                                                 
2
Some studies have analyzed effect of social capital and collective action on participation in HVM, 
e.g.,Kaganzi et al., (2009), Markelova, et al., (2009), and Andersson et al., (2015). However, such data are 
collected differently from social network data. Proxies like group membership or membership to certain 
project or NGO activities are often used, which do not necessarily reflect direct interaction and exchange of 
information between individuals. 
Chapter 2. Informal Information Networks and Smallholder Participation in High-
Value Markets  
10 
 
show that the effects of information networks could differ depending on the context. 
Thus, general conclusions about the effect of information networks on household and 
agricultural decision making are not justified. 
In this paper, we identify social networks by randomly matching farmers within 
our sample (Conley & Udry, 2010; Maertens & Barrett, 2013). Building on primary data 
consisting of farmers supplying HVM or TM, we analyze three main aspects. First, we 
analyze determinants of the existence of information links between farmers. In our 
definition, an information link exists if farmers exchange information on possible 
vegetable marketing options. Second, we investigate the effect of having information 
links with farmers that previously supplied HVM on farmer’s own probability of 
participation in HVM. A recent study on participation in HVM shows that there can be 
significant participation dynamics, with many smallholders dropping out and others 
joining HVM (Andersson et al., 2015). Therefore, analyzing effects of information 
networks statically may not tell a complete story. In our third objective, we analyze the 
impacts of having information links with previous HVM farmers on farmer’s own 
participation dynamics over a two time period. 
We use the case study of Kenya because it is one of the countries in Africa that 
has experienced a rapid growth of emerging high-value markets such as supermarket in 
the past decade (Reardon et al. 2008). Supermarkets in Kenya now account for about 10% 
of national grocery sales, and over 20% of food retailing in major cities (Planet Retail, 
2015). At the same time, smallholders in Kenya, like in many other developing countries, 
are faced with challenges of inadequate market information (Okello et al., 2012). 
Findings of this study could have wider implications in other developing countries 
experiencing similar growth of supermarkets or other emerging high-value supply chains. 
Therefore, having a better understanding of the information networks and their effects on 
participation in HVM and participation dynamics is also important from a policy 
perspective. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
The agri-food systems in developing countries have been facing dynamic changes in the 
past two decades (Reardon et al., 2009; Reardon & Timmer, 2014). Among other factors, 
the recent rapid growth of supermarkets is contributing to this change (Reardon et al., 
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2004; Reardon & Timmer, 2007; Neven et al., 2009). Supermarkets and other emerging 
high-value supply chains are increasingly changing their procurement systems, from 
buying through traditional markets (TM) to contractual agreements with farmers, often 
through specialized intermediaries (Reardon & Berdegué, 2002; Rao & Qaim, 2011). 
This has created both opportunities and challenges for smallholder farmers. On the one 
hand, participation in these new high-value supply chains require farmers to meet diverse 
stringent requirements in terms of quality, quantity, timely supply, and product 
specifications (Key & Runsten, 1999; Reardon & Barrett, 2000; Weatherspoon et al., 
2001). On the other hand, those who manage to participate benefit immensely in terms of 
increased household incomes, improved household nutrition, productivity, and 
employment creation (Miyata et al., 2009; Rao et al., 2012; Michelson, 2013; Rao & 
Qaim, 2013; Chege et al., 2015; Andersson et al., 2015).  
In this paper we combine literature on emerging high-value markets (HVM) and 
social network to find out the role of information networks for HVM participation. Unlike 
supplying TM, farmers require diverse information before they can successfully supply 
HVM. They require information on buyer requirements in terms of product quality, 
quantity, and product specifications. Furthermore, farmers need information on how to 
best meet these requirements on a consistent basis. To fulfill the requirements may 
require changing production methods and/or heavily investing on farm equipment. Thus, 
prior to this investment decision, farmers require information on the benefits and 
challenges of supplying HVM. In the case of participation in some HVM like 
supermarkets, the actual outcome of participation may not be easily revealed in terms of 
significantly higher prices than in the TM, but often stems from less salient features such 
as less price volatility and more stable demand throughout the year (Rao & Qaim, 2011; 
Michelson, 2013). 
Literature on social learning shows that people are likely to adopt an innovation if 
they see evidence from outcomes of earlier adopter that convince them that the innovation 
is worth adopting (Young, 2009; Conley & Udry, 2010). In the case of participation in 
emerging high-value markets therefore, the process of learning may be through peers. 
Since there are multiple farmers supplying different markets in similar circumstances, 
farmers can attain information on the HVM, learn the practices of other HVM farmers, 
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learn about the outcome of participation, and make informed decisions on whether to join 
the HVM or not. 
Social networks may also play other roles besides dissemination of market 
information. Screening buyers and sellers, as well as monitoring and enforcing contracts 
often involves high costs (Aleem, 1990). When buyers and sellers interact frequently, 
patterns of expected behavior and bonds of trust are established allowing the social 
network to serve a screening function (Wydick et al., 2011). This consequently reduces 
transaction costs of market participation. Additionally, the possibility of social sanctions 
may lower the probability of contract breaching by either the buyer or seller. Finally, 
social networks can be used to reduce the burden of financial requirements among 
farmers. Supplying HVM may require farmers to invest in farm machinery and equipment 
such as those for irrigation (Rao et al., 2012). However, smallholder farmers are often 
poor and may lack resources to invest in such equipment. Social networks can assist such 
farmers to overcome this barrier by enhancing pulling of resources and making joint 
investments in purchasing the required equipment or using social networks as an informal 
source of loans. Furthermore, social networks can also be importance for credit awareness 




2.3.1 Conceptual Framework 
In this sub-section, we discuss more formally how information networks are likely to 
affect farmers’ participation decisions. 
 
Determinants of the Existence of Information Links 
Our first objective is to analyze determinants of the existence of information links 
between a pair of farmers (dyad). A dyad is a pair of linked actors, in which the actor 
whose network is being studied (actor i), is linked to another actor (actor j) (Smith & 
Christakis, 2008). Based on the theoretical literature on network formation, (see Jackson, 
(2007) for an extensive review), people form links with each other based on the cost-
benefit analysis of the links. Farmers are expected to form an information link if the 
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benefits that accrue from the relationship outweigh the cost of forming and maintaining it. 
This can be represented as follows: 
 
  𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑘 = {
1      𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑘(𝑋𝑖𝑗)  − 𝐶𝑘(𝑋𝑖𝑗) ≥ 0                                         
0      otherwise                                                                      
     (2.1) 
 
where Lijk  denotes the directed information link indicating that farmer i receives 
information from farmer j with respect to activity k, Bk (.) represents the benefits of the 
link, and the cost of establishing or maintaining the link is represented by Ck (.). The 
costs and benefits depend on the characteristics of individuals i and j, Xij. Based on past 
literature on role of information networks for adoption of agricultural technology
3
, Xij will 
include social and geographical distances. Social distance refers to the similarities and 
differences in individual characteristics between i and j such as age, gender and 
education, whereas geographical distance refers to the physical distance between i and j 
measured in kilometers (km) or whether the two farmers are in the same neighborhood or 
region.  
Xij will also include the previous choice of the supply channel of the paired 
farmers. Empirical evidence shows that farmers can attain information on adoption of 
agricultural technology through network members who have already adopted the 
technology (Bandiera & Rasul, 2006; Matuschke & Qaim, 2009; Conley & Udry, 2010). 
Regarding participation in HVM, farmers who have already supplied HVM will be a 
better source of information regarding supplying HVM, as compared to those who have 
not. Thus, the benefits of forming an information link with these farmers may be higher. 
Farmers can attain market information from other sources than their informal social 
networks, for example traders. Therefore, Xij will also include other sources of market 
information. 
 
                                                 
3
Due to the lack of previous studies on determinants of information link in regard to HVM, the extensive 
literature on other types of information networks especially in the context of adoption of agricultural 
technology, offer lessons for our case. 
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Determinants of Participation in High-Value Markets 
Our second objective is to analyze the effect of having information links with farmers that 
previously supplied high-value markets (HVM) on farmer’s own probability of HVM 
participation. Supplying HVM can be modeled as a binary choice decision, assuming 
farm households aim to maximize their utility subject to household resource constraints 
(Manski, 1977). So that utility, U, is determined by a set of farm, household and 
contextual variables, Z, which also influence farmers’ ability to adjust to the requirements 
of the emerging supply channels, leading to participation. Variable Z also includes the 
level of connectedness with information network members. Information networks 
disseminate important information among farmers hence lowering the transaction costs 
(Conley & Udry, 2001). We therefore model a utility maximizing farm household as: 
 
  𝑀𝐴𝑋 𝑈 = 𝑓(𝑍)           (2.2) 
 
If we define h to be HVM and t the TM, a farmer will participate in HVM, if the utility 
derived from this channel, 𝑈ℎ
∗, is greater than the utility 𝑈𝑡
∗, from TM. However, 𝑈ℎ
∗ and 
𝑈𝑡
∗ are latent variables. What we observe is the supply channel that the farmer chooses, Y. 
A farmer will choose to supply HVM, Y=1 or TM, Y=0, following the following decision 
rule: 
 
  𝑌 = {
1        𝑖𝑓 𝑈ℎ
∗ ≥ 𝑈𝑡
∗                                                             
0       if 𝑈ℎ
∗ < 𝑈𝑡
∗                ∀ℎ ≠ 𝑡                                     
     (2.3) 
 
2.3.2 Measuring Social Network 
Different methods can be used to collect social network data. Maertens and Barrett (2013) 
give an excellent review of these methods. In summary, there are two main approaches: 
undertaking a complete village census or taking a sample of the population of interest. 
Undertaking a complete village census entails asking all farmers to list all their 
information contacts and the kind of information they share (De Weerdt & Dedrcon, 
2006; Fafchamps & Gubert, 2007; van den Broeck & Dercon, 2011). This makes this 
method time consuming and may only be applicable in small villages (Goswami & Basu, 
2010; van den Broeck & Dercon, 2011). Furthermore, some respondents may forget to 
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mention certain network partners. Also, data are only collected within the network 
boundary previously defined, for example, a village (Udry& Conley, 2004). 
In the case of taking a sample of the population, several ways of sampling are 
documented in the literature (see Maertens & Barrett (2013) for this discussion). One 
sampling technique that has gained preference amongst economist lately is “random 
matching within sample” (Conley & Udry, 2010; Santos & Barrett, 2010; Maertens & 
Barrett, 2013). Each farmer is matched with a certain number of randomly drawn 
individual from the sample, and asked to elicit details on the kind of relationship the 
farmer has with each of these individuals. This method has the advantage that it can be 
implemented within a short period of time. Furthermore, Santos and Barrett (2008) use 
Monte Carlos simulation on a network of herders in Ethiopia and show that this method 
outperforms other methods of sampled networks. The main drawback of using sampled 
networks however, is that a key network member may be omitted from the sampling 
hence leading to a large omitted variable bias (Maertens & Barrett, 2013). In our study, 
we collected information network data using “random matching within sample” method. 
We further collected additional information about farmers’ other information networks 
(besides those in our sample), so as to reduce the bias of omitted variable. This is 
explained in detail in sub-section 2.4.2. 
 
2.3.3 Empirical Strategy 
There are three issues we aim to analyze: first, determinants of the existence of 
information links; second, effects of having information links with farmers who 
previously supplied high-value markets (HVM) on farmers’ own probability of HVM 
participation; and third, the effects of having information links with farmers who 
previously supplied HVM on farmer’s own participation dynamics including joining and 
dropping from HVM. 
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Analyzing Determinants of the Existence of Information Links 
To empirically analyze determinants of existence of information links between a dyad of 
farmers, we follow Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) with adjustments to suit our study, and 
estimate the following model:  
 
𝐿𝑖𝑗(2012) = 𝛽 + 𝛼1 (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗)(2008) +  𝛼2 (𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗)(2008) + 𝛾𝑤𝑖𝑗(2008) +
𝜌𝑀𝑖𝑗(2008) + 𝑖𝑗          (2.4) 
 
where Lij denotes the probability of existence of an information link between individuals i 
and j. The dyadic relationship is directional and therefore 𝐿𝑖𝑗 does not have to equal 𝐿𝑗𝑖. xi 
and xj are characteristics of individuals i and j that are likely to influence probability of 
existence of a link, including the social distance characteristics. Since Lij is directional, 
regressors 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗 enters the regression as such, not in absolute value (Fafchamps and 
Gubert, 2007). Parameter 𝛼1  measures effect of differences in attributes on 𝐿𝑖𝑗 while 𝛼2  
measures effect of combined level of xi and xj on Lij. Variable 𝑤𝑖𝑗 captures link attributes 
of dyad i and j, including geographical distance, whereas 𝑀𝑖𝑗 denotes supply channel 
variables. All the explanatory variables are lagged to 2008 to avoid reverse causality. 
Parameter 𝜌 will show the effect of past choice of supply channel of the dyads on 
probability of existence of an information link (𝐿𝑖𝑗). Finally, 𝑖𝑗  is the error term. 
A potential problem of estimating equation (2.4) is that the error terms are likely 
to be inconsistent due to cross-observation correlation in the error terms involving same 
individuals. It is possible that at one time the respondent is the individual i, and in another 
instance the same respondent is identified as individual j. Therefore, there is need to 
correct the standard errors. Since our data were collected differently from Fafchamp and 
Gubert (2007), we are not able to follow their standard error correction method. 
Therefore, we cluster the standard errors of the probit model based on farmers i and j 
following Petersen (2009). 
This probit model will show determinants of existence of an information link. To 
understand the effects of information links on HVM participation, we undertake further 
analysis as explained in the following. 
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Analyzing Determinants of Participation in High-Value Markets 
As discussed in the conceptual framework, farm households’ decision on the choice of 
the supply channel is an individual decision based on utility derived from each channel, 
and each household will choose to participate in the supply channel with the highest 
utility. Therefore, participation in HVM can be specified as follows: 
 
  𝐻 (2012) = 𝛽𝑍(2008) + 𝛼𝑁(2012) + 𝛾𝑂(2012) + 𝜇       (2.5) 
 
where H(2012) is a dummy variable equal to one if the household supplied HVM in 2012, 
and zero otherwise; Z(2008) is a vector of explanatory variables that we lag to 2008 to 
avoid reverse causality; N(2012) captures “HVM information link within sample”; a binary 
variable which is equal to one if the main person in the household responsible for 
vegetable production and marketing talked to at least one social network member about 
vegetable marketing options, and zero otherwise. The social network member came from 
our sample and had to have supplied HVM in 2008. 𝑂(2012) denotes “HVM information 
link outside sample”. This is also a binary variable which is equal to one if the main 
person in the household responsible for vegetable production and marketing talked to at 
least one other farmer currently supplying HVM, about vegetable marketing options, and 
zero otherwise. This refers to farmers other than those already randomly sampled and 
matched with the respondent. 𝛼 and 𝛾 are the parameters of interest, which show the 
effects of HVM information links on participation in HVM. 𝛽 is a vector of other 
parameters to be estimated, and 𝜇 captures stochastic disturbances, assumed to be 
normally distributed. 
We draw on existing literature to identify explanatory variables to be included 
under Z. Previous studies have identified farmer characteristics such as age, gender, and 
education level; and physical capital as important determinants of supplying HVM 
(Hernández et al., 2007; Neven et al., 2009; Rao & Qaim, 2011; Andersson et al., 2015). 
We also control for traders (proxy for other sources of market information) as farmers 
may receive vegetable marketing information from other sources than informal social 
networks. We include distance to tarmac road as a measure of infrastructure conditions. 
Farmers who live close to tarmac roads may have easy access to transport hence easily 
market their produce compared to those living deep inside the villages (Hernández et al., 
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2007; Michelson, 2013). Furthermore, they may also easily receive more information 
about other marketing options. Finally, we include the region dummies to capture 
possible regional effects.  
 
Analyzing Determinants of Dynamics of Participation in High-Value Markets 
Our third objective is to estimate effect of having information links with farmers that 
previously supplied high-value markets (HVM), on farmer’s own participation dynamics. 
If farm households are faced with a decision to participate in HVM or traditional markets 
(TM) over two time period, they are likely to fall into four possible categories: Category 
1=the household supplies HVM in both periods (HVM stayer); category 2=the household 
supplies TM in the first period and HVM in the second period (HVM newcomer); 
category 3=the household supplies HVM in the first period and TM in the second period 
(HVM dropout) and category 4= the household supplies TM in both periods (TM stayer). 
The probability that one alternative is chosen is the probability that the utility of that 
alternative exceeds the utility of all other available alternatives.  
The choice of supply channel over the two time periods may be influenced by 
access to information on supplying HVM. As discussed in section 2.2, supplying HVM 
may require more information than supplying TM. We analyze the effect of having 
information links with previous HVM farmers on own participation dynamics using two 
information link variables (“HVM link within sample” and “HVM link outside sample”). 
All other control variables discussed under determinants of supplying HVM are also used 
to analyze participation dynamics. We undertake our dynamic analysis using a 
multinomial logit model (Greene, 2008). 
  
Chapter 2. Informal Information Networks and Smallholder Participation in High-
Value Markets  
19 
 
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
In this sub-section, we describe how the farm and information network data were 
collected and show some descriptive results. 
 
2.4.1 Farm Survey 
This study uses data from smallholder vegetable farmers from rural households of the 
former Kiambu District in the Central province of Kenya (under the new constitution 
Kiambu district is now in Kiambu County). The main economic activity in the region is 
agriculture mainly horticulture farming, dairy farming, tea, and coffee production. Due to 
its proximity to Nairobi city, Kiambu serves as the main source of most vegetables sold in 
Nairobi’s supermarkets and spot markets (Neven et al., 2009). 
Household data were collected from 331 smallholder vegetable farmers in 2012, 
77 participating in high-value market (HVM) and 274 in traditional market (TM). These 
farmers were also interviewed in 2008 when the sampling was done. In 2008, farmers 
were selected using a stratified random sampling procedure, differentiating between 
HVM and TM farmers. TM farmers were randomly sampled from 31 administrative 
locations that mainly produce vegetables in Kiambu District. HVM farmers were selected 
using lists from HVM suppliers (Rao & Qaim, 2011).We use 2008 data to lag our 
variables so as to avoid issues of reverse causality, and to analyze dynamics of 
participation in HVM in our third objective.  
In both years data were collected using a structured questionnaire that was 
carefully pretested prior to the data collection. Data collected included household 
characteristics, information on vegetable production and marketing, other farm and non-
farm economic activities, household assets, various institutional variables, and 
information network data (only in 2012). 
 
2.4.2 Information Network Data 
We use three information link variables in our analysis. The first variable, “link within 
sample”, is used in a dyadic regression model to elicit the determinants of existence of 
information links. Second variable “HVM link within sample” and third variable “HVM 
link outside sample” are used in the probit and multinomial logit models to analyze the 
effects of having information links with previous HVM farmers on farmer’s own HVM 
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participation and participation dynamics. The three models are discussed in the 
methodology section. 
These models have different units of analysis and therefore require different types 
of data. In a dyadic regression model the unit of analysis is a dyad, therefore, information 
on each link between the network pairs are required. On the other hand, for the probit and 
multinomial logit models the unit of analysis is the household, thus household level data 
is required.  
As mentioned earlier, these social network data were collected using the “random 
matching within sample” approach (Maertens & Barrett, 2013). Respondent were 
randomly matched with a maximum of seven randomly selected farmers from our sample, 
including HVM and TM farmers. Of the seven matches, five were sampled from the 
respondent’s village and two from the neighboring village. In some cases, respondents 
could not be matched with the two farmers from the neighboring village since our 
sampled villages did not have any neighboring village in our sample. Therefore, such 
farmers were only matched with five farmers from within the respondent’s village. 
All social network variables used allow for the direction of the information flow. 
All variables are designed in a way that farmer i receives information from farmer j. The 
advantage of using directed social network data is that we can account for the fact that the 
exchange of information is not necessarily reciprocal, meaning that even if farmer i 
receives information from farmer j, this does not mean that j also provides information to 
farmer i. 
The first information network variable, which we refer to as “link within sample”, 
is based on the following social network questions which were asked in the following 
sequence; to start with, farmers were asked about their acquaintances with the matches, 
by asking the questions: 
 
“Do you know farmer x?” If yes, “How many times have you talked to him/her in 
the last month?” 
 
If the individual farmer (farmer i) talked to the match (farmer j) at least one time, then 
farmer j is said to belong to farmer i’s close social network that could act as a source of 
information. However, knowing and talking to a fellow farmer about general issues does 
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not necessarily mean that these farmers exchange market-related information. Therefore, 
to identify actual exchange of information about vegetable marketing, the following 
question was asked, only to farmers that know their matches: 
 
“Have you ever talked to farmer x about different marketing channels for 
vegetables?” 
 
If the farmers responded with a yes, then we classify this as an information link, that is, 
those individuals that farmers have chosen as a source of information on vegetable 
marketing. This “link within sample” variable is binary and used in our dyadic regression 
model to address the first research question. 
The second information network variable is referred to as “HVM link within 
sample” and we use it to address the second and third research question. This variable is 
based on the “link within sample” discussed before. However, since our interest in the 
second and third objective is finding out how information network affects participation in 
HVM, the information link farmers who previously participated in HVM would be the 
appropriate ones to provide information on aspects regarding participating in HVM, for 
example requirements and benefits of participation. Therefore, we define the “HVM link 
within sample” as a binary variable equal to one if out of the “link within sample” there 
was at least one farmer that supplied HVM in 2008, and zero otherwise. We use this 
variable as binary because majority of the respondents received information on marketing 
channels only from one HVM farmer. 
The need for a third information link variable “HVM link outside sample” is 
driven by the fact that our social network data is based on sampled networks. When using 
such a methodology, there is the risk of getting a large omitted variable bias in case the 
sampled network omits an important network pair (Maertens & Barrett, 2013). Therefore, 
we asked further questions to capture these links. Farmers were asked the following 
questions: 
 
“Do you know any other vegetable farmers who are supplying their 
vegetables to HVM ?” “If yes, how many?” 
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“Out of these farmers that you know who supply HVM, have you talked to 
any of them about marketing of vegetables?” “If yes, how many?” 
 
If the respondent talked to at least one other HVM farmer about vegetable marketing, 
then we reckon existence of information link. We also use this variable as binary, which 
is equal to one if the respondent talked to at least one other HVM farmer about vegetable 
marketing and zero otherwise. Additionally, we collected information on distances to 
these other farmers that the respondent knows. 
When we multiply the 331 farmers interviewed with the number of matches given 
to each farmer, we arrive at 1449 pairs of farmers (dyads) that we would consider in our 
dyadic analysis. However, descriptive analysis shows that not everyone knows everyone 
else within the sampled farmers. A total of 39% of the matches are not known to the 
respondents, implying that these matches do not have any social relation with the 
respondents. Yet, there needs to be existing social relations before an information link can 
be formed as farmers can only contact those farmers known to them. Therefore, we 
restrict our dyadic analysis to the subsample of 61% of the sample that know their match 
(884 dyads), as suggested in the literature (Santos & Barrett, 2010). 
 
2.4.3 Descriptive Results 
The descriptive statistics of the dyads show that the links through which vegetable 
farmers actively acquire marketing information comprise of a subset of their social 
network members. In total, 70% of the known matches are selected as sources of 
marketing information. HVM farmers have a higher percentage of information link 
farmers (74%) compared to TM farmers (67%), but this difference is not statistically 
significant. A further analysis of the dyads that know their matches show that 79% of the 
farmers know the buyer of their peer’s vegetables. 
Turning to the analysis at the household level, Table 2.1 shows the descriptive 
statistics of the interviewed households, differentiated by HVM and TM. The HVM 
farmers in our sample sell their vegetables in supermarkets and other institutions like 
schools and hotels. Even though these constitute only a part of the broad high value 
market channels, our analyses on the role of information networks to spread market 
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information can also be applied to other types of HVM, such as export market and other 
institutions. Therefore, the use of the term HVM is justified.  
The descriptive results show that on average, 23% of the sampled households 
supply their vegetables in HVM. HVM farmers are more connected; a higher percentage 
has information networks in their personal networks. In line with previous studies (e.g. 
Rao & Qaim, 2011 and Andersson et al., 2015), HVM farmers are more educated and 
they have higher physical capital and wealth endowment compared to TM farmers. 
The descriptive analyses only give an overview of what we expect in our further 
analysis. However, these results should not be over interpreted because we do not control 
for other factors. In the next section we undertake econometric analysis where other 
confounding factors are controlled for. 
 
Table 2.1.Descriptive statistics of sample households by marketing channel 
 
Full sample HVM TM 







HVM link within sample (dummy) 0.38 0.49 0.57*** 0.50 0.32 0.47 
HVM link outside sample (dummy) 0.40 0.49 0.73*** 0.45 0.30 0.46 
Trader is source of mkt info (dummy) 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.50 
Participation in NGO activities (dummy) 0.22 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.21 0.41 
Age of farmer (years) 50.29 13.28 50.00 12.92 50.37 13.41 
Education of farmers (years) 9.40 3.58 10.53** 3.17 9.06 3.63 
Male farmers (%) 0.66 0.47 0.79** 0.41 0.62 0.49 
Household size 3.52 1.78 3.86 1.83 3.41 1.76 
Off farm income (dummy) 0.49 0.50 0.66*** 0.48 0.44 0.50 
Farm size (acres)  2.09 2.79 2.95** 3.87 1.82 2.32 
Irrigation technology (dummy) 0.77 0.42 0.92*** 0.27 0.73 0.45 
Livestock ownership (dummy) 0.82 0.38 0.82 0.39 0.83 0.38 
Owns a vehicle (means of transport) 
(dummy) 0.13 0.34 0.25*** 0.43 0.10 0.30 
Access to credit (dummy) 0.11 0.32 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.33 
Electricity access (dummy) 0.74 0.44 0.91*** 0.29 0.69 0.47 
Distance to tarmac road (km)  2.01 2.59 1.44* 2.07 2.18 2.70 
Limuru region 0.25 0.43 0.06*** 0.25 0.31 0.46 
Kikuyu/Westlands/Dagorett region 0.46 0.50 0.66*** 0.48 0.40 0.49 
Githunguri/Lower Lari/Lari region 0.29 0.45 0.27 0.45 0.29 0.46 





 Notes: *, **, *** show statistical significance difference between HVM and TM at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; 
HVM, high-value channels; TM, traditional market; All variables are lagged to 2008 except for the two information 
link variables where we use 2012 values because these data were not collected in 2008 
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2.5 Results and Discussion 
 
 
2.5.1 Determinants of the Existence of Information Links 
To address our first research question, i.e., determinants of the existence of information 
links, we use dyadic probit model specified in equation (2.4). Table 2.2 presents the 
results of this estimation. Results of the social distance variables show that dyads of the 
same gender are more likely to exchange vegetable marketing information compared to 
dyads of different gender. This can be explained by higher costs of forming and 
maintaining a link when dyads are dissimilar. These results are in line with finding of 
previous studies (Conley & Udry, 2010). We also find that large vegetable farmers are 
less likely to exchange market information. This is plausible since the large farmers, who 
are mainly wealthy farmers, are often more informed about several agricultural aspects 
including marketing and therefore may be sharing similar ideologies, hence no need to 
source information from each other. 
Table 2.2.Determinants of the existence of information links: Dyadic regression 
results 
 Coefficients Clustered 
std error 
Both i & j are HVM farmers
a 0.624*** (0.209) 
Farmer i is HVM, j is TM
a 0.364** (0.170) 
Farmer i is TM, j is HVM
a 0.206 (0.151) 
Live in same village 0.420*** (0.123) 
Distance between farmer i&j (Km) -0.131* (0.069) 
Same gender 0.173* (0.103) 
Age in years (difference) -0.006 (0.004) 
Age in years (sum) 0.001 (0.003) 
Education in years (difference)  -0.012 (0.013) 
Education in years (sum) 0.001 (0.013) 
Veg. area in acres (sum) -0.073** (0.032) 
Veg. area in acres (difference) -0.037 (0.040) 
Same soil quality -0.004 (0.093) 
Both i& j are in the lower 2 income quintiles(poor) -0.045 (0.145) 
Both i& j are in the upper 2 income quintiles (rich) 0.160 (0.171) 
Farmer i is rich & farmer j is poor 0.139 (0.161) 
Traders are main source of veg.mkt info. (for one) -0.069 (0.090) 
Both in Kikuyu/Westlands/Dagoretti region -0.094 (0.135) 
Constant 0.114 (0.525) 
Number of observations 884  
Notes: ∗∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗p<0.1; HVM, high-value channels; TM, traditional market; Farmer i is the 
respondent and farmer j is the match; i is obtaining information from j; standard errors are clustered at farmers i’s 
and j’s level; 
a
base category is “Both i & j are TM farmers”; All variables are lagged to 2008 except for “same soil 
quality”, where we use 2012 values, because these data were not collected in 2008 
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Geographical distance matters as well. The likelihood of the existence of 
information link increases if farmers are living in the same village, and decreases if they 
are living far from each other. This affirms the importance of distance in network 
formation as it reduces the cost of forming a link. This is also in line with findings of past 
research e.g. Conley and Udry (2010) and Maertens and Barrett (2013). 
Farmers’ previous choice of supply channel also play a role in spreading market 
information. Farmers who previously supplied HVM are more likely to exchange 
vegetable market information among themselves compared to those who supplied TM. 
This is not unexpected. As discussed earlier, supplying HVM requires more information 
than supplying TM, and farmers who have previously supplied HVM would be in the best 
position to offer practical information on what works in that market.  Furthermore, HVM 
farmers are likely to have short social distance, hence lower cost of forming and 
maintaining a link. We also find that farmers who previously participated in HVM are 
likely to form a link with TM farmers. However, only HVM farmers are likely to obtain 
vegetable marketing information from TM farmers, but we do not find evidence of the 
reverse. This can be explained by the fact that HVM farmers might be dissatisfied with 
some aspects of supplying HVM and therefore may seek information regarding TM. 
During the survey, HVM farmers, especially those supplying in supermarkets, expressed 
dissatisfaction regarding rejection of produce by supermarkets. This may be one of the 
factors that would drive them to seek information regarding supplying TM.  
 
2.5.2 Effects of HVM Information Links on Farmer Participation 
To address our second research question, i.e., to find out the effect of having information 
links with farmers that previously supplied HVM on farmer’s own probability of 
participation, we use probit model presented in equation (2.5), and Table 2.3 presents 
results from the estimation. The marginal effect of the first information link variable, 
(HVM link within sample), is positive and significantly correlated with participation in 
HVM as expected (Table 2.3). Having an information link with at least one farmer who 
previously supplied HVM increases farmer’s own probability of participation in HVM by 
10 percentage points. The second information link variable, (HVM link outside sample) 
also has a positive and significant effect on participation. Having an information link with 
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at least one previous HVM farmer outside our sample increases farmer’s probability of 
participation in HVM by 19 percentage points.  
Other factors that significantly influence participation in emerging HVM are 
farmer characteristics such as gender and years of education, being in off-farm 
employment, infrastructure related factors such as access to electricity and short distance 
to tarmac road. These results are in line with findings of previous studies (Hernández et 
al., 2007; Rao & Qaim, 2011; Andersson et al., 2015). Conversely, coming from Limuru 
region is negatively correlated with participation in HVM. This could be explained by 
two factors: two wholesale markets operate within Limuru area. Therefore, farmers in this 
area have an advantage over other farmers in other regions in terms of TM choices. In 
addition, there was an NGO that was linking farmers to supermarkets in 2008, and this 
NGO worked less with farmers in Limuru area compared to other regions. 
Table 2.3.Effects of HVM information links on probability of supplying HVM: 
Probit model results 
 Marginal effects Robust std. 
errors 
HVM link within sample 0.096** 0.039 
HVM link outside sample 0.190*** 0.039 
Trader as source of information  0.024 0.038 
Complain of vegetable rejection  -0.010 0.042 
Participation in NGO activities  0.005 0.053 
Male farmer  0.081* 0.045 
Farmer education  0.013** 0.006 
Age of farmer  -0.001 0.012 
Age of farmer squared  0.000 0.000 
Household size  0.005 0.012 
Off farm income  0.069* 0.040 
Electricity access  0.157*** 0.061 
Farm size (acres) 0.014 0.009 
Livestock ownership  -0.019 0.052 
Irrigation technology  0.064 0.064 
Own means of transport  0.068 0.063 
Access to credit  -0.106* 0.061 
Distance to the tarmac road  -0.030*** 0.009 
Limuru region -0.155* 0.091 
Kikuyu/westlands/dagoretti region 0.047 0.070 
Number of observations 331  
Chi







p< 0.01; HVM, high-value market; All variables are lagged to 2008 except for 
the two information link variables, where we use 2012 data, because these data were not collected in 2008 
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2.5.3 Effects of Information Network on Participation Dynamics 
To address our third objective, i.e., the effect of having information links with other 
farmers that previously supplied HVM on farmers’ own participation dynamics; we 
undertake further analysis using multinomial logit models. Results are presented in Table 
2.4. Having information links with HVM farmers increases farmer’s own probability of 
participation in HVM. Both information link variables (“HVM link within sample” and 
“HVM link outside sample”) have a positive effect on farmers being in HVM stayers 
category (as opposed to being in any other category). HVM information links increase the 
probability of farmers staying in HVM by 5 to 10 percentage points but decreases the 
probability of staying in TM (TM stayers) by 9 to 16 percentage points. Also, having 
information links with HVM farmers increases farmers’ own probability of joining HVM 
by 5 percentage points (for HVM link outside sample). 
 










HVM link within sample 0.045**(0.021) 0.035(0.026) 0.008(0.023) -0.088**(0.041) 
HVM link outside sample 0.097***(0.030) 0.053*  (0.028) 0.014  (0.026) -0.164***(0.045) 
Trader as source of information 0.015(0.019) 0.002  (0.024) 0.030  (0.022) -0.047(0.040) 
Complain of veg. rejection  0.010(0.019) -0.019  (0.030) 0.001  (0.029) 0.008(0.046) 
Participation in NGO activities 0.067**(0.033) -0.067  (0.046) 0.131***(0.043) -0.131*(0.069) 
Male farmer  0.030(0.024) 0.039  (0.031) -0.011  (0.025) -0.058(0.048) 
Farmer education  0.007**(0.004) 0.003  (0.004) 0.003  (0.003) -0.013*(0.007) 
Age of farmer  0.003(0.005) -0.002(0.008) 0.005(0.006) -0.007(0.013) 
Age of farmer squared  -0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) -0.000  (0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Household size -0.005  (0.006) 0.007(0.008) -0.012*(0.007) 0.011(0.014) 
Off farm income 0.053***(0.019) 0.009(0.025) 0.023(0.025) -0.084**(0.041) 
Electricity access 0.053(0.037) 0.068* (0.035) -0.017(0.025) -0.104*(0.058) 
Farm size  0.005(0.004) 0.007  (0.006) 0.004  (0.004) -0.015(0.010) 
Livestock ownership -0.032(0.025) 0.015(0.036) -0.060*(0.036) 0.076(0.062) 
Irrigation technology  0.015(0.038) 0.031(0.040) -0.013(0.029) -0.032(0.066) 
Own means of transport  0.032   (0.037) 0.020  (0.042) 0.039  (0.031) -0.090(0.071) 
Access to credit  -0.059  (0.037) 0.007(0.035) 0.038  (0.028) 0.015(0.060) 
Distance to the tarmac road  -0.010**(0.004) -0.018***(0.006) 0.002  (0.003) 0.025***(0.008)
 
Limuru region -0.059(0.051) -0.067(0.049) -0.059 (0.058) 0.185*(0.095) 
Kikuyu/Westlands/Dagoretti 
region 
0.041(0.035) -0.003  (0.040) 0.006  (0.035) -0.045(0.071) 
Number of observations    331 
Chi







p< 0.01; HVM, high-value market; TM, traditional market; Marginal effects (at the mean) are 
reported with robust standard errors in parentheses; All variables are lagged to 2008 except for the two information link 
variables, where we use 2012 data, because these data were not collected in 2008 
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We further find that infrastructure, human, and physical capital variables are 
important determinants of farmers’ participation dynamics. Farmers with more education, 
off-farm employment, living near tarmac road, and those with institutional support 
linking them to markets are likely to be in HVM stayers category as opposed to being in 
any other category. On the other hand, those without institutional support, with lower 
education level, no off-farm employment, and poor infrastructure (electricity and tarmac 
road) are likely to be in TM stayers category. Infrastructure (electricity access and 
distance to tarmac road) turns out as important determinant of farmers being in HVM 
newcomers category. Probability of being in HVM dropout category decreases with 
livestock ownership (proxy for wealth) and household size (proxy for labor), but 
increases with participation in NGO market linkage program activities. These findings are 
in line with results of a recent study analyzing determinants of participation dynamics 
(Andersson et al., 2015). 
 
2.5.4 Robustness Tests 
In this sub-section, we carry out additional analyses to test the robustness of our results. 
To start with, we undertake further analysis to find out whether matching farmers with 
different number of matches could bias our results. As discussed in section 2.4, not all 
farmers were matched with seven matches. Descriptive statistics on number of matches 
randomly allocated to each farmer show that 79% of the farmers were matched with five 
to seven farmers, whereas 21% were matched with less than five farmers. As a robustness 
check, we dropped all individual farmers matched with less than five matches (21%) and 
undertook analysis on the remaining sample of 700 dyads. Results of the reduced sample 
are very similar to those of the full sample. The two information link variables that had a 
positive and significant effect in the full sample also have a positive and significant effect 
in the reduced sample. The first information link variable “Both i& j are HVM farmers” 
has a coefficient of 0.55 whereas “Farmer i is HVM, j is TM” has a coefficient of 0.43. 
The magnitudes of both coefficients are very close to those from full sample (Table 2.2).  
In the second robustness test, we are interested in finding out whether there are 
farmers who were only matched with TM-supplying farmers and not a single HVM-
supplying farmer. If there are, this could have an influence on whether such households 
could have HVM information links or not. But could this be driving our results on effect 
of HVM information links on farmer’s own participation? Indeed we find 95 households 
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were not matched with any HVM-supplying farmer. As robustness test, we dropped these 
households and undertook our analysis with the reduced sample. Results of the probit 
model are shown in Table 2.5. Both information link variables have a positive and 
significant effect on participation in HVM. The magnitude of the marginal effects are also 
very close to those from the full sample (Table 2.3). 
Table 2.5.Effect of HVM information links on probability of supplying HVM: Probit 





HVM link within sample 0.118*** (0.041) 
HVM link outside sample 0.183*** (0.043) 
Trader as source of information  0.018 (0.038) 
Complain of vegetable rejection  0.040 (0.040) 
Participation in NGO activities  0.054 (0.051) 
Male farmer  0.095** (0.047) 
Farmer education  0.014** (0.007) 
Age of farmer  0.014 (0.011) 
Age of farmer squared  -0.000 (0.000) 
Household size  0.000 (0.012) 
Off farm income  0.096** (0.041) 
Electricity access  0.151*** (0.056) 
Farm size (acres) 0.015* (0.008) 
Livestock ownership  -0.035 (0.055) 
Irrigation technology  0.026 (0.066) 
Own means of transport  -0.014 (0.060) 
Access to credit  -0.119** (0.057) 
Distance to the tarmac road  -0.034*** (0.009) 
Limuru region -0.145* (0.088) 
Kikuyu/westlands/dagoretti region 0.051 (0.063) 
Number of observations 236  
Chi







p< 0.01; HVM, high-value market;  Households that were not matched with 
any HVM-supplying households are excluded in this analysis; All variables are lagged to 2008 except for 
the two information link variables, where we use 2012 data, because these data were not collected in 2008 
 
Finally, we seek to find out whether the information link variables could be 
endogenous hence biasing the probit model results on effects of HVM information links 
on farmer’s own participation. One can think of various possible ways in which the 
information link variables could be potentially endogenous. Social interactions are 
symmetrical such that farmer i’s behavior affects the behavior of the network member, 
and vice versa. Moreover, a farmer could get to know a network member because they 
share similar characteristics or they supply in the same supply channel and therefore self-
select into a specific social network group. Finally, unobserved attributes such as similar 
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preferences and environment related factors affecting both the decision maker being 
modeled as well as the behavior of farmers in his/her network could also lead to biased 
estimates. In our probit model analysis, we have included various variables including soil 
characteristics, to control for such confounding factors. Nevertheless, we undertake 
further analysis to check for endogeneity of the information link variables as robustness 
check of our results. 
We employ instrumental variable (IV) approach to address both observed and 
unobserved bias. The challenge of using IV approach is in finding valid instruments. 
Instruments need to be exogenous, correlated with the endogenous variable, and 
uncorrelated with the outcome variable, i.e., the supply channel. We use various 
instruments that we believe to be valid as explained below. 
As instrument for the first information link variable “HVM link within sample” 
we use gender (male dummy) and average age (years) of the information network 
members. Characteristics of neighbors have recently been used as instrument for social 
capital (Andersson et al., 2015). In this recent article, the authors give an extensive 
discussion on why neighbor characteristics are not likely to affect farmers’ choice of 
supply channel directly, but indirectly through neighbors. Previous research show that 
farmer characteristics influence own choice of supply channel (Neven et al., 2009).  
However, social network research show that characteristics of neighbors are not likely to 
affect farmer’s own participation decision (Matuschke and Qaim, 2009; Santos and 
Barrett, 2010). Therefore, we expect that characteristics of information networks are only 
likely to have an indirect effect on farmers’ participation decision through information 
networks.  
For the second information link variable “HVM link outside sample”, we use 
average distance to other HVM-supplying farmers that the respondent has information 
link with outside our sample, as the instrument. As shown in the social network literature, 
distance is a key determinant in existence of an information link (Conley & Udry, 2010; 
Maertens & Barrett, 2013). A social network link is more likely between farmers located 
near each other, since the cost of social interaction would be lower than when farmers are 
located far apart. At the same time, distance between information network members is not 
likely to have a direct effect on their choice of supply channel. 
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All our instruments are statistically significant in the first stage regression 
implying that they are important in explaining the specific information link variables. The 
test of over identifying restrictions fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments 
are uncorrelated with the error term (p-value=0.152). Furthermore, the Wald test of 
exogeneity fails to reject the null hypothesis that the two information variables are 
exogenous (p-value=0.153). Therefore, we conclude that the two information link 
variables are exogenous 
 
2.6 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
In this study, we have combined the literature on social networks and emerging high-
value supply chains to elicit the importance of information networks when choosing 
agricultural output markets. Precisely, we focus on informal farmer interactions to 
exchange information, what we call ‘information links’. In our definition, an information 
link exists if farmers exchange information on possible vegetable marketing options. In 
this paper, we have analyzed three aspects. First, the determinants of the existence of 
information links between farmers using dyadic probit models. Second, we have assessed 
the effects of having information links with other farmers that previously supplied HVM 
on farmers’ own probability of participation in HVM using probit models. Finally, using 
multinomial logit models, we have assessed the effects of having information links with 
other farmers that previously supplied HVM on farmers’ own participation dynamics 
including joining, dropping, or supplying HVM over a two time period: 2008 and 2012.  
Analysis of social effects is usually beset by econometric challenges like selection 
bias, simultaneity and correlated unobservable variables. In our analysis, we attempted to 
tackle these challenges in various ways such as including several variables that would 
capture unobserved characteristics and lagging some variables that we had past data on to 
avoid simultaneity. We also undertook various robustness checks including using 
instruments. 
 Our results show that HVM farmers are obtaining vegetable marketing 
information from fellow HVM farmers and also from TM farmers. We however, do not 
find evidence that TM farmers are obtaining marketing information from HVM farmers. 
Further, we find that having information links with other farmers that previously supplied 
HVM increase probability of farmers’ own participation in HVM by 10 to 19 percentage 
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points. Results of the multinomial logit model show that access to market information is 
likely to enhance farmers’ participation in HVM overtime, and decrease the probability of 
supplying TM overtime. This is plausible because farmers would be interested to 
participate in the most lucrative channel. 
Our results have important policy implications for dissemination of market 
information. To start with, it is important that market information is disseminated to 
farmers so that they can make informed market choice decisions. Informal information 
systems like social network would be a pathway to disseminate such information: our 
findings show that these networks have an effect on farmers’ decision making on choice 
of marketing channel. The findings that there is flow of market information among HVM 
farmers and that HVM obtain market information from TM farmers and not the vice 
versa, has important implications. Given that HVM-supplying households are mostly the 
more wealthy ones and those with larger farms, further development of the HVM is likely 
to aggravate the inequality between small and large farmers through differential access to 
information. Therefore, governments need to put in place other mechanisms to support 
the informal information networks in spreading market information. For example, the 
agricultural extension officers can disseminate market information through small groups 
at the village level, while ensuring inclusive engagement of all farmers (those supplying 
HVM and TM) in such groups.  
The findings that information networks increase the probability of participation in 
HVM, and that of staying in HVM imply that participation in HVM is likely to increase 
as farmers attain information about these markets. Therefore, it is vital to avail market 
information to farmers to increase participation. Furthermore, increased participation in 
HVM is likely to results in positive welfare effects in terms of household income, 
household nutrition, productivity, and employment creation as shown in past research, 
and this is likely to have an effect on overall economic development. 
Our results should be taken as an analytic evidence for the important role played 
by information networks in choice of supply channel. Even though our study is tailored to 
the specific context of smallholder vegetable farmers in rural Kenya, the findings have 
broader applicability to other areas of developing countries experiencing rapid growth of 
supermarkets and other emerging high-value markets, while at the same time facing 
challenges of accessing market information. This study being the first to use informal 
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social networks data in the context of modern supply chains makes a great contribution 
both in the social network and HVM literature. However, more research in this direction 
is needed. This would for instance be a study using complete panel data on social 
networks and combining social network with behavioral field experiments to capture 
unobserved endogeneity.  
 
 




3 Impacts of Supermarkets on Farm Household Nutrition in Kenya4 
 
Abstract. Many developing countries experience a food system transformation with a 
rapid growth of supermarkets. We analyze impacts of supermarkets on farm household 
nutrition with survey data from Kenya. Participation in supermarket channels is 
associated with significantly higher calorie, vitamin A, iron, and zinc consumption. We 
use simultaneous equation models to analyze impact pathways. Supermarket-supplying 
households have higher incomes, a higher share of land under vegetables, and a higher 
likelihood of male control of revenues. Furthermore, income and the share of land under 
vegetables have positive impacts, while male control of revenues has negative impacts on 
dietary quality. Policy and further research implications are discussed. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the recent past, many developing countries have experienced a profound food system 
transformation with a rapid growth of supermarkets (Timmer, 2009; Neven et al., 2009; 
Minten et al., 2010; Reardon et al., 2012). This supermarket growth can be attributed to 
both demand and supply side factors (Reardon et al., 2009; Mergenthaler et al., 2009; 
Lakatos & Fukui, 2014). On the demand side, rising incomes, urbanization, and changing 
lifestyles contribute to preference shifts towards higher-value foods, including processed 
and convenience products, which modern retailers are better equipped to provide than 
traditional markets (Rischke et al. 2015). On the supply side, the supermarket growth was 
facilitated by policy changes such as market liberalization in the food industry and greater 
openness for foreign direct investment. This retail revolution has also caused structural 
changes along the supply chains. Supermarkets try to offer their customers a consistent 
variety of high-quality products. To ensure continuous supply, supermarkets have 
established their own procurement systems, involving centralized buying points and 
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contractual arrangements with farmers and traders (Reardon & Berdegué, 2002; Reardon 
et al., 2009; Rao et al., 2012). 
Several studies have analyzed impacts of farmer participation in these new 
supermarket channels on farm productivity (Hernándezet al., 2007; Nevenet al., 2009; 
Rao et al., 2012), sales prices (Michelson et al., 2012), household income (Miyata et al., 
2009; Rao & Qaim, 2011; Michelson, 2013; Andersson et al., 2015), and labor markets 
(Neven et al., 2009; Rao & Qaim, 2013). Most of these studies conclude that 
supermarkets can contribute to rural economic growth and a modernization of the small 
farm sector. Strikingly, however, there is no research that has analyzed possible impacts 
of supermarkets on farm household nutrition (Gomez & Ricketts, 2014; Popkin, 2014). 
While recent research has examined how supermarkets may influence dietary habits and 
nutrition of urban consumers (Neven et al., 2006; Pingali, 2007; Asfaw, 2008; Tessieret 
al., 2008; Rischke et al., 2015; Kimenju et al., 2015), a focus on farm household nutrition 
is important, too. Smallholder farmers make up a large proportion of the undernourished 
people worldwide. 
In this article, we address this research gap and analyze the impacts of 
supermarkets on farm household nutrition, using detailed survey data specifically 
collected for this purpose. We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we add a new 
perspective to the existing body of literature on supermarket impacts. Second, we 
contribute conceptually to the analysis of agriculture-nutrition linkages. Given the 
persistently high rates of rural undernutrition, the international community has shown a 
renewed interest in better understanding the nutrition and health impacts of agricultural 
innovations (Dube et al., 2012; Smith & Haddad, 2015). Yet, very few studies have 
evaluated such impacts; identifying suitable methodologies has proven a challenge (de 
Haen et al., 2011; Masset et al., 2012; Kabunga et al., 2014). 
Our study focuses on smallholder farmers in Kenya. Kenya is an interesting 
example because supermarkets have rapidly gained in importance there in recent years. 
Supermarkets in Kenya now account for about 10% of national grocery sales, and over 
20% of food retailing in major cities (Planet Retail, 2015). Whereas this share in Kenya is 
still lower than in middle-income countries in Asia and Latin America, it is already higher 
than in most other countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Based on detailed food consumption 
data, we compare nutritional indicators between farm households with and without 
supermarket contracts. In addition to calorie intakes, we analyze levels of micronutrient 




consumption as indicators of nutritional quality. Possible issues of selection bias are 
addressed with an instrumental variable approach. We also analyze impact pathways. 
Participation in supermarket channels may affect household nutrition through increasing 
cash incomes. Moreover, supermarket contracts may influence the farmers’ choice of 
commodities produced, and thus the types of foods available in the household from own 
production. Finally, there may be changes in gender roles within the farm family that 
could also affect household nutrition (Sraboni et al., 2014; Imai et al., 2014). Earlier 
research showed that commercialization of agriculture is often associated with men taking 
over control of resources that were previously controlled by women (von Braun & 
Kennedy, 1994). We develop and estimate simultaneous equation models to analyze such 
impact pathways. 
 
3.2 Farm Household Survey 
In 2012, we carried out a survey of smallholder vegetable farmers in Kiambu District, 
Central Province of Kenya (after the constitutional change in Kenya this is now Kiambu 
County). Kiambu is relatively close to Nairobi and is the capital’s main source of 
horticultural produce (Rao & Qaim, 2011). Some of the farmers in this region produce 
vegetables for supermarkets, while others sell their vegetables in traditional channels. The 
two biggest supermarket chains sourcing vegetables from Kiambu are Nakumatt and 
Uchumi, which are both Kenyan owned. Foreign owned retail chains so far play a much 
smaller role in Kenya (Planet Retail, 2015). 
Based on information from the district agricultural office, four of the main 
vegetable-producing divisions were chosen. In these four divisions, 31 administrative 
locations were purposively selected, again using statistical information on vegetable 
production. Within the locations, vegetable farmers were sampled randomly. In total, our 
data set comprises observations from 384 farm households – 85 that participated in 
supermarket channels and 299 that sold only in traditional channels. These households 
were visited, and household heads were interviewed face-to-face, using a structured 
questionnaire that was carefully designed and pretested. The data collected include 
general household characteristics, details on vegetable production and marketing, other 
farm and non-farm economic activities, food and non-food consumption (see below for 
details), and various institutional variables. 




Sample households are typical smallholder farmers with an average farm size of 
about 2 acres (0.8 hectares). These households produce vegetables that are exotic to 
Kenya, such as kale, spinach, and cabbage, as well as Kenyan indigenous vegetables like 
black night-shade and amaranth. In addition, sample households are engaged in other 
agricultural activities such as the production of staple and cash crops like maize, beans, 
tea, and coffee. Many are also involved in small-scale livestock farming. Table 3.1 shows 
sample descriptive statistics for a number of socioeconomic variables that are used as 
controls in the regression analysis below. In addition to the household head, we captured 
some information about gender relations within the household. Eighty-nine percent of the 
sample households are headed by males. Household heads have 9.6 years of formal 
schooling on average. In contrast, the main female in the household, who in most cases is 
the spouse of the household head, has a formal education of only about one year. 
 
Table 3.1.Summary statistics of farm and household variables by marketing channel 












Farm land owned (acres) 2.06 2.9 2.82** 3.7 1.84 2.6 
Share of area grown with vegetable 
(%) 
53.24 29.0 60.35* 30.0 51.22 28.4 
Annual household income (1000 Ksh) 471.69 737.8 938.48*** 1160.4 338.99 490.2 
Household assets (100,000 Ksh) 2.32 5.7 4.16*** 8.6 1.79 4.5 
Off-farm income (dummy) 0.70 0.5 0.82** 0.4 0.66 0.5 
Annual off-farm income (1000 Ksh) 148.43 301.7 291.94*** 508.2 107.64 191.4 
Distance to market (km) 3.05 3.6 2.78 1.9 3.13 3.9 
Credit access (dummy) 0.17 0.4 0.22 0.4 0.16 0.4 
SM farmers among 5 nearest 
neighbors (number) 
0.97 1.4 2.27*** 1.7 0.60 1.0 
Male household head(dummy) 0.89 0.3 0.95* 0.2 0.87 0.3 
Age of household head(years) 51.75 13.5 51.12 12.8 51.93 13.8 
Education of household head (years) 9.59 3.7 10.55** 3.3 9.31 3.8 
Education of main female (years) 0.97 3.0 0.25* 1.4 1.18 3.3 
Male control over vegetable revenue 
(dummy) 
0.73 0.5 0.85** 0.4 0.69 0.5 
Number of observations 384  85  299  
Notes: Ksh, Kenyan shillings; SM, supermarket. The official exchange rate in 2012 was 1 US dollar = 85 
Ksh. 
 
Table 3.1 also reveals that there are significant differences between supermarket 
and traditional channel farmers with respect to several socioeconomic variables. This is 
because farmers self-select into the group of supermarket suppliers according to their 
conditions and preferences, which needs to be accounted for in the impact analysis. 




Supermarket farmers tend to be wealthier and more educated than farmers in traditional 
channels. Following Fischer & Qaim (2012a), survey respondents were also asked which 
household member controls vegetable production and revenue. To ensure collection of 
reliable information, enumerators were trained to ask these questions and confirm the 
responses from various perspectives. As can be seen in Table 3.1, males control the 
revenues from vegetable production in 85% of the supermarket-supplying households. In 
traditional channel households, this number is significantly lower with 69%. 
Supermarket and traditional channels also differ considerably with respect to 
marketing conditions. Traditional channel farmers have no advance agreements with the 
buyers of their vegetables. They either sell to traders at the farm gate or in traditional 
wholesale markets without any promise of repeated transactions. There is no market 
assurance in traditional vegetable channels, and prices tend to be volatile. In contrast, 
supermarket farmers have agreements, either with the supermarkets directly or with 
specialized agents. These agreements are mostly verbal in nature; they specify vegetable 
quantities, quality, and form of supply. Prices in supermarket channels are stable and 
higher than in traditional channels. For actual delivery, supermarket farmers are contacted 
via mobile phone a few days in advance and asked to deliver a certain lot at a particular 
time. Farmers have to transport their produce themselves to the supermarkets in Nairobi. 
Vegetables have to be cleaned and bundled before delivery, ready for the supermarket 
shelves. Payments are usually made with a delay of one or two weeks. Hence, while 
supplying supermarkets is attractive in terms of price incentives, farmers with high 
opportunity costs of time and limited access to transportation and credit are less likely to 
participate. These observations are consistent with earlier research in Kenya (Neven et al., 
2009; Rao & Qaim, 2011; Andersson et al., 2015). 
The 299 traditional channel farmers in our sample sell their vegetables only in 
traditional channels. The 85 supermarket farmers sell most of their vegetables to 
supermarkets. Only if the quantities produced exceed the contractual agreement, 
supermarket farmers sell these excess quantities in traditional channels. A few households 
in our sample sold their vegetables under contract to hotels or schools. As the contracts 
with hotels and schools are similar to the agreements with supermarkets, these few 
households are classified as supermarket farmers for the purpose of this analysis. 
 




3.3 Indicators of Household Nutrition 
 
3.3.1 Measurement Approach 
The main objective of this study is to analyze the impacts of supermarket participation on 
household nutrition. This requires identification of suitable nutrition indicators that can be 
used as outcome variables. Various possible indicators exist (de Haen et al., 2011). 
Recent studies have used data on food expenditure or households’ subjective food 
security assessment in evaluating impacts of new agricultural technologies (Shiferaw et 
el., 2014; Kabunga et al., 2014). Other studies have used data on child anthropometrics 
(Masset et al., 2012). While these approaches are useful to capture certain dimensions of 
food insecurity and undernutrition, they are not suitable to analyze impacts in terms of 
household nutrition behavior and dietary quality. In order to examine such aspects, we 
collected detailed information on household food consumption. 
We included a 7-day food consumption recall in the survey. To ensure accurate 
information, this part of the interview was carried out with the person in the household 
responsible for food choices and preparation. This person was mostly a female household 
member who often responded together with the household head. Details on food 
quantities consumed from own production, purchases, transfers, and gifts were collected 
for over 180 food items. These data were used to calculate daily calorie consumption in 
each household as well as consumption levels of certain micronutrients (The term 
“consumption” refers to everything that enters the household. Sometimes, this is also 
referred to as “availability”, which may differ from actual intake levels, as is explained 
below). We concentrate on vitamin A, iron, and zinc, because deficiencies in these 
micronutrients are widespread and constitute serious public health problems in many 
developing countries (Black et al., 2008; Stein et al., 2008). 
To calculate calorie and micronutrient consumption levels, reported food 
quantities were corrected for non-edible portions. Edible portions were converted to 
calorie and nutrient levels using food composition tables for Kenyan foods (FAO, 2010; 
Sehmi, 1993). In a few cases where individual food items could not be found, other 
international food composition tables were consulted (FAO, 2012; USDA, 2005). To 
make values comparable across households, we divided by the number of adult 
equivalents (AE), taking into account household size, demographic structure, and levels 
of physical activity. One AE is equal to a moderately active adult male. In these 




calculations, it is assumed that food within the household is distributed according to 
individual calorie and nutrient requirements (IOM, 2000; FAO, WHO, UNU, 2001). 
For micronutrients, losses during cooking had to be accounted for (Bognár, 2002). 
Furthermore, issues of bioavailability need to be considered. Bioavailability of iron and 
zinc in particular depends on the composition of meals, as body absorption is influenced 
by enhancing and inhibiting factors (IZiNCG, 2004; WHO & FAO, 2004). Since we do 
not have information on the exact composition of meals, we had to make assumptions 
based on the literature and knowledge about local food habits in the study region. For 
iron, WHO & FAO (2004) provide a bioavailability range of 5-15%; we assume low iron 
bioavailability of 5%. For zinc, IZiNCG (2004) differentiates between mixed/refined 
vegetarian diets and unrefined, cereal-based diets. We assume unrefined, cereal-based 
diets and low zinc bioavailability of 15%. This is consistent with assumptions made by 
WHO & FAO (2004) for Kenya. 
To determine calorie and micronutrient deficiency, we compare amounts 
consumed with standard levels of requirements. For calories, a daily intake of 3000 kcal 
is recommended for a moderately active male adult (FAO, WHO, &UNU, 2001). 
Moreover, it is recommended that a safe minimum daily intake should not fall below 80% 
of the calorie requirement. Based on this, we use a minimum intake of 2400 kcal per AE 
and categorize households below this threshold as undernourished. Following WHO & 
FAO (2004), we use daily estimated average requirements (EAR) per AE of 625 μg of 
retinol equivalent (RE) for vitamin A, 18.3 mg for iron, and 15.0 mg for zinc. Households 
with consumption levels below these thresholds are categorized as deficient. 
While our approach of using household food consumption data to measure 
nutrition is useful to assess possible impacts on food security and dietary quality, it also 
has a few limitations (de Haen et al., 2011; Fiedler et al., 2012). First, by using a single 7-
day recall we cannot account for seasonal variation in food consumption. Second, we are 
not able to account for intra-household food distribution. Third, the 7-day recall data 
measure consumption levels, which are only a crude proxy of actual food and nutrient 
intakes. Food wasted in the household or portions given to guests or fed to pets cannot 
always be fully accounted for, which may result in overestimated intake levels. 
Furthermore, as explained above, issues of bioavailability have to be approximated. 
While these limitations have to be kept in mind, we do not expect a systematic bias in our 




impact assessment, because the same issues hold for both supermarket and traditional 
channel farmers 
. 
3.3.2 Nutrition Indicators by Marketing Channel 
Table 3.2 shows the calculated nutrition indicators for the sample of households. On 
average, households consume 3258 kcal, 1374 μg of vitamin A, 17 mg of iron, and 21 mg 
of zinc per day and adult equivalent (AE). The standard deviations in the sample are 
relatively high. About 21% of all households are undernourished. For vitamin A and zinc, 
the prevalence of deficiency is in a similar magnitude; the prevalence of iron deficiency is 
much higher with an estimated 64%. 
 
Table 3.2.Nutrition indicators by marketing channel 






Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Calorie consumption (kcal/day/AE) 3258 1081.9 3348 1206.2 3232 1044.7 
Prevalence of undernourishment (%) 21 40.7 19 39.3 21 41.1 
Vitamin A consumption (μg RE/day/AE) 1375 926.3 1449 825.5 1354 953.3 
Prevalence of vitamin A deficiency (%) 16 37.1 14 35.0 17 37.7 
Iron consumption (mg/day/AE) 17 7.2 17 7.4 16 7.1 
Prevalence of iron deficiency (%) 64 48.0 62 48.7 65 47.8 
Zinc consumption (mg/day/AE) 21 7.8 22 8.7 21 7.5 
Prevalence of zinc deficiency (%) 24 42.9 24 42.7 24 43.0 
Number of observations 384  85  299  
Notes: AE, adult equivalent; RE, retinol equivalent. A household is categorized as undernourished when calorie 
consumption is below 2400 kcal per AE and day. Micronutrient deficiencies are categorized as daily consumption levels 
below625μg of RE for vitamin A, 18.27mg for iron, and 15 mg for zinc. These deficiency thresholds are further 
discussed in the text. 
  
The comparison between the two groups of farmers shows that supermarket 
suppliers have slightly higher levels of calorie and micronutrient consumption than 
traditional channel suppliers. Likewise, the prevalence of deficiency is somewhat lower 
among supermarket farmers for all indicators. However, these differences are small and 
not statistically significant. It is important to note that these differences should not be 
interpreted as impacts of supermarket participation or lack thereof. As was shown in 
Table 3.1, the two groups differ not only in terms of marketing channel but also in terms 
of several other socioeconomic characteristics. Unlike a controlled experiment with 




random assignment of the treatment, we use observational data where farmers self-
selected into marketing channels and therefore differ systematically in terms of observed 
and unobserved factors. Not controlling for these factors might lead to a serious bias in 
impact assessment. In the next section, we explain the approach that we use to identify 
unbiased treatment effects of supermarket participation on nutrition. 
 
3.4 Supermarket Impacts on Household Nutrition 
We are interested to estimate the impact of supermarket channel participation on 
household nutrition. This is not straightforward, however. The comparison of 
supermarket and traditional channel suppliers in the previous section revealed systematic 
socioeconomic heterogeneity, so that observed differences in the nutrition outcome 
indicators between the two groups cannot be interpreted as impacts of supermarket 
participation. Such simple comparison would be possible when using experimental data 
with random assignment of the treatment, but not with observational data where 
households have self-selected into treatment. We explain our strategy to avoid self-
selection bias in the following. 
 
3.4.1 Regression Framework 
To analyze the impacts of supermarket participation on farm household nutrition, we 
regress the nutrition indicators discussed in the previous section on supermarket 
participation as treatment variable and a set of control variables as follows: 
 
 𝑁 = α0 + 𝛼1 𝑆𝑀 + α2 𝑋1 + ε1 (3.1) 
 
where N is the nutrition indicator of interest, SM is a dummy for supermarket 
participation, X1 is a vector of control variables that are expected to influence household 
nutrition, and ε1is a random error terms. 𝛼1 represents the treatment effect. We estimate 
separate models for calorie, vitamin A, iron, and zinc consumption. Given that previous 
research showed that supermarket participation has a positive effect on household 
income, we expect positive treatment effects. 
Control variables used as part of the vector X1 include education, gender, and age 
of the household head, as well as education of the main female in the household. We also 
control for household size, land area owned, and the value of non-land assets (e.g., 




machinery and irrigation equipment). To avoid possible issues of reverse causality, we 
use lagged asset values referring to the situation before households had started to supply 
supermarkets. Possible issues of endogeneity are also the reason why we do not include 
current household income. In terms of contextual variables, we control for access to road 
and transport infrastructure, piped water, and distance to the nearest local food market. 
 
3.4.2 Instrumental Variable Approach 
Household nutrition is influenced by a number of factors, not all of which we are able to 
observe. This is unproblematic for the impact assessment, as long as these unobserved 
factors are not correlated with the treatment variable. However, if such correlation exists 
the estimated treatment effect from equation (3.1) will be biased. Due to self-selection 
and significant correlation between the treatment variable and observed socioeconomic 
factors, it is in fact likely that unobserved heterogeneity is an issue, if not controlled for. 
For instance, it is possible that the farmers’ entrepreneurial skills jointly affect 
supermarket participation and household nutrition, but we are not able to observe 
entrepreneurial skills. We use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to control for self-
selection bias. IV approaches are common techniques in the economics literature to 
reduce self-selection problems and other endogeneity issues in impact assessment 
(Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009; Deaton, 2010; Winters et al., 2011). The underlying idea is 
to use an instrument in a first-stage regression to obtain predictions of the treatment 
variable. These predictions are then used instead of the treatment variable itself in the 
second stage outcome regression to avoid correlation with the error term. 
The challenging part is to find a valid instrument. A valid instrument has to be 
exogenous, correlated with supermarket participation, but not correlated with the nutrition 
outcome indicators, except for the indirect effect through supermarket participation 
(Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009; Kabunga et al., 2014). In that sense, variables such as 
farmers’ education or asset ownership would not qualify as instruments: while human and 
physical capital endowments are expected to influence supermarket participation, these 
variables are also likely to affect household nutrition through other channels. Education 
may influence nutrition awareness; asset ownership may influence income and thus 
economic access to food in various ways. We identified “the number of supermarket 
farmers among the five nearest neighbors” as a valid instrument for supermarket 
participation, as we justify below. The five nearest neighbors are not necessarily the 




immediate neighbors, but the five nearest households included in the sample based on 
GPS coordinates. These are usually households in the same village but can also be 
households belonging to the neighboring village. In most parts of rural Kenya, including 
Kiambu, settlements within villages are scattered because people live on the land that 
they cultivate (Miller et al., 2011; Fischer & Qaim, 2012b). Hence, administrative 
boundaries are of limited practical relevance; in some cases a household belonging to a 
neighboring village may be located closer than a same-village household. The average 
distance of farm households to the five nearest neighbors in our sample is 0.13 
kilometers. 
In smallholder production systems of Kenya, farms and farmland are inherited 
from one generation to the next. Especially in the agro-ecologically favorable areas, 
where land is scarce, migration within rural areas is rare (Miller et al., 2011). Hence, farm 
households do not actively choose who else lives in their neighborhood, which makes our 
instrument exogenous to farmers’ decisions. Within the sampled locations in Kiambu, we 
do not observe significant regional clustering in the sense that only farmers with similar 
characteristics from specific neighborhoods would supply supermarkets. To test for this, 
we correlated the instrument – the number of supermarket farmers among the five nearest 
neighbors – with household characteristics such as education, farm size, and the value of 
other household assets. These correlation coefficients are all small and statistically 
insignificant (Table A3.1 in the Appendix). We also correlated household income with 
mean income of the five nearest neighbors, obtaining a small correlation coefficient of 
0.09. 
However, social interactions between neighboring farm households occur. Recent 
research showed that farmers’ interactions through social networks can significantly 
influence agricultural technology adoption decisions (Maertens& Barrett, 2013). 
Similarly, collective action among farmers from the same neighborhood can reduce 
transaction costs and facilitate access to high-value output markets (Fischer & Qaim, 
2012b). In a recent study in Kenya, Andersson et al. (2015) showed that farmers with 
neighbors that supply supermarkets are much more likely to supply supermarkets 
themselves, because logistics can be coordinated and the cost of delivering produce to 
Nairobi be shared. Indeed, our instrument – the number of supermarket farmers among 
the five nearest neighbors – is closely correlated with own supermarket supply. This 




variable is highly significant in all first-stage regression models (Table A3.2 in the 
Appendix). 
When neighboring farmers coordinate their supermarket deliveries and exchange 
information on marketing, it is possible that they also exchange other types of 
information, for instance on nutrition, so that our instrument may possibly also have a 
direct effect on the nutrition indicators in the outcome equations. When correlating the 
number of supermarket suppliers among the five nearest neighbors with calorie and 
micronutrient consumption levels, the correlation coefficients are small. Except for 
vitamin A, they are all insignificant (Table A3.3 in the Appendix). And the significant 
correlation between the instrument and vitamin A consumption seems to be an indirect 
effect through supermarket participation. Once we control for supermarket participation 
and other explanatory variables in a regression model, the instrument coefficient turns 
insignificant (Table A3.3 in the Appendix). These tests support the validity of the 
instrument. 
We had also tested other instruments, without being able to identify alternatives 
that meet all criteria of instrument validity. In particular, we tried distance to 
supermarket, but found that this is not correlated with participation in supermarket 
channels. We also tried infrastructure variables, such as access to roads and public 
transportation. Some of these variables are correlated with supermarket participation, but 
infrastructure also seems to influence household nutrition through other pathways, so that 
the IV models with these alternative instruments are not properly identified. 
We stress that impact assessment with cross-section observational data is always 
difficult, because perfect instruments are rarely available. Hence, some endogeneity 
problems might possibly remain, which is important to keep in mind when interpreting 
the estimates. But the chosen instrument – the number of supermarket suppliers among 
the five nearest neighbors – seems to be strong. The resulting IV models produce robust 
results, which are presented in the following. 
 
3.4.3 Estimation Results 
The second-stage of the IV models with the nutritional indicators as dependent variables 
are shown in Table 3.3. The estimated treatment effects are all positive and significant, 
implying that supermarket participation contributes to improved nutrition. Controlling for 
other factors, supermarket participation increases calorie consumption by 598 kcal per 




adult equivalent (AE), which implies a 19% increase over mean consumption levels of 
traditional channel households. Iron and zinc consumption levels are both raised by 
around 3 mg per AE, implying increases of 15-18%. The increase in vitamin A of 1302 
μg RE per AE involves almost a doubling of mean consumption levels. This large effect 
may be due to the specialization on vegetable production in supermarket-supplying 
households (Rao et al., 2012). Green leafy vegetables are an important source of vitamin 
A in Kenyan diets, and higher levels of production are likely to cause higher levels of 
consumption. Further details of impact pathways are analyzed in section 3.5. 




















 (244.81) (325.79) (1.72) (1.71) 
Male household head (dummy) 20.40 25.85 3.19
*
 -3.38 
 (265.22) (274.47) (1.71) (2.14) 



















 (0.32) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education of household head (years) 3.31 7.87 0.13 0.09 
 (17.18) (12.43) (0.11) (0.12) 
Education of main female (years) 0.41 35.49 -0.01 -0.20 
 (25.78) (24.04) (0.17) (0.22) 









 (39.11) (42.57) (0.16) (0.38) 
Farm land owned (acres) -42.12
*
 -17.32 -0.11 -0.14 
 (22.65) (20.69) (0.14) (0.14) 
Household assets (100,000 Ksh) 27.02
**
 4.39 0.08 0.18
**
 
 (12.17) (7.86) (0.07) (0.08) 
Access to piped water (dummy) 21.47 57.11 -0.01 -0.05 
 (37.49) (50.50) (0.23) (0.23) 





 (20.38) (15.68) (0.11) (0.12) 
Public transport in village (dummy) -221.63
*
 -102.08 -0.40 -1.10 
 (113.60) (95.59) (0.72) (0.77) 
Distance to market(km) 15.81 5.35 0.01 0.04 





























Number of observations 384 384 384 384 
Notes.
*
 denotes significance at 10% level; 
**
 denotes significance at 5% level; 
***
 denotes significance at 1% 
level; SM, supermarket; AE, adult equivalent; Coefficients of instrumental variable models are shown with 
robust standard errors in parentheses; Results of the first-stage equation are shown in Table A3.2 in the 
Appendix.  
 




In terms of control variables, we find that households with older household heads 
have lower calorie and micronutrient consumption levels. Likewise, larger households 
have consistently lower consumption levels per AE. This is a typical phenomenon when 
using data from food consumption recalls (Ecker& Qaim, 2011), as larger households 
tend to use foods more efficiently with less waste. More household assets significantly 
increase the consumption of calorie and zinc, but not of vitamin A and iron. This 
underlines that the economic status of a household alone is not a good predictor of 
healthy and balanced diets. The lower part of Table 3.3 shows selected model statistics. 
The F-test statistics of the excluded instrument refer to the first-stage equations (Table 
A3.2 in the Appendix). These statistics confirm that the number of supermarket farmers 
among the five nearest neighbors is a strong instrument in all four models. 
 
3.5 Analysis of Impact Pathways 
 
3.5.1 Conceptual Framework 
Results in the previous section suggest that participation in supermarket channels has 
positive impacts on household nutrition. So far, however, the pathways through which 
these impacts occur remain obscure. We hypothesize that nutrition impacts of 
supermarket participation will mainly occur through three closely related pathways, as 
shown in Figure 3.1. The first pathway is through possible changes in household income. 
Several studies showed that participation in supermarket channels can cause significant 
income gains (Reardon & Berdegué, 2002; Hernándezet al., 2007; Rao & Qaim, 2011; 
Andersson et al., 2015). Higher incomes improve the economic access to food, which 
may result in higher calorie consumption, especially in previously undernourished 
households. Moreover, rising incomes may contribute to better dietary quality and higher 
demand for more nutritious foods, including vegetables, fruits, and animal products. 
These changes in demand would also result in improved micronutrient consumption. 
The second pathway may be through altered agricultural production choices at the 
farm level and thus changes in the availability of home-produced foods. Previous studies 
showed that the commercialization of agriculture is often associated with on-farm 
specialization (von Braun & Kennedy, 1994). This has also been observed for farms 
supplying supermarkets (Rao et al., 2012). As mentioned, the supermarket contracts in 
Kenya are associated with higher price stability; hence they reduce market risk and 




provide incentives for farmers to specialize. Similar developments were also observed 
elsewhere (Michelson et al., 2012). Whether such changes in production choices 
influence household nutrition in positive or negative directions will depend on the types 
of commodities that farmers produce under contract. If farmers specialize on cash crops 
with no or low nutritional value – such as tea, coffee, or cut flowers – dietary quality may 
not improve. Yet, in our case supermarket farmers specialize on vegetables. This may 
lead to more vegetable consumption at the household level and thus improved dietary 
quality. Even if farmers produce vegetables primarily for sale, certain portions that do not 
meet the stipulated quality standards or that exceed the quantity agreement with 














The third pathway is related to possible changes in gender roles and intra-
household decision-making. In many African countries, subsistence food crops are often 
controlled by women, whereas cash crops are predominantly controlled by men. 
Accordingly, the process of commercialization may be associated with men taking over 
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changes in gender roles and responsibilities were indeed observed in studies on 
horticultural supply chains in different African countries (Ezumah & Di Domenico, 1995; 
Fischer & Qaim, 2012a). A possible shift from female to male control of production and 
revenue and a loss of women’s bargaining power within the household may also have 
nutrition implications (Sraboni et al., 2014; Imai et al., 2014). Female-controlled income 
is often more beneficial for household nutrition, because women tend to spend more than 
men on food, health, and dietary quality (Hoddinott & Haddad, 1995). Hence, 
supermarket participation may have a negative partial effect on nutrition through this 
gender pathway. 
 
3.5.2 Empirical Strategy 
In order to test the discussed hypotheses on impact pathways empirically, we develop a 
model of simultaneous equations as follows: 
 𝑁 = α0 + α1 𝑌 + α2 𝑆𝑉 + α3 𝐺 + α4 𝑋2 + ε2 (3.2) 
 𝑌 =  β0 + β1𝑆𝑀 + β2𝑋3 + ε3 (3.3) 
 𝑆𝑉 =  σ0 + σ1𝑆𝑀 + σ2𝑋4 + ε4 (3.4) 
 𝐺 =  δ0 + δ1𝑆𝑀 + δ2𝑋5 + ε5 (3.5) 
 𝑆𝑀 =  φ0 + φ1𝑆𝑀𝑁 + φ2𝑋6 + ε6 (3.6) 
where N is the respective indicator of household nutrition, which depends on household 
income (Y), the share of farm land under vegetables (SV) that we use as a measure of 
specialization, the gender of the household member who controls vegetable revenues (G), 
and a vector of other control variables (X2), including household size, education, and 
other socioeconomic factors. Following the discussion above, Y, SV, and G are influenced 
by supermarket participation, represented by the SM dummy, and additional covariates 
(X3 to X5). However, as discussed above, SM is endogenous itself because farmers self-
select into the supermarket channel. This is modeled in equation (3.6), where SM is 
explained by the number of supermarket farmers among the five nearest neighbors 
(SMN), which was used as a valid instrument in section 3.4, and a vector of other control 
variables (X6). 




This system of simultaneous equations, where some of the dependent variables are 
binary, is estimated with a mixed-process maximum likelihood procedure (Roodman, 
2011). We estimate a separate system for each nutrition indicator, namely calorie, vitamin 
A, iron, and zinc consumption. Except for the dependent variable in equation (3.2), these 
four systems are specified identically. 
 
3.5.3 Estimation Results 
Full estimation results for the four systems of equations are shown in Tables A3.4 to A3.8 
in the Appendix of this chapter. Results for the main variables of interest are summarized 
in Table 3.4. The hypothesized impact pathways are all confirmed. The upper part of 
Table 3.4 shows that household income has a positive and significant effect on calorie 
and micronutrient consumption. Likewise, the share of the farm area grown with 
vegetables influences nutrition positively. Especially the effect for vitamin A is relatively 
large: an increase in the area share by 10 percentage points increases vitamin A 
consumption by almost 400 μg RE per AE, implying a 30% increase over mean 
consumption levels. This sizeable effect should not surprise given that vegetables are a 
very important source of vitamin A in the local context. The main staple food in Kenya is 
white maize, which does not contain vitamin A. Other sources of vitamin A are livestock 
products, which are only consumed in small quantities, due to income constraints. The 
results in Table 3.4 further show that male control of vegetable revenues has large 
negative effects on calorie and micronutrient consumption, which we attribute to gender 
differences in income use, as discussed above. 
The lower part of Table 3.4 shows how supermarket participation affects these 
important determinants of household nutrition. Depending on the particular model, selling 
vegetables in supermarket channels increases annual household income by 300,000 Ksh, 
implying a gain of over 60%. This is consistent with earlier research on supermarket 
impacts in Kenya (Rao & Qaim, 2011; Andersson et al., 2015). Moreover, as expected, 
supermarket participation contributes to a higher degree of on-farm specialization on 
vegetables. On average, and controlling for other factors, the share of the area grown with 
vegetables is around 20 percentage points higher for supermarket suppliers than for 
traditional channel farmers. Finally, supermarket participation has a significant effect on 
gender roles within the household. Selling to supermarkets increases the likelihood of 
male control of vegetable revenues by over 20 percentage points. This is in line with the 




existing literature on agricultural commercialization (von Braun & Kennedy, 1994; 
Fischer & Qaim, 2012a). 
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(0.21) (0.23) (0.00) (0.00) 
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(1235.63) (1352.08) (7.40) (8.59) 
Effect on annual household income (1000 Ksh) 
   










(129.95) (123.62) (127.76) (131.64) 
Constant -48.625 -14.868 -19.836 -16.395 
 
(230.85) (227.00) (229.49) (225.13) 
Effect on share of area with vegetables (%) 
    





















(19.55) (19.28) (19.72) (19.55) 
Effect on male control over revenue (dummy) 
    










(0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) 
Constant 0.602 0.596 0.365 0.563 
 
(0.48) (0.45) (0.45) (0.48) 
Effect on SM participation (dummy) 
    



























Number of observations 384 384 384 384 
Notes:
 *
 denotes significance at 10% level; 
**
 denotes significance at 5% level; 
***
 denotes significance at 
1% level. SM, supermarket; AE, adult equivalent. Coefficients are shown with standard errors in 
parentheses. Only the variables of major interest are shown here. Full results of the simultaneous equation 
models with all control variables are shown in Tables A3.4 to A3.8 in the Appendix of this chapter.  
 
The overall effect of supermarket participation on household nutrition is positive. 
But the analysis of impact pathways reveals that this overall effect involves both positive 
and negative partial effects. Hence, it is of interest to know more about the relative 
magnitude of these partial effects. This can be calculated based on the different model 




estimates. For all models, the income effect accounts for 30-40% of the overall effect. 
The gender effect is in a similar magnitude, but with opposite sign. Hence, the overall 
effects are strongly driven by the specialization of supermarket farmers on vegetables, 
which are a rich source of micronutrients in particular. These results are specific to the 
concrete case and should not be extrapolated to other situations. It is possible that the 
nutrition impacts would be less favorable in situations where farmers in supermarket 
channels specialize on producing crops with lower nutritional value. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Many developing countries are currently experiencing a profound food system 
transformation, which is associated with a rapid growth of supermarkets. The expansion 
of supermarkets can also have far-reaching implications for farmers. Recent research has 
shown that smallholder farmers can benefit in terms of higher productivity and income, 
provided that they can be linked to the emerging high-value supply chains. In this study, 
we have analyzed what participation in supermarket channels may mean for farm 
household nutrition. The analysis contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, 
it adds to the knowledge on supermarket impacts; nutrition effects for farm households 
have not been studied previously. Second, it contributes conceptually to the discussion on 
agriculture-nutrition linkages by developing a method that is suitable to capture various 
nutrition dimensions and determinants. 
Building on data from smallholder vegetable farmers in Kenya, we have shown 
that participation in supermarket channels has positive nutrition impacts. We have used 
detailed food recall data to derive several nutrition indicators, such as calorie, vitamin A, 
iron, and zinc consumption. While these are not precise measures of individual nutrition 
status, they provide a reasonable overview of food security and dietary quality at the 
household level. Controlling for other factors, participation in supermarket channels 
increases calorie, iron, and zinc consumption by 15-20%. The positive effect for vitamin 
A consumption is even higher.  
In a further step, we have analyzed impact pathways, using simultaneous equation 
models. We could show that supermarket participation affects household nutrition mainly 
via three pathways, namely through (1) income, (2) crop production choices at the farm 
level, and (3) gender roles. The first pathway has a positive effect on nutrition. Farmers 
who participate in supermarket channels benefit from income gains, and higher incomes 




improve the economic access to food. The second pathway has a positive nutrition effect 
as well. In this particular case, supermarket farmers sell vegetables under contract. As 
these supermarket contracts provide market assurance and price stability, farmers have an 
incentive to specialize on vegetable production. More vegetable production also entails 
higher quantities of vegetables consumed at the household level. Vegetables are an 
important source of vitamin A in particular, which also explains the large positive impact 
of supermarket participation on vitamin A consumption. In contrast, the third pathway 
has a negative effect on nutrition. Supermarket participation contributes to a shift from 
female to male control of vegetable revenues, and male household members tend to spend 
less on nutrition and dietary quality. Such a change in gender roles within the household 
is not uncommon in the process of agricultural commercialization. The total nutrition 
effects of supermarket participation are positive, but they could be even more positive if a 
loss of female control of vegetable revenues could be prevented. 
These results have two broader implications. First, the food system transformation 
and the growth of supermarkets in developing countries can contribute to economic 
development and improved nutrition in the small farm sector. This is an important 
finding, because smallholder farmers make up a large proportion of all undernourished 
people worldwide. Policy support may be required in some cases to link small farms to 
emerging supply chains and overcome constraints in terms of underdeveloped 
infrastructure and weak institutions. Second, the analysis of impact pathways underlines 
that a good understanding of the complex interactions between agriculture and nutrition is 
required to promote desirable outcomes. A clear message from our findings is that the 
role of women should be strengthened to further improve nutritional benefits. Gender 
mainstreaming of programs that try to link smallholders to supermarkets and other high-
value supply chains would be an important step in this direction. 
In spite of the robust findings, our study also has a few limitations that should be 
mentioned and addressed in follow-up research. First, the analysis builds on cross-section 
data where farm households self-selected into the supermarket channel. We used an 
instrumental variable approach to reduce issues of selection bias. While we carefully 
selected and tested the instrument, it is possible that some endogeneity issues remain. 
Collecting panel data and using differencing techniques would help to increase the 
estimates’ reliability. Second, nutrition impacts of supermarket participation might 
change over time, for instance because household consumption behavior is adjusted only 




gradually, or because income and gender effects are subject to temporal variability. Such 
dynamics could not be comprehensively analyzed here. Disaggregation of our results 
suggests that the nutrition effects are somewhat larger for households that have supplied 
supermarkets for several years than for new entrants into this supply chain, although the 
differences are not statistically significant. Again, panel data would be useful to analyze 
such impact dynamics further. Third, the food consumption data used here are a good 
indicator of dietary quality but not a precise measure of individual nutritional status. 
Follow-up research might additionally include anthropometric data, especially for 
children, as these are more reliable indicators of nutritional status. Fourth, the results 
estimated here are specific to the concrete situation in Kenya and should not be 
generalized. Gender effects will differ by social context, and whether further 
specialization of farm production is good or bad for nutrition will depend on the type of 
crops supplied to supermarkets. More micro-level research along the lines proposed here 





Table A3.1. Correlation between instrument and farm household characteristics 
 Correlation coefficients 
p-value 
 
Education 0.078 0.130 
Gender 0.069 0.177 
Farm size 0.042 0.413 
Household assets 0.007 0.888 
Note: The number of supermarket farmers among the five nearest neighbors is used as instrument for 
supermarket participation. 
  














SM farmers among 5 nearest 
neighbors 
0.50
*** 0.33*** 0.49*** 0.51*** 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) 
Male household head (dummy) -0.75* -0.90** -0.70 -0.77* 
 
(0.45) (0.36) (0.45) (0.45) 
Age of household head (years) 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.01 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age squared -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education of household head 
(years) 
0.05
* 0.03 0.05* 0.05* 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Education of main female (years) -0.16*** -0.12** -0.16*** -0.15*** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Household size (AE) 0.10 0.19*** 0.04 0.19** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.09) 
Farm land owned (acres) 0.05 0.05** 0.05 0.04 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Household assets (100,000 Ksh) 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Access to piped water (dummy) -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Distance to tarmac road (km) 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Public transport in village (dummy) 0.34* 0.21 0.35* 0.30 
 
(0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) 
Distance to market (km) -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -2.77** -1.06 -2.84** -2.28 
 
(1.39) (1.13) (1.37) (1.39) 
LR chi-squared 120.69*** 121.37*** 119.26*** 122.62*** 
Number of observations 384 384 384 384 
Notes: 
*
 denotes significance at 10% level;
**
 denotes significance at 5% level; 
***
 denotes significance at 1% 
level. SM, supermarket; AE, adult equivalent; VA, vitamin A. Coefficients are shown with robust standard 
errors in parentheses.   




Table A3.3. Association between instrument and outcome variables with and 










Correlation coefficient 0.066 0.111 0.078 0.067 
 (0.201) (0.029) (0.128) (0.188) 
Regression coefficient -64.803 78.185 -0.393 -0.393 
 (0.319) (0.189) (0.562) (0.429) 
Notes: The number of supermarket farmers among the five nearest neighbors is used as instrument for 
supermarket participation. p-values are shown in parentheses. The regression models include supermarket 
participation and the same control variables as those in Table 3.3, in addition to the instrument. 
  















Annual household income (1000 Ksh.) 0.501** 0.939*** 0.003** 0.004** 
 
(0.21) (0.23) (0.00) (0.00) 
Share of area grown with vegetables 
(%) 
26.769
*** 39.559*** 0.147*** 0.168*** 
 
(8.20) (9.35) (0.05) (0.06) 
Male control over vegetable revenue 
(dummy) 
-1013.312
*** -1346.740*** -8.522*** -7.344*** 
 
(285.98) (151.24) (1.27) (2.09) 
Household size (AE) -303.882*** -201.013*** -1.314*** -3.338*** 
 
(40.84) (45.74) (0.15) (0.44) 
Male household head (dummy) 468.183 267.478 8.109*** 0.360 
 
(351.46) (317.26) (2.05) (2.53) 
Age of household head (years) -50.627 -21.048 -0.135 -0.146 
 
(35.21) (36.53) (0.21) (0.24) 
Age squared 0.585* 0.323 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.32) (0.33) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education of household head (years) 11.445 22.031 0.084 0.119 
 
(23.90) (25.77) (0.15) (0.16) 
Education of main female (years) -2.890 -9.527 0.055 -0.177 
 
(28.39) (24.24) (0.17) (0.20) 
Distance to market (km) 17.355 0.699 0.008 0.046 
 
(17.78) (18.48) (0.10) (0.12) 
Distance to tarmac road (km) 69.113** 70.190** 0.508*** 0.612*** 
 
(27.01) (28.23) (0.16) (0.18) 
Constant 3774.757*** 86.549 15.308** 25.227*** 
  (1235.63) (1352.08) (7.40) (8.59) 
LR chi-squared  507.93*** 485.04*** 520.12*** 517.00*** 
Number of observations 384 384 384 384 
Notes: 
*
 denotes significance at 10% level;
**
 denotes significance at 5% level; 
***
 denotes significance at 1% level. 
SM, supermarket; AE, adult equivalent; VA, vitamin A. Coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses. 
The models for calories and for each micronutrient in Tables A3.4 to A3.8 were estimated jointly as simultaneous 
systems of equations.  
 






















SM participation (dummy) 361.894*** 297.791** 342.556*** 368.007*** 
 
(129.95) (123.62) (127.76) (131.64) 
Wealth index 114.649*** 127.732*** 114.555*** 109.133*** 
 
(34.96) (31.85) (35.07) (34.96) 
Male household head (dummy) 91.027 92.247 121.036 59.864 
 
(104.35) (104.68) (103.02) (105.38) 
Age of household head (years) -3.654 -3.702 -3.998 -4.404 
 
(2.78) (2.78) (2.79) (2.79) 
Education of household head 
(years) 
2.106 0.893 2.889 2.034 
 
(10.93) (10.85) (10.98) (10.88) 
Household size (AE) 56.885*** 66.141*** 30.569** 97.698*** 
 
(21.41) (24.18) (12.70) (31.28) 
Off-farm income (dummy) 197.106*** 166.342** 193.911*** 188.050*** 
 
(69.71) (67.61) (69.10) (69.22) 
Farm land owned (acres) 75.003*** 75.389*** 76.012*** 75.415*** 
 
(12.83) (12.22) (12.78) (12.75) 
Credit access (dummy) 32.744 63.122 28.666 19.728 
 
(82.75) (69.83) (81.73) (82.16) 
Constant -48.625 -14.868 -19.836 -16.395 
  (230.85) (227.00) (229.49) (225.13) 
Number of observations 384 384 384 384 
Notes: 
*
 denotes significance at 10% level;
**
 denotes significance at 5% level; 
***
 denotes significance at 1% level. 
SM, supermarket; AE, adult equivalent; VA, vitamin A. Coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses. 
The models for calories and for each micronutrient in Tables A3.4 to A3.8 were estimated jointly as simultaneous 
systems of equations  
 
  


















SM participation  (dummy) 20.228** 23.138*** 23.144*** 17.647** 
 
(8.89) (7.21) (8.43) (8.90) 
Irrigation (dummy) 11.243*** 11.593*** 12.265*** 11.655*** 
 
(4.30) (3.80) (4.55) (4.52) 
Farm land owned (acres) -2.221*** -1.901*** -2.083*** -2.075*** 
 
(0.54) (0.52) (0.56) (0.55) 
Off-farm income (dummy) -6.283** -8.920*** -6.756** -7.717*** 
 
(2.55) (2.36) (2.65) (2.60) 
Household assets (100,000 Ksh) 0.388* 0.221 0.275 0.363 
 
(0.23) (0.18) (0.24) (0.24) 
Distance to market (km) -0.000 0.014 0.046 0.001 
 
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) 
Distance to tarmac road (km) -1.351*** -1.411*** -1.413*** -1.379*** 
 
(0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) 
Access to piped water (dummy) -1.268 -0.319 -1.440 -1.447 
 
(1.19) (1.08) (1.29) (1.24) 
Male household head (dummy) 5.354 4.397 4.829 5.713 
 
(4.41) (4.37) (4.42) (4.39) 
Age of household head (years) -1.147 -1.260* -1.139 -1.170 
 
(0.72) (0.71) (0.72) (0.72) 
Age squared 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Education of household head 
(years) 
-2.649
** -1.012 -1.910 -2.670** 
 
(1.12) (0.97) (1.17) (1.16) 
Education squared 0.079 -0.019 0.034 0.083 
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
Constant 104.841*** 102.606*** 101.230*** 106.068*** 
 
(19.55) (19.28) (19.72) (19.55) 
Number of observations 384 384 384 384 
Notes: 
*
 denotes significance at 10% level; 
**
 denotes significance at 5% level; 
***
 denotes significance at 1% level. 
SM, supermarket; AE, adult equivalent; VA, vitamin A. Coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses. 
The models for calories and for each micronutrient in Tables A3.4 to A3.8 were estimated jointly as simultaneous 
systems of equations.  
 
  



















SM participation (dummy) 0.224** 0.379*** 0.213** 0.213** 
 
(0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) 
Member in women’s group (dummy)
a -0.124*** -0.068** -0.098*** -0.118*** 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Male household head (dummy) 0.351*** 0.399*** 0.359*** 0.368*** 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Age of household head (years) -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education of household head (years) -0.015** -0.015*** -0.013** -0.014** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household head married (dummy) 0.136 0.073 0.140* 0.127 
 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Constant 0.602 0.596 0.365 0.563 
  (0.48) (0.45) (0.45) (0.48) 
Number of observations 384 384 384 384 
Notes: 
*
 denotes significance at 10% level; 
**
 denotes significance at 5% level; 
***
 denotes significance at 1% level. 
SM, supermarket; AE, adult equivalent; VA, vitamin A. Coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses. 
The models for calories and for each micronutrient in Tables A3.4 to A3.8 were estimated jointly as simultaneous 
systems of equations. 
a 
This refers to the main female in the household. Women’s groups are involved in various 


























SM farmers among 5 nearest 
neighbors 
0.083
*** 0.075*** 0.080*** 0.086*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Farm land owned (acres) 0.013 0.011* 0.015* 0.011 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Own vehicle (dummy) 0.047 0.005 0.057 0.040 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Access to piped water (dummy) 0.005 0.010 0.004 0.003 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Assets before SM (100,000 Ksh) 0.004 -0.000 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Distance to tarmac road (km) 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.002 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Male household head (dummy) -0.148 -0.084 -0.155 -0.163 
 
(0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) 
Age of household head (years) 0.007 -0.003 0.008 0.002 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education of household head 
(years) 
0.011
* 0.012** 0.011* 0.011* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Education of main female (years) -0.029** -0.020* -0.031** -0.029** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household size (AE) 0.013 0.019 0.005 0.031 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.708* -1.915 -2.792** -2.319 
  (1.41) (1.19) (1.36) (1.48) 
Number of observations 384 384 384 384 
Notes: 
*
 denotes significance at 10% level; 
**
 denotes significance at 5% level; 
***
 denotes significance at 1% 
level. SM, supermarket; AE, adult equivalent; VA, vitamin A. Coefficients are shown with standard errors in 
parentheses. The models for calories and for each micronutrient in Tables A3.4 to A3.8 were estimated jointly as 
simultaneous systems of equations.  
 
 




4 Following Up on Smallholder Farmers and Supermarkets in Kenya5 
 
Abstract. In many developing countries, supermarkets are expanding rapidly. This affects 
farmers’ marketing options. Previous studies have analyzed welfare effects of smallholder 
participation in supermarket channels from a static perspective, using cross-section data. 
We develop a conceptual framework and use panel data to better understand participation 
and impact dynamics. The analysis focuses on vegetable producers in Kenya. 
Participation in supermarket channels is associated with income gains. However, many 
farmers have dropped out of the supermarket channel due to various constraints. The 
initial income gains cannot be sustained when returning to the traditional market. 




Global food supply chains are in rapid transition. In developing countries in particular, 
income increases, urbanization, and globalization have contributed to changing lifestyles 
and dietary habits (Pingali 2007; Popkin 2014). The increase in demand for readily 
available food of high quality and variety, together with other factors, has contributed to a 
large-scale expansion of supermarkets (Reardon et al. 2003; Reardon et al. 2009; Minten 
et al. 2009; Mergenthaler et al. 2009; Michelson et al. 2012). In fact, the expansion of 
supermarkets has been of such a scale that the phenomenon is often referred to as a 
‘supermarket revolution’ (Reardon and Gulati 2008; Reardon et al. 2009). This 
supermarket revolution has raised questions about the wider implications for poverty. 
Several recent studies have analyzed whether smallholder farmers are able to supply 
supermarkets, and – if so – what impacts this may have on household welfare (Hernández 
et al. 2007; Neven et al. 2009; Rao and Qaim 2011). Results suggest that farmers mostly 
benefit from supplying supermarkets, but that it is often difficult for smallholders to enter 
these new, high-value supply chains. 
                                                 
5
 This chapter is co-authored by Camilla Andersson, Elizaphan Rao, and Matin Qaim. The following roles 
were performed by me: conceptualization and designing of the study in cooperation with all co-authors; 
implementing the survey in cooperation with Camilla Andersson; interpretation of research results in 
cooperation with all co-authors; and revision of the paper with all co-authors. This chapter was published in 
the American Journal of Agricultural Economics in 2015 




One important shortcoming of previous studies is that they mainly rely on cross-
section data. This means that the reliability of estimated impacts hinges on either the 
assumption that supermarket participation is determined by variables that are fully 
observed or that the instruments employed are valid.
6
 Here, we address this shortcoming 
by using panel data collected from smallholder vegetable farmers in Kenya. In particular, 
we combine differencing approaches with instrumental variable techniques to better 
account for possible selection bias. 
A second drawback with cross-section data is that the dynamics of supermarket 
participation cannot be analyzed. Who joins, who stays, and who leaves supermarket 
channels over time? What are the determinants of these dynamics, and what are the 
effects on household welfare? For example, is joining the supermarket channel also 
associated with an income gain for latecomers? Are the early participants gaining more 
than the latecomers? Can higher income levels of supermarket suppliers be sustained 
when they return to the traditional market? Do farmers who return to the traditional 
market earn more or less than farmers who never entered the supermarket channel? And, 
are income disparities between supermarket and traditional market suppliers increasing or 
decreasing over time? These are important questions, because supermarkets are still on 
the rise in many developing countries. Using the panel data from Kenya we address such 
questions as well. 
 
4.2  Literature Review 
Starting from the early-1990s, supermarkets have gained market shares in many 
developing countries at remarkable speed. Reardon and Gulati (2008) divide this 
expansion of supermarkets into three distinct waves. The first wave took off in South 
America, East Asia, and South Africa, where supermarkets increased their market shares 
from a modest 10% of retail sales in 1990, to 50-60% in the mid-2000s. The second wave 
started in the mid-1990s in Mexico, Central America, and much of Southeast Asia, where 
supermarkets increased their market shares from 5-10% to 30-50% by the mid-2000s. The 
                                                 
6
 One exception is Michelson (2013), who used a difference-in-difference estimator to analyze impacts of 
supermarket participation on household productive assets in Nicaragua. However, data about past asset 
ownership of supermarket suppliers were collected through a farmer recall, which is less accurate than a 
real panel data base. Furthermore, we are aware of one recent study that used panel data to evaluate the 
impact of contracts on farmers’ subjective wellbeing in Senegal (Dedehouanou, Swinnen, and Maertens 
2013). That study in Senegal focused on the horticultural export sector, not on farmers participating in 
supermarket channels. 




third wave began in the late-1990s in China, India, and Vietnam. By the mid-2000s, the 
sales of supermarkets in these countries grew at annual rates of 30-50%. Reardon et al. 
(2008) further recognized a fourth wave taking off in Eastern and Southern Africa, where 
supermarket shares are still small but growing significantly. In Kenya, the modern retail 
sector has grown at an annual rate of 19% over the past few years (Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics 2012). Supermarkets in Kenya now account for about 10% of 
national grocery sales; in large cities, the share is already much higher (Planet Retail 
2014). 
Supermarkets differ from traditional markets in many ways that also affect 
procurement channels and marketing options for farmers. The basic concept is that 
produce of certain quality can be sold to consumers continuously. For supermarkets in 
developing countries, this concept is often difficult to accomplish by sourcing from 
traditional wholesale markets, where supply is not always reliable in terms of quantity 
and quality. Hence, especially for horticultural produce, new procurement systems were 
established, involving specialized supermarket traders, centralized procurement through 
distribution centers, and the use of ‘preferred suppliers’ who are able to meet the 
requirements on quality and consistent supply (Reardon et al. 2008). Often, these 
preferred suppliers are farmers who are contracted by supermarkets through written or 
verbal agreements, as is also the case in Kenya (Neven and Reardon 2004; Rao et al. 
2012). 
The scale of the spread of supermarkets in the developing world together with the 
new set of requirements for suppliers has spurred a growing body of literature studying 
whether or not smallholder farmers can be successfully included in these new supply 
chains. Of particular interest for this article are the studies about participation in the 
Kenyan horticulture sector by Neven et al. (2009) and Rao and Qaim (2011). Neven et al. 
(2009) conclude that many smallholders face a capital vector threshold that prevents them 
from participation in supermarket channels. This vector includes physical capital 
(irrigation, transport, cell phones etc.), financial capital, human capital, and social or 
organizational capital. In line with this, Rao and Qaim (2011) show that supermarket 
participants are more likely to have larger farms, own means of transportation, better 
education, and off-farm income sources. Many have also participated in an NGO project 
that specialized on linking smallholder farmers to high-value markets. 




Similar results were found elsewhere. Moustier et al. (2010) acknowledge the 
importance of farmer organizations for supermarket participation in Vietnam. Blandon et 
al. (2009) highlight the key role of transaction costs and collective action in Honduras. 
Hernández et al. (2007) stress the importance of assets for participation in Guatemala. 
Michelson (2013) emphasizes the significant role of farmers’ geographic location as well 
as access to water and transportation for supermarket participation in Nicaragua. 
Although these studies offer important insights about determinants of participation at one 
point in time, they do not provide information about participation dynamics, such as 
factors influencing farmers’ decisions to drop out of supermarket channels or join at a 
later stage.  
When it comes to the impact of supermarket participation on household welfare, 
previous studies have generally found very positive results. For Kenya, Rao and Qaim 
(2011) showed that participation increases average household income of vegetable 
farmers by 48%, resulting from higher prices and higher productivity achieved by 
supermarket suppliers. Michelson (2013) found significant positive impacts of 
supermarket participation on asset holdings in Nicaragua. Minten et al. (2009) revealed 
positive effects on income stability and seasonality smoothening in Madagascar. One 
exception to these positive results is the study by Hernández, Reardon, and Berdegué 
(2007), who did not find a significant difference in profits between supermarket and 
traditional channel suppliers in Guatemala, due to much higher expenditures for inputs in 
the new supply chain. 
As always in impact assessment studies, researchers trying to establish the 
treatment effect of supermarket participation run into the classical evaluation problem: 
what would have been the outcome for supermarket participants if they had not 
participated? The mentioned studies used different approaches to address this problem. 
Rao and Qaim (2011) used an endogenous switching regression model, assuming that 
participation in a special NGO market linkage project and availability of public transport 
would affect income only indirectly through the supermarket participation link. 
Michelson (2013) employed a difference-in-difference approach, for which assumptions 
are less restrictive, but her data accuracy may potentially be lower due to long recall 
periods in the farmer survey. Minten et al. (2009) studied perceived impacts among 
farmers, thus using a subjective outcome measure. Finally, Hernández et al. (2007) 
compared net incomes between supermarket and traditional channel suppliers without 




controlling for possible selection bias. In sum, the validity of previous impact results 
hinges on a number of assumptions. In their review paper, Reardon et al. (2009) discuss 




In this article, we use a panel data set collected in two rounds: 2008 and 2012. 
This allows us to follow the same farmers over time and study changes in income as these 
farmers join or leave supermarket channels. Thus, we can control for selection on 
unobserved time-invariant variables. We use instruments to test for possible bias through 
time-variant heterogeneity. Furthermore, the panel data allow us to analyze how possible 
income differences between supermarket and traditional channel suppliers develop over 
time. 
 
4.3  Conceptual Framework 
We are particularly interested in two research questions that were not sufficiently 
addressed in the previous literature. First, what factors influence the dynamics of 
smallholder participation in supermarket channels, or high-value markets more generally? 
Second, what are the impacts of these dynamics on household income? 
 
4.3.1 Dynamics of Smallholder Participation 
As mentioned in the literature review, previous studies suggest that participation in high-
value markets (HVM) depends positively on access to various types of capital such as 
physical, financial, human, and social capital. To analyze the dynamics of smallholder 
participation, we use a diagrammatic framework with access to two types of capital on the 
axes, as shown in Figure 4.1. To make the description more intuitive, we can think of 
‘capital 1’ as physical capital and ‘capital 2’ as social capital. Physical capital includes 
equipment and finance required for high-value production (such as technology, means of 
transportation, and credit), whereas social capital involves the farmers’ social network 
and collective action that may be important for accessing information and reducing 
transportation and transaction costs. In panel (a) of Figure 4.1, farmers are uniformly 
distributed in the plane, depending on their individual access to the two types of capital. 
Farmers with low access to physical and social capital supply traditional markets (TM), 
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 Potential endogeneity problems in econometric studies were also acknowledged by Stokke (2009), who 
used numerical simulations in a structural framework to analyze supermarket impacts. 




whereas farmers with better access are more likely to supply HVM. In the graph, farmers 
located on the dividing line between the HVM and TM regions are indifferent between 
the two marketing options. 
Up till here, cross-section data would suffice to analyze farmers’ initial decision to 
participate in HVM. However, in reality conditions are not static. As various literature 
strands show, economic agents react to uncertainty and changing circumstances, which 
can lead to market entry and exit decisions over time (Dixit 1989; Hopenhayn 1992; Shen 
2014). In panel (b) of Figure 4.1, the situation in a second time period is shown where a 
change in external circumstances occurred. This change in circumstances caused some 
farmers who previously supplied TM to now switch to HVM. This may be due to an 
increase in the price premium paid in HVM, improved transport infrastructure, increased 
activity by an NGO facilitating HVM access, or other types of external shocks. Of course, 
circumstances might also change in the opposite direction (not shown in the figure), with 
farmers who previously supplied HVM switching back to TM. 
In panel (b) of Figure 4.1, it is assumed that the change in external circumstances 
affects all farmers evenly, so that HVM entry or exit decisions all occur in one direction. 
Yet, heterogeneous farmers may be affected differently by external shocks, as shown in 
panel (c). For instance, farmers with low access to physical capital may be affected more 
negatively by an NGO that decreases market linkage activities previously offered. It is 
also possible that price premiums in HVM are only offered to those farmers who are 
capable of meeting certain standards, which may be easier for farmers with better access 
to physical capital. In fact, there may be different types of external shocks that occur 
simultaneously, affecting farmers in different ways. In panel (c), a few additional farmers 
enter HVM in the second period, while others who supplied HVM previously switched 
back to TM. Hence – depending on the situation – theory predicts switching in both 
directions. 





 (a) First period 
 
(b) Second period with exogenous shock 
 




(c) Second period with different kind of exogenous shock 
 
Figure 4.1.Supply channel participation dynamics for farmers with different types 
and levels of capital 
 
Notes: HVM, high-value markets; TM, traditional markets. 
 
4.3.2 Contract Offer and Impact Dynamics 
So far, we implicitly assumed that all farmers who are able and willing to supply HVM 
would actually do so. In reality, entering HVM often requires a contractual relationship 
between supermarkets or other agribusiness firms and farmers. The decision to participate 
is therefore not made by the farmer alone, but also depends on whether he/she is offered a 
contract. If farmers’ willingness to supply HVM is higher than the demand, supermarkets 
will prefer those farmers where contracts are associated with lower transaction costs. 
Especially in growing industries, supply and demand conditions can change rapidly, so 
that who is offered a contract is not a constant parameter. 
These dynamics in HVM participation can also lead to dynamics in the effects on 
farmers’ income. When farmers choose freely, they will opt for the most profitable supply 
channel from their individual perspective. However, when farmers are not offered a 
contract, they may also end up in a less lucrative channel. 




Furthermore, income differences and dynamics depend on farmers’ expectations, 
previous choice of supply channel, and the functioning of credit markets. For example, 
farmers that are expecting to supply HVM but, for various reasons, end up in TM, may 
find themselves in a situation where they have overinvested in physical capital that is not 
easily covered by returns in TM. Assuming naïve expectations, this could lead to a 
situation where farmers that dropped out of HVM suffer from large sunk costs and thus 
have lower income than TM stayers. Similarly, if credit markets are functioning poorly, 
farmers may potentially not be able to invest at once but may need some time in HVM to 
reach the optimal level of physical capital. Under such circumstances, new HVM 
suppliers may have lower income than farmers who entered HVM earlier and stayed. 
In sum, participation and income dynamics can take a number of different 
pathways. Which of the outcomes predicted by theory really occurs is an empirical 
question, depending on initial conditions and developments over time in a particular 
context. We analyze such dynamics empirically, using panel data from Kenya. 
 
  




4.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
4.4.1 Household Panel Survey 
Data for this study were collected in Kiambu District, Central Province of Kenya (in 
Kenya’s new constitution, Kiambu is now a county). Kiambu is mainly an agricultural 
region with high-potential land. About 70% of the population is involved in agriculture, 
and the vast majority (about 90%) of the farmers are smallholders producing maize, 
beans, potatoes, and other food crops for subsistence. The major cash crops in the region 
are tea, coffee, and horticultural crops. Farmers in Kiambu produce leafy vegetables 
including exotic types, like kale and spinach, as well as indigenous species such as 
amaranthus and black nightshade. Kiambu is located in relative proximity to Nairobi. 
Even before the spread of supermarkets, Kiambu was one of the main vegetable-
supplying regions for the capital city. The two biggest supermarket chains now sourcing 
vegetables from Kiambu are Nakumatt and Uchumi, which are both Kenyan owned. 
Foreign owned retail chains so far play a much smaller role in Kenya (Rao, Brümmer, 
and Qaim 2012). 
The first round of data was collected in 2008. At that time, 402 vegetable farmers 
were interviewed using a structured questionnaire. The farmers were selected with a 
stratified random sampling procedure, differentiating between supermarket and traditional 
channel suppliers. Supermarket farmers were selected from lists of suppliers obtained 
from supermarkets. In order to get a sufficient number of observations, all farmers on 
these lists in Kiambu were selected. Farmers supplying traditional markets were 
randomly selected from 31 administrative locations in Kiambu. These locations were 
selected to cover the main vegetable-growing areas based on data from the District 
Agricultural Office. 
The second round of the survey was conducted in 2012. Despite significant 
efforts, some of the farmers from the first round could not be met again. Ten households 
had stopped vegetable cultivation altogether. Each missing household was replaced by 
another randomly selected vegetable-growing household in the same village. In this 
article, we only employ data from farmers who were surveyed in both rounds; a balanced 




panel is required for the differencing approach that is further explained below. Thus, we 





4.4.2 Farm and Household Characteristics 
Farm and household characteristics are shown in Table 4.1. We differentiate between 
HVM and TM suppliers. The majority of the farmers in HVM supply vegetables to 
supermarkets. This involves verbal agreements on quantity, price, and time of delivery. A 
few HVM farmers also sell their vegetables to companies and institutions (e.g., hotel 
chains). As the agreements between farmers and these companies and institutions are 
similar to the agreements with supermarkets, including both in the same HVM category is 
justified. 
While the supply channel of farmers may change over time, the distinction 
between HVM and TM suppliers in any particular year is clear-cut. All TM suppliers sell 
their vegetables only in traditional markets. Most HVM suppliers sell their vegetables 
primarily to HVM; only when the harvested amount at a particular date unexpectedly 
exceeds the agreement with supermarkets or other institutions, the surplus is sold in TM. 
HVM suppliers tend to specialize on one HVM channel. That is, in 80% of the cases, the 
HVM supplier sells to only one particular supermarket, company, or institution. 
Sample households are typical smallholders with an average farm size of 1-2 
acres. Some of the variables shown in Table 4.1 deserve further explanation. Personal 
characteristics of the farmer are captured in terms of age, gender, and education. This 
refers to the person in the household responsible for vegetable cultivation and marketing, 
which may or may not be the household head. Wealth and capital endowment are 
captured in terms of ownership of assets, such as land, livestock, and a vehicle (means of 
transportation), among others. Furthermore, we look at access to certain types of 
infrastructure, such as piped water and electricity. Household size and off-farm 
employment of the farmer are proxies for labor availability and the opportunity cost of 
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 Of the 66 farmers that could not be interviewed again in 2012, 18 were supplying supermarkets and 48 
traditional markets in 2008. In order to test for attrition bias we followed an approach similar to Wooldridge 
(2002 p. 582), using the full sample from the first round and estimating the probability that a household is 
also interviewed during the second round with a probit model. Based on this model, we estimated the 
inverse mills ratio, which was included in a first-differenced income equation for the reduced sample used 
in our analysis. The inverse mills ratio was insignificant in this income equation. We conclude that attrition 
bias is not an issue. 




time. Off-farm employment may also be an important source of cash for farm investments 
when credit markets fail (Oseni and Winters 2009). 
Table 4.1.Sample descriptive statistics 
  HVM 2008 TM 2008 HVM 2012 TM 2012 



































































































































































































































 p<0.1. HVM, suppliers to high-value markets; TM, suppliers to traditional 
markets. Mean values are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. Monetary values for 2012 were 
deflated to 2008. Mean values between HVM and TM in the same year were tested for statistically 
significant differences. 
a
 This variable was measured in different ways in the two survey rounds, hence only 
the 2012 values are included.  




In the conceptual framework we discussed the possible role of social capital to 
facilitate farmers’ access to HVM. We proxy social capital with a variable measuring the 
number of farmers supplying HVM among the five nearest neighbors in terms of 
geographic proximity. The five nearest neighbors refer to other farmers in the sample and 
are derived from GPS coordinates measured at the farmers’ homestead. Coordination 
between nearby farmers may reduce the cost of supplying HVM. In principle, clustering 
of HVM farmers could also be the result of supermarkets preferring to transact with 
farmers located in proximity to one another and therefore, as such, is not conclusive 
evidence that social capital matters. However, in this case the transaction costs are 
primarily borne by the HVM farmers themselves, as supermarkets require farmers to 
deliver their vegetables directly to the stores in Nairobi. Indeed, previous research in 
Kiambu showed that collective action among HVM farmers from the same neighborhood 
helps to reduce transport and transaction costs (Rao and Qaim 2011). 
We also discussed the possible role of NGOs to facilitate HVM access. In the 
study area, an international NGO had implemented a project since the mid-2000s aiming 
at linking farmers to supermarkets (Ngugi, Gitau, and Nyoro 2007). This NGO promoted 
collective action and trained farmers to meet the supermarket standards in terms of 
quality, consistency, and post-harvest handling of vegetables. The NGO also helped 
farmers to negotiate supply conditions and provided financial assistance to bridge the 
time between vegetable delivery and payment by the supermarkets. These support 
measures seemed to be effective in linking smallholders to supermarket channels in the 
early period (Rao and Qaim 2011). However, farmer participation in this NGO project 
decreased significantly between 2008 and 2012. The reason is that the NGO had phased 
out most of its activities in the region by 2012. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 4.1 show that farmers supplying HVM own 
more land, are better educated, and have better access to transportation and off-farm 
employment than TM farmers. HVM suppliers also have more neighbors supplying HVM 
and higher household incomes. The possibility to obtain credit for buying production 
assets such as irrigation infrastructure is significantly higher for farmers supplying HVM 
(around 80%) than for farmers supplying TM (around 50%). Household incomes, 
expressed in Kenyan shillings (Ksh), were calculated by including all farm enterprises 
and off-farm economic activities over a 12-months period. In the survey, output from 
crop cultivation was covered separately for the two seasons of the year (long rains and 




short rains). For the farm income calculations, total output was valued at market prices.
9
 
Costs for inputs and hired labor were subtracted. Off-farm earnings of all household 
members were reported for the entire 12-months period. All monetary values for 2012 




4.5 Participation Dynamics 
In this section, we first describe the dynamics of HVM participation in the sample and 
discuss reasons for supply channel choices as subjectively stated by farmers, before 
analyzing determinants more formally with econometric models. Figure 4.2 shows how 
market participation evolved between 2008 and 2012. In 2008, out of the 336 farm 
households, 115 had supplied HVM. Four years later, almost half of the former HVM 
suppliers had dropped out of this supply channel. At the same time, only 7% of the 
former TM suppliers had switched to HVM by 2012. 
 
Figure 4.2.Dynamics of participation in high-value markets (2008-2012) 
Notes: HVM, high-value markets; TM, traditional markets; N, number of observations 
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 For crops other than vegetables, we used the stated average seasonal price for the revenue calculations. If 
a crop was produced but not sold by a particular farmer, we used the average price stated by other farmers 
in the same village. For vegetables, we had asked the farmers more specifically for the total revenue per 
season. 
10
 For deflating, we used the annual weighted average consumer price index obtained from the Kenya 
National Bureau of Statistics (http://www.knbs.or.ke/consumerpriceindex.php). 
Farmers supplying HVM
(N=115)
Farmers continuing to supply HVM
(N=61)
2008 2012




Farmers starting to supply HVM
(N=16)
Farmers continuing to supply TM
(N=205)




4.5.1 Reasons for Supplying Specific Markets 
In order to better understand these dynamics, all farmers were asked about reasons for 
selling vegetables in their particular supply channel. Answers from the 2012 survey round 
are summarized in Table 4.2 (several answers were possible). We differentiate between 
HVM and TM suppliers. HVM suppliers in 2012 include HVM stayers (those that 
supplied HVM in both survey rounds) and newcomers (those that had switched to HVM 
after 2008). TM suppliers in 2012 include TM stayers (those that supplied TM in both 
survey rounds) and HVM dropouts. Table 4.2 reveals an interesting pattern with 
significant differences. Both HVM stayers and newcomers were more likely to state 
market assurance and price related aspects – such as high, stable, and reliable price – as 
reasons for supplying the HVM channel.
11
 This is a first indication that this channel may 
indeed offer price incentives and provide market assurance. But the answers reflect 
personal experiences by those who supply HVM and should not be interpreted as 
objective descriptions of supply chain characteristics. Farmers supplying TM were more 
likely to mention other reasons, such as the ability to negotiate the price with their buyers, 
prompt payment, and lenient quality requirements. It also seems that lack of alternative 
marketing options and lack of means of transportation are reasons for many farmers to 
supply TM. 
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 Similar questions were asked in the 2008 survey round as well. HVM farmers in 2008 also mentioned 
higher prices and assured demand as important reasons for supplying this channel, though with somewhat 
lower proportions as those shown for HVM stayers in table 2. This difference could indicate that the price 
advantages in HVM further increased over time. 




Table 4.2.Reasons stated for supplying a specific market (Proportion of farmers) 














Buyer offers a high 
price 
0.73 0.54 0.28 0.31 0.38
***
 
Buyer pays a stable 
price 
0.45 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.32
***
 
Buyer does not change 
price arbitrarily 
0.34 0.31 0.02 0.04 0.29
***
 
Can negotiate price 
with buyer 
0.09 0.08 0.44 0.43 -0.34
***
 
Buyer pays promptly 0.48 0.39 0.57 0.67 -0.19
***
 
Buyer provides assured 
demand 
0.73 0.54 0.28 0.29 0.41
***
 
Buyer is lenient on 
quality requirements 
0.04 0.00 0.07 0.1 -0.06
*
 
No worry about 
spoilage after selling 





0.36 0.23 0.19 0.1 0.21
***
 
Buyer is well known in 
the village 
0.07 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.00 
Have no alternative 
market (buyer) 
0.04 0.00 0.26 0.16 -0.15
***
 
Have no means of 
transportation 
0.00 0.15 0.17 0.13 -0.11
**
 
To save time 0.02 0.08 0.26 0.18 -0.16
***
 







 p<0.1. A reason is only listed if at least 10% of farmers in any group 
mentioned this reason. 
 
We were also interested in the reasons stated by TM suppliers in 2012 for not 
supplying supermarkets. These answers are summarized in Table 4.3. Farmers who had 
previously supplied supermarkets often stressed time, labor, and transport constraints, as 
well as their own inability to supply consistently, as reasons for not supplying 
supermarkets in 2012. In contrast, among those who never supplied supermarkets, the 
most frequent answer was difficulty to get the initial contract, followed by inability to 
supply consistently, and the high time requirements.
12
 A higher labor requirement in 
supermarket channels was also pointed out by Rao and Qaim (2013). This is particularly 
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 In 2008, not being aware of the supermarket supply channel was an important reason mentioned by TM 
farmers. Transport problems and inability to supply consistently were also mentioned, yet by a lower 
proportion of farmers. This suggests that constraints in accessing HVM may have become more evident 
over time. 




related to more time-intensive post-harvest operations required by supermarkets, such as 
cleaning and bundling the vegetables. Moreover, vegetables have to be delivered to 
supermarkets in Nairobi. As these transactions are usually managed by farmers 
themselves, the opportunity cost of own time can be sizeable. 
 





Farmers who never 
supplied supermarkets 
They do not pay promptly 0.21 0.09 
Timing of payment unreliable 0.02 0.00 
High price variation 0.00 0.00 
Price agreement unreliable 0.00 0.00 
Price too low 0.05 0.00 
They purchase too small quantities 0.14 0.02 
Standards too strict 0.17 0.17 
Rejection rate too high 0.07 0.02 
Quality agreement unreliable 0.02 0.00 
It is difficult to get the initial contract 0.07 0.82 
I am unable to supply required quantity 
consistently 
0.33 0.34 
I have too much spoilage 0.33 0.02 
They cheat on spoilage 0.10 0.00 
Reliable means of transport required 0.43 0.26 
Too time consuming / labor demanding 0.52 0.27 
Too capital intensive 0.11 0.20 
 
 
4.5.2 Conditional Probit Analysis 
We now turn to the econometric analysis of the participation dynamics. In a first 
step, we study the probability of supplying HVM in 2012, conditional on the choice of 
supply channel in 2008. This analysis is conducted by dividing farmers into two 
subsamples based on their HVM participation status in 2008 and estimating a separate 
probit model for each subsample. These two probit models are given by: 
 
 𝑃(𝐻𝑉𝑀2012 = 1 |𝐻𝑉𝑀2008 = 1) = 𝑓(𝒙2008)      (4.1) 
 𝑃(𝐻𝑉𝑀2012 = 1 |𝐻𝑉𝑀2008 = 0) = 𝑓(𝒙2008)      (4.2) 
 




where 𝒙 is a vector of household specific explanatory variables. These models can 
provide an indication of why some farmers stayed in HVM while others dropped out, and 
why some farmers joined HVM while others stayed in TM. With opposite signs, the 
estimates also help to explain the mirror outcome, namely reasons for dropping out as 
opposed to staying in HVM, and for staying in TM as opposed to joining HVM. To 
reduce reverse causality and allow coherent interpretation of the probit estimates, all 
household characteristics in 𝒙 are lagged one time period, that is, they refer to 2008.
13
 
The only exception is participation in the NGO project, where we use 2012 values, 
because we expect changes in NGO activity to influence farmers’ decision. 
Participation in the NGO project is potentially endogenous, as there may be 
unobserved factors that are jointly correlated with NGO and HVM participation. 
Similarly, the number of HVM farmers among the five nearest neighbors, which we use 
as a proxy for social capital, may also be endogenous. To test for endogeneity of both 
variables, we employed an instrumental variable (IV) approach, using neighbor 
characteristics as instruments. Details of the IV approach and the test procedure are 
provided in Appendix A4.1 of this paper. The test fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity for both variables (Table A4.3.1 in the appendix). 
Results of the conditional probit models are shown in Table 4.4. The probability 
of joining HVM in the later period as compared to staying in TM increases with off-farm 
employment (column 1). As mentioned, income from off-farm employment may provide 
cash for farm investments when credit markets fail. The probability of joining HVM also 
increases with use of advanced irrigation techniques, access to piped water, and the 
number of neighboring farmers supplying HVM. The probability of staying in HVM as 
compared to dropping out increases with household size, access to electricity, ownership 
of means of transportation, and number of neighboring farmers supplying HVM, but 
decreases if the farmer is a male (column 2).  
It should be noted that the number of observations for these conditional probit 
estimates in Table 4.4 is quite small, especially for the model in column (2). This is also 
the reason for the low levels of statistical significance for some of the variables. We 
tested the robustness of the results by excluding variables that were insignificant. With 
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 The use of lagged variables for farm assets reduces endogeneity issues but may not eliminate them 
completely. If farmers invested in physical capital prior to HVM entry, in order to gain market access, 
assets might still be endogenous. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. 




the exception of own means of transportation, the observed effects are robust to these 
changes. 
The importance of neighbor participation in HVM for farmers’ decisions confirms 
that social capital matters for supply channel choices. Participation in the NGO project is 
not significant. This does not surprise, because the effect shown in Table 4.4 refers to 
2012, when the NGO had already stopped most of its activities in the region. In 
alternative estimates, we replaced NGO participation in 2012 with NGO participation in 
2008 with different results: farmers who participated in the NGO project in 2008 were 21 
percentage points more likely to drop out of HVM by 2012, when the NGO had ceased 
most of its activities. In yet another specification, we used the change in NGO 
participation between 2008 and 2012 as explanatory variable, also leading to a significant 
effect: losing NGO support increased the probability of dropping out of HVM by 23 
percentage points. 
 
Table 4.4.Conditional probit model estimates 
 (1) 
Probability of HVM supply 
in 2012 among those who 
supplied TM in 2008 (HVM 
newcomers) 
(2) 
Probability of HVM supply 
in 2012 among those who 
supplied HVM in 2008 
(HVM stayers) 
Male farmer 0.022 (0.046) -0.260* (0.133) 
Education of farmer 0.002 (0.005) -0.022 (0.018) 
Age of farmer -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.004) 
Household size 0.004 (0.008) 0.058** (0.027) 
Off-farm employment 0.060* (0.034) 0.066 (0.085) 
Land size 0.009 (0.009) 0.014 (0.030) 




 (0.034) 0.169 (0.137) 
Own livestock 0.015 (0.041) 0.025 (0.112) 
Access to electricity 0.055 (0.035) 0.315*** (0.117) 
Own means of transportation -0.033 (0.040) 0.192* (0.111) 
Access to public transportation -0.010 (0.061) 0.118 (0.148) 
Access to tarmac road 0.059 (0.040) 0.132 (0.095) 
Access to piped water 0.065* (0.039) 0.089 (0.093) 
Limuru region -0.034 (0.049) 0.030 (0.218) 
Kikuyu/Westlands region -0.046 (0.043) 0.073 (0.131) 
No. of HVM neighbors  0.044*** (0.013) 0.062** (0.028) 
Participation in NGO project 
(2012) 
-0.009 (0.089) 0.096 (0.137) 
Number of observations 221 115 
Pseudo R
2 0.34 0.25 













These results are consistent with our conceptual framework, predicting that 
physical and social capital matter for HVM participation and that exogenous shocks can 
contribute to additional market entry and exit decisions over time. The fact that the 
probability of staying in HVM (dropping out) increases (decreases) with household size 
may be explained by the higher time requirements in the supermarket channel. 
Households with more members tend to have lower opportunity costs of family labor 
time. 
 
4.5.3 Multinomial Logit Analysis 
The conditional probit model estimates have the advantage that they give us information 
about why farmers change supply channels in the second period, given their first-period 
choice. However, based on these models we cannot draw any generalizable inference 
about which types of farmers are likely to end up as HVM stayers, HVM dropouts, 
newcomers in HVM, or stayers in TM. To analyze these aspects further, we estimate the 
unconditional probability of the different decision paths simultaneously with a 
multinomial logit model, which is specified as: 
 











, 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 = 4
  (4.3) 
 
where j=1 for HVM stayers, j=2 for HVM dropouts, j=3 for HVM newcomers, and j=4 
for TM stayers. As above, 𝒙𝒊 is a vector of explanatory variables specific to each 
household i, and 𝜷 is a vector of parameters to be estimated. We focus on the marginal 
effect of the change in an explanatory variable on the probability of falling into a certain 




∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝛽𝑙)𝑙 . 
Results are shown in Table 4.5. The probability of staying in HVM increases 
with off-farm employment, access to electricity, and the number of neighbors supplying 
HVM. The probability of dropping out increases with education and the number of 




neighbors supplying HVM and decreases with family size.
14
 Better educated farmers and 
smaller families are likely to have higher opportunity costs of time. The fact that the 
number of HVM neighbors positively affects both the probability of staying in HVM and 
the probability of dropping out may surprise on first sight, but is actually plausible with 
this model specification. Farmers can only fall into the HVM stayer and dropout 
categories when they had entered HVM in the first place. As the number of HVM 
neighbors in 2008 is an important determinant of market entry, we expect a positive 
association also with staying and dropping out when the whole sample – with many 
farmers who never entered HVM – is included in estimation. 
The probability of being a HVM newcomer increases with access to piped water, 
access to electricity, and the number of neighbors supplying HVM. Finally, the 
probability of staying in TM decreases with education, off-farm employment, farm size, 
access to public transportation, and the number of neighbors supplying HVM, but 
increases with family size. There also seems to be a regional effect with farmers in 
Limuru being more likely to stay in TM. This can be explained by two factors. First, the 
NGO that helped to link farmers to supermarkets concentrated less on Limuru than on the 
other regions, even in 2008. Second, due to two wholesale market centers located in 
Limuru farmers in that region have better traditional marketing conditions than their 
colleagues in other regions. 
In sum, the results confirm previous studies in that farmer characteristics as well 
as physical and social capital endowments are important determinants of HVM 
participation.
15
 The results add to the knowledge by showing that the same factors also 
play an important role in explaining participation dynamics. Furthermore, the estimation 
results underscore that exogenous shocks can affect farmers’ ability to supply HVM 
differently, depending on individual endowments with different types of capital. 
 
                                                 
14
 As for the conditional probit models, we also ran an alternative specification of the multinomial logit 
model using lagged NGO participation. In that alternative specification, NGO participation in 2008 is 
highly significant in the dropout equation: it increases the probability of dropping out by 0.21. 
15
 As an additional robustness test, we used a correlated random effects probit model to control for 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. Note that such a model with observations from two time periods 
can analyze the determinants of HVM participation, but not the participation dynamics. Results are 
presented in Table A4.3.2 in the Appendix of this paper. Due to correlation between the explanatory 
variables, many of the coefficients are insignificant. Yet, NGO participation and the number of HVM 
neighbors have a positive and significant impact on HVM participation, while household size has a negative 
impact. 




Table 4.5. Multinomial logit model estimates 





































































































































































































Number of observations 336    
Pseudo R







 p<0.1. HVM, high-value markets; TM, traditional markets. Marginal effects 
are shown with standard errors in parentheses.  
 
 
4.6 Impact of Participation 
In this section, we analyze the impacts of HVM participation on household income. We 
develop and estimate a number of different models to address the various questions on 
impact and impact dynamics. We start by estimating the average treatment effect of 
HVM participation with the full sample of farmers, including newcomers and dropouts. 




To better understand the effects of joining and leaving HVM, we then continue by 
splitting the sample accordingly. In a further step, we explore income differences 
between farmers who stayed in HVM and farmers who recently joined, as well as 
between farmers who dropped out of HVM and farmers who stayed in TM. Finally, we 
are interested to know whether the income difference between HVM suppliers and TM 
suppliers is increasing or decreasing over time. A broader discussion of the results and 
their implications is provided in the next section. 
 
4.6.1 Average Impact of HVM Participation 
In a first model, we analyze whether HVM participation has any effect on income. Since 
we have panel data available, we employ a differencing technique, using the change in 
household income (𝑦) between 2008 and 2012 as dependent variable, and the change in 
HVM participation as treatment variable. Furthermore, we include changes in relevant 
farm and household characteristics (𝒛) as control variables: 
 
 𝑦2012 − 𝑦2008 = 𝛼 + 𝛿(𝒛2012 − 𝒛2008) + 𝛾1(𝐻𝑉𝑀2012 − 𝐻𝑉𝑀2008) + 𝑒                   (4.4) 
 
This model has the advantage that all unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity is 
removed, because it exploits the within-household variability in the variables. The 
coefficient 𝛾1  gives the impact of HVM participation. 
Descriptive statistics of the difference variables used in the impact regressions are 
shown in Table A4.3.3 in the Appendix of this chapter. Estimation results are shown in 
Table 4.6. HVM participation has a large positive and significant effect on household 
income. The coefficient implies that – controlling for other factors – HVM suppliers have 
an income that is 185 thousand Ksh higher than that of TM suppliers, equivalent to a 59% 
difference. However, since changes in the treatment variable may occur through both 
farmers entering and leaving HVM, the underlying dynamics remain unclear. This will be 
further analyzed below. 
 
  




Table 4.6. Average impact of HVM participation on household income 
 
Change in household income 
Change in HVM 184,589*** (59,577) 
Change in age of farmer 2,064 (2,934) 
Change in gender of farmer -61,890 (59,215) 
Change in education of farmer 5,579 (8,926) 
Change in land size 65,119*** (18,136) 
Change in livestock ownership 143,300** (66,152) 
Change in off-farm employment 95,944** (43,403) 
Change in use of advanced irrigation techniques 1,287 (56,782) 
Change in household size 12,267 (12,714) 
Change in ownership of means of transportation -5,740 (75,601) 
Constant 40,825 (33,788) 









 p<0.1. HVM, high-value markets. Coefficient estimates are shown with 




4.6.2 Impact of Entering and Leaving HVM 
A drawback of the differencing model in equation (4.4) is that the treatment variable 
(𝐻𝑉𝑀2012 − 𝐻𝑉𝑀2008) takes on the value 1 for farmers that join HVM, 0 for farmers 
that stay either in HVM or TM, and -1 for farmers that drop out of HVM. In our case, 
only 16 farmers newly entered HVM between 2008 and 2012, while 54 previous HVM 
suppliers dropped out. This implies that the result presented in Table 4.6 is likely driven 
by the income loss associated with dropping out. In a different model specification, we 
split the sample and separately analyze the income effect of entering and leaving HVM: 
 
 (𝑦2012 − 𝑦2008|𝐻𝑉𝑀2008 = 0) =       (4.5) 
𝛼 + 𝛿(𝒛2012 − 𝒛2008) + 𝛾2(𝐻𝑉𝑀2012 − 𝐻𝑉𝑀2008) + 𝑒 
 
 (𝑦2012 − 𝑦2008|𝐻𝑉𝑀2008 = 1) =        (4.6) 
𝛼 + 𝛿(𝒛2012 − 𝒛2008) + 𝛾3(𝐻𝑉𝑀2008 − 𝐻𝑉𝑀2012) + 𝑒 
 
where 𝛾2 describes the impact of joining HVM as compared to staying in TM, and 𝛾3 
describes the effect of dropping out of HVM as compared to staying in that channel. To 




facilitate interpretation, we have turned around the HVM difference in equation (4.6), so 
that a negative sign of 𝛾3 would indicate an income loss from dropping out and vice 
versa. 
We estimate these models in equations (4.5) and (4.6) with ordinary least squares 
(OLS). To control for time-variant heterogeneity we additionally use a treatment-effect 
estimator, where the treatment variable is instrumented with the number of HVM farmers 
among the five nearest neighbors. This variable was shown to play an important role for 
farmers’ participation decisions and was tested successfully for exogeneity in the 
participation equation. We performed additional analyses to test whether the number of 
HVM neighbors has a direct influence on household income. These tests are described in 
Appendix A4.2 of this paper; they confirm the validity of the instrument. 
Results from estimates of equations (4.5) and (4.6) are shown in Table 4.7. The 
results suggest that joining HVM contributes to significant income gains. This holds true 
for both the OLS and treatment-effects results. The estimates also indicate that dropping 




                                                 
16
 As an alternative to the models in equations (5) and (6) one could analyze the effects of joining and 
leaving HVM in one model with the full sample and separate treatment dummies for HVM newcomers, 
HVM dropouts, and HVM stayers (TM stayers would form the reference). We estimated such an 
alternative model with OLS and obtained similar results. In order to control for selection on time-variant 
unobserved variables, we also tried estimating the model using a multivariate treatment regression. 
However, the results proved to be highly sensitive to the number of draws and are therefore not reported 
here. In this respect, splitting the sample is advantageous. A drawback is that the inference can only be 
drawn for the subsample used, not for the whole sample.  




Table 4.7.Impact of entering and leaving HVM on household income 























































































































































First-stage probit: dependent variable 𝐻𝑉𝑀2008 




















LR test of independent equations 
(p)   
0.371 0.474 
Number of observations 221 115 221 115 
Adjusted R








 p<0.1. HVM, high-value markets. Coefficient estimates are shown with 
standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in all models is change in annual household income 
measured in Ksh.  
 
 
4.6.3 Income Differences between Farmers in the Same Channel 
As discussed above, farmers in the same supply channel but with a different participation 
history may earn different incomes, for instance, due to sunk costs and credit market 
imperfections. We estimate two additional models to examine whether income 




differences within one channel can be observed, depending on participation history. One 
of these models looks at farmers who supplied HVM and the other at farmers who 
supplied TM in 2012: 
 
 (𝑦2012|𝐻𝑉𝑀2012 = 0) = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝒛2012 + 𝛾4𝐻𝑉𝑀2008 + 𝑒     (4.7) 
 (𝑦2012|𝐻𝑉𝑀2012 = 1) = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝒛2012 + 𝛾5𝐻𝑉𝑀2008 + 𝑒     (4.8) 
 
Note that we are now interested in explaining income in 2012, not income changes over 
time. For TM suppliers in 2012, 𝛾4 indicates whether there is an income difference 
between those that stayed in TM and those that dropped out of HVM. A negative 
coefficient would suggest that dropouts are worse off than TM stayers, which could be 
due to overinvestment in certain production equipment. For HVM suppliers in 2012, 𝛾5 
indicates the income difference between newcomers and stayers in HVM. A positive 
(negative) coefficient would suggest that HVM stayers (newcomers) have an income 
advantage. Equations (4.7) and (4.8) are not based on differencing techniques, so both 
time-variant and time-invariant heterogeneity can potentially bias the results. We employ 
a treatment-effect estimator to control for such bias, using the number of HVM neighbors 
as instrument for HVM participation. 
The estimation results are shown in Table 4.8. We do not find a significant 
income difference between stayers in TM and dropouts from HVM. Thus, dropouts do 
not seem to suffer from overinvestment. Likewise, we do not observe a significant 
difference between HVM stayers and newcomers. 
 
  




Table 4.8.Difference in income between farmers in the same supply channel 
  OLS Treatment effects 
Model  









































































































































































First-stage probit: dependent variable 𝐻𝑉𝑀2008 
















LR test of independent equations 
(p)   
0.541 0.515 
Number of observations 259 77 259 77 
Adjusted R








 p<0.1. HVM, high-value markets. Coefficient estimates are shown with 








4.6.4 Income Divergence or Convergence between Channels 
In a next step, we are interested to see whether the income gap between HVM 
participants and non-participants increases or decreases over time. We estimate: 
 
 (𝑦2012 − 𝑦2008|𝐻𝑉𝑀2012 = 𝐻𝑉𝑀2008) = 𝛼 + 𝛿(𝒛2012 − 𝒛2008) + 𝛾6𝐻𝑉𝑀2008 + 𝑒   
          (4.9) 
 
This model is confined to farmers that did not change their supply channel between 2008 
and 2012, that is, we look at HVM stayers and TM stayers. Hence, 𝛾6 can be interpreted 
as the difference in income dynamics between the two channels, controlling for other 
factors. A positive 𝛾6 would indicate an increasing income divergence between the two 
channels, whereas a negative coefficient would imply a converging trend. 
Table 4.9 shows the estimation results. The positive and significant coefficient 
for the HVM dummy indicates that the income difference between the two channels 
diverges over time. That is, controlling for other factors, HVM stayers have higher 
income growth than TM stayers, which may be explained by the possibility to build up a 
larger capital stock from the higher profits in HVM. 
  




Table 4.9.Difference in income between HVM stayers and TM stayers 




































































First-stage probit: dependent variable 𝐻𝑉𝑀2008 












LR test of independent equations (p) 
 
0.474 










 p<0.1. HVM, high-value markets. Coefficient estimates are shown with 






Despite the fact that participation in HVM was associated with substantial income gains 
in 2008 (Rao and Qaim, 2011), almost half of the previous HVM suppliers had dropped 
out four years later. Our analysis suggests that dropping out of HVM is not a decision 
based on economic superiority. On the contrary, being in HVM is still associated with 
higher incomes, while dropping out leads to a significant income loss. When asking the 
farmers about their reason for dropping out, time constraints were frequently mentioned. 
This is in line with our econometric result that larger household size increases the 
probability of staying in HVM, while smaller household size increases the probability of 




dropping out. Household size is a proxy for the availability of family labor. Especially 
cleaning, bundling, and delivering the vegetables to the supermarkets in Nairobi are time-
intensive activities that are difficult to outsource to hired labor. Hence, referring back to 
the diagrams discussed in the conceptual framework, access to household labor seems to 
be another type of capital that influences farmers’ ability to supply HVM. 
Strong social networks or assistance through an NGO – as was offered in 2008 – 
can reduce the need for family labor to a certain extent, because activities can be 
coordinated and transaction costs reduced. Indeed, we find that farmers with more HVM 
neighbors and NGO support are more likely to participate themselves in HVM. The NGO 
also provided specific training for farmers to supply supermarkets successfully. However, 
when the NGO activities were reduced in subsequent years, many supermarket suppliers 
switched back to traditional channels, especially those that had relied on NGO support in 
the past. 
Our results also suggest that heterogeneous physical capital endowments, such 
as piped water, advanced irrigation techniques, transportation, and off-farm income, are 
important factors in explaining why some farmers join HVM and others do not. Such 
physical capital components also influence the participation dynamics. 
We showed that farmers who dropped out of HVM have a lower income than if 
they would have stayed in HVM, but do they earn less than if they had stayed in TM? As 
argued in the conceptual framework, farmers who expected to remain in HVM but, for 
some reason, are forced to drop out, may find themselves in a situation where they have 
overinvested in productive assets and equipment. However, in the empirical analysis we 
did not find that HVM dropouts earn less than TM stayers, suggesting that 
overinvestment may not be a large problem. This is also confirmed when we look at the 
value of production equipment across farms. For instance, the 2012 value of irrigation 
equipment (water pumps, irrigation pipes, and sprinklers) does not differ significantly 
between HVM dropouts and TM stayers. Another interesting aspect is the role of off-
farm income. Compared to the TM stayers, the group of HVM dropouts had lower off-
farm incomes in 2008 (when they supplied HVM), but not in 2012. A plausible 
explanation is that the freed family labor time after the dropout could be used for other 
income-earning activities, thus reducing the loss from switching back to TM. 
Looking at the income dynamics in the HVM channel we found that newcomers 
have a higher income than if they would have stayed in TM. Moreover, HVM newcomers 




realize gains that are similar to those of the HVM stayers, suggesting that earlier market 
entrants do not have an income advantage through capital accumulation in the earlier 
period. Indeed, we do not find significant differences when comparing the value of 
equipment between HVM stayers and newcomers. However, as the number of HVM 
newcomers in our sample is very small, these results should be interpreted with caution. 
Finally, our results suggest that the income growth for farmers who manage to 
stay in HVM is higher than for farmers in TM, pointing at widening disparities between 
the two channels. Given the substantial income gains that can be achieved in the 
supermarket channel, policymakers may be interested in finding ways to increase 
participation of smallholders. The NGO linkage activities were quite effective as long as 
they lasted. Yet, a major challenge is to find solutions that are sustainable and do not 
result in considerable dropout once the support is withdrawn. Recognizing the 
importance of neighbors supplying HVM, policies that target groups of people should be 
preferred over policies that target individual farmers. 
One limitation of our study is the relatively small sample size, especially when it 
comes to farmers who newly entered supermarket channels between the first and the 
second round of the panel survey. Follow-up studies with larger sample sizes and more 
rounds of data collection would be interesting to verify the results. It should also be 
stressed that our sample of farmers from Kiambu is not necessarily representative of 
Kenya as a whole or other regions in Africa. Kiambu is relatively close to Nairobi, where 
market access is more favorable than in remoter regions. Gains from supplying 




In this article, we have used panel data from Kenya to study the dynamics of farmer 
participation in supermarket channels and related impacts on household income. The 
results confirm that supermarket participation is associated with large income advantages, 
which is in line with most previous studies that had used cross-section data. However, the 
estimation results from the first-difference models are mainly driven by a larger number 
of farmers that dropped out of the supermarket channel – a shift that led to significant 
reductions in income. The supermarket revolution promises to benefit farmers in Africa, 




but it may also contribute to rising income disparities, unless infrastructure improvements 
and organizational support for smallholders are implemented on a broader scale. 
However, taking a broader perspective it should be stressed that rural households 
can benefit from the supermarket revolution and other supply chain transformations not 
only as farmers, but also through spillovers to labor markets. While this was not 
examined here, several studies showed that supermarkets and related high-value supply 
chains for horticultural crops tend to generate additional rural employment, especially for 
women (Maertens and Swinnen 2009; Colen et al. 2012; Rao and Qaim 2013). Analyzing 





A4.1 Testing for Endogeneity in Probit Models 
In the probit models described in equations (4.1) and (4.2) of the article, two variables 
may potentially be endogenous, namely the number of farmers supplying HVM among 
the five nearest neighbors and participation in the NGO project. To test whether 
endogeneity is an issue that leads to a bias in our estimates, we used an instrumental 
variable (IV) approach. As instruments, we use neighbor characteristics, aggregated as 
the sum of the five nearest neighbors’ individual values. The number of farmers 
supplying HVM among the five nearest neighbors is instrumented with the gender (male 
dummy), education (years of schooling), and household size of these neighbors. As was 
shown in previous research (e.g., Neven et al., 2009; Reardon et al., 2009), these 
characteristics influence farmers’ supply channel choices. At the same time, neighbor 
characteristics are not expected to affect the farmer’s own participation decision directly. 
In their study on social networks and technology adoption in India, Matuschke and Qaim 
(2009) demonstrated that the decisions of neighbors and other network members 
influenced farmers’ own adoption behavior, whereas network members’ characteristics 
did not have a direct effect. This is in line with Santos and Barrett (2010), who used data 
from Ghana to show that other farmers are important sources of information but that the 
identity of these other farmers does not play a significant role for own decision-making. 
One could argue that better-off farmers, who are more likely to supply HVM, 
cluster in certain localities, which could lead to correlation between neighbors’ 




characteristics and the probit model error terms. However, except for certain geographic 
differences that we control for through regional dummies, the study area is very 
homogenous in terms of agroecological conditions. Also, regional clustering based on 
household characteristics is uncommon in rural areas of Kenya, where land is inherited 
from one generation to the next. 
The other potentially endogenous variable, participation in the NGO project, is 
instrumented with the number of farmers among the five nearest neighbors who 
participated in the same NGO project and owned a car or van in the previous period. The 
motivation behind using this instrument is that the NGO promotes collective action 
among farmers and that the attractiveness of participation increases when neighboring 
farmers that can provide transportation are also part of this project. At the same time, it is 
unlikely that this variable is correlated with the error terms in equations (4.1) and (4.2) for 
the same reasons as explained for the other instruments. 
Results from the IV probit, including first-stage results for both potentially 
endogenous variables, are shown in Table A4.3.1 in the Appendix of this chapter. For 
comparison the normal probit results are also shown. The significance of the instruments 
in the first-stage regressions together with the test of overidentifying restrictions suggest 
that the instruments are valid. Yet a Wald test that we carried out fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that the two variables – number of HVM neighbors and NGO participation – 
are exogenous. The models shown in Table A4.3.1 use the total sample of 336 farmers to 
increase the number of observations and have more degrees of freedom. We carried out 
the same IV estimations and statistical tests also for the two subsamples of the conditional 
probit (equations 4.1 and 4.2) with the same general conclusion. 
 
A4.2 Validity of the Instrument in the Impact Models 
The models to analyze the impact of HVM participation on household income use 
differencing techniques that control for time-invariant heterogeneity. However, the 
treatment variables (HVM or change in HVM) may potentially be correlated with 
unobserved time-variant effects. If such time-variant effects also influence income, they 
might lead to biased estimates of the treatment effects. To control for time-variant 
heterogeneity, we use a treatment-effect estimator, where the treatment variable in each 
model is instrumented with the number of HVM farmers among the five nearest 
neighbors. As was shown, this variable is exogenous and correlated with HVM 




participation. However, it is theoretically possible that the number of HVM neighbors 
affects income and income changes also through other channels. For instance, innovative 
farmers in the neighborhood may contribute to broader knowledge spillovers or gains 
from collective action beyond the supermarket channel. We carried out several tests to 
find out whether such alternative effects of the instrument on the outcome variables exist. 
In a first test, we follow an approach by Di Falco et al. (2011) and regress the 
change in household income directly on the number of HVM neighbors, including other 
controls. Results are shown in Table A4.3.4 further below. In column (1), we use the 
subsample of TM suppliers to see whether they might also benefit from HVM farmers in 
their neighborhood. However, we do not find a significant effect. In column (2), we use 
the subsample of HVM suppliers; their decision to supply HVM is influenced by HVM 
neighbors, but does the number of HVM neighbors also have a direct effect? In other 
words, is there a heterogeneous impact on income depending on the number of HVM 
neighbors (see Bjorklund and Moffitt, 1987)? Again, we do not find a statistically 
significant effect. 
We also correlated the number of HVM neighbors with vegetable revenue. A 
positive correlation coefficient could indicate that farmers coordinate their supply or 
jointly negotiate for better prices. But we find a small, insignificant negative coefficient 
of -0.02. The correlation coefficient between the number of HVM neighbors and total 
household income is -0.11. We conclude that the number of HVM farmers among the 








A4.3 Appendix Tables 
 


















Participation in NGO project (NGO) 0.654
*
 (0.361) 1.164 (2.357) 
  
Male farmer -0.051 (0.356) -0.054 (0.410) 0.290 (0.216) -0.046 (0.045) 
Education of farmer 0.026 (0.030) 0.026 (0.034) -0.042
**
 (0.019) 0.003 (0.004) 
Age of farmer -0.007 (0.009) -0.006 (0.009) -0.015
***
 (0.005) 0.000 (0.001) 







 (0.127) -0.009 (0.026) 
Land size 0.055 (0.062) 0.053 (0.070) 0.029 (0.037) -0.008 (0.008) 
Use of advanced irrigation techniques 0.451 (0.295) 0.424 (0.302) 0.161 (0.164) 0.035 (0.034) 
Own livestock 0.219 (0.267) 0.242 (0.285) -0.346
**
 (0.171) -0.001 (0.035) 






 (0.158) 0.013 (0.033) 
Own means of transportation 0.457
*
 (0.268) 0.450 (0.297) 0.302 (0.195) -0.018 (0.040) 
Access to public transportation 0.294 (0.309) 0.247 (0.346) -0.017 (0.182) 0.042 (0.038) 
Access to tarmac road 0.319 (0.216) 0.300 (0.219) 0.149 (0.145) 0.014 (0.030) 
Access to piped water 0.246 (0.199) 0.227 (0.211) 0.230 (0.142) 0.008 (0.029) 





Kikuyu/Westlands region 0.135( 0.269) 0.185 (0.557) 0.405
*







 (0.660) 0.061 (0.137) 






 (0.063) -0.017 (0.013) 
Education among five nearest neighbors   0.027
***
 (0.008) -0.000 (0.002) 




 (0.013) 0.000 (0.003) 
NGO participants and car owners among 













 p<0.1. Coefficient estimates are shown with standard errors in parentheses. The 
test of overidentifying restrictions fails to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with 








Table A4.3.2.Correlated random effects probit estimates 
 HVM participation 
 Coefficients Std. Error 
Male farmer 0.471 (0.379) 
Education of farmer 0.0537 (0.0583) 
Age of farmer 0.00157 (0.0199) 
Household size -0.207** (0.0853) 
Off-farm employment -0.0345 (0.284) 
Land size 0.0747 (0.124) 
Use of advanced irrigation techniques -0.155 (0.397) 
Own livestock -0.173 (0.454) 
Access to electricity -0.112 (0.489) 
Own means of transportation 0.722 (0.449) 
Access to public transportation 0.231 (0.314) 
Access to tarmac road -0.399 (0.349) 
Access to piped water -0.0551 (0.314) 
No. of HVM neighbors  0.404*** (0.134) 
Participation in NGO project 0.916** (0.445) 
Mean of explanatory variables yes  







 p<0.1. HVM, high-value markets. 
 
Table A4.3.3. Descriptive statistics of difference variables used in impact models 
 Mean value Standard deviation 
Change in income 70,124 490,149 
Change in HVM -0.11 0.44 
Change in age of farmer 0.99 9.61 
Change in gender of farmer -0.25 0.45 
Change in education of farmer 0.23 3.04 
Change in land size 0.16 1.65 
Change in livestock ownership 0.03 0.39 
Change in off-farm employment 0.21 0.60 
Change in use of advanced irrigation techniques -0.01 0.46 
Change in household size 0.82 2.07 
Change in ownership in means of transportation -0.05 0.35 
Number of observations 336  
Note: All changes were calculated as 2012 minus 2008 values. 








Change in income (TM 
suppliers in 2012) 
(2) 
Change in income (HVM 
suppliers in 2012) 
Age of farmer 344.2 -12584.6* 
 
(1874.6) (6836.6) 
Gender of farmer -17375.3 377510.3** 
 
(45584.6) (171784.6) 
Education of farmer 5229.4 -38537.8 
 
(6867.0) (28188.8) 
Land size 30357.8*** 148954.7*** 
 
(11379.9) (30059.2) 
Livestock ownership 121300.5* 479664.6** 
 
(62972.8) (226620.7) 
Off-farm employment 161498.6*** -135760.3 
 
(46089.2) (212504.3) 
Use of advanced irrigation techniques 60501.9 445627.3* 
 
(49087.7) (231421.4) 
Household size 18200.2 31824.1 
 
(12237.4) (42676.2) 
Ownership of means of transportation 272894.3** 844515.5*** 
 
(110084.4) (191767.2) 
No. of HVM neighbors 3005.0 -59924.3 
 
(19165.5) (46231.2) 
Constant -191739.4 202405.4 
 
(157469.4) (629187.8) 







 p<0.1. HVM, high-value markets. TM, traditional markets. Coefficient 
estimates are shown with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is change in annual 








5 General Conclusion 
 
5.1 Main Findings 
Many developing countries are currently experiencing a profound food system 
transformation, which is associated with a rapid growth of modern retailers such as 
supermarkets. The growth of modern supply chains has been prominent in developing 
countries in the past two decades. Recent studies show that supplying emerging high-
value markets (HVM) can be beneficial to producers in terms of improved incomes and 
productivity. However, there is still continued debate on other ways in which producers 
may benefit and also whether smallholders are able to overcome hurdles associated with 
supplying the HVM. Supplying HVM necessitates that farmers have the essential capital 
base to produce the required quantities while meeting the quality requirements. For 
farmers to supply HVM successfully, they may need information regarding buyer 
requirements, how to change their production and marketing system to meet those 
requirements, and benefits that accrue from supplying HVM. Such information may be 
less required when supplying traditional markets, but lack of access to information may 
limit smallholders from HVM participation. 
In this dissertation, we contribute to the literature by analyzing the role of 
information networks in disseminating HVM information and hence participation. 
Additionally, we analyze the impacts of HVM participation on household nutrition and 
incomes.  These aspects have either not been researched before, or they have been 
insufficiently researched. We have undertaken these analyses in three different but 
interlinked essays. The first and second essays have primarily used cross-section data 
collected from smallholder vegetable farmers in rural Kenya in 2012. The third essay has 
built on panel data from the same smallholder farmers collected over two rounds: 2008 
and 2012. 
In the first essay, we have analyzed the role of information networks in spreading 
information regarding HVM participation, an area that has not been analyzed before. 
Inadequate market information is cited as a main constraint in market participation. In the 
case of HVM participation, lack of market information may mean that only few farmers 
participate in these markets. Further developments of the modern markets could therefore 




aggravate the difference between small and large farms due to differential access to 
market information. In this essay, we have analyzed characteristics of farmers that are 
likely to exchange market information using individual level data and dyadic regressions. 
We have found that farmers supplying HVM are exchanging market information among 
themselves, and they are also getting information from those supplying traditional 
markets (TM). However, we do not find evidence that TM farmers are obtaining market 
information from HVM farmers. In addition, we have analyzed the impact of having an 
information link with HVM farmers on participation in HVM. Using probit models, we 
have shown that having an information link with at least one farmer who previously 
supplied HVM increases farmers’ own probability of participation in HVM by 10 to 19 
percentage points. To get a better understanding of these impacts over time, we have 
analyzed effect of the information networks on HVM participation dynamics using 
multinomial logit models.  We found that having an information link with at least one 
HVM farmer increases farmer’s own probability of participation in HVM over time but it 
decreases farmer’s probability of supplying TM over time.   
In the second essay, we have analyzed impacts and impact pathways of HVM 
participation on household nutrition, an area that has also not been analyzed before. Our 
analysis has utilized seven-day recall data on household food consumption covering over 
180 different food items. To analyze impacts, we have used an instrumental variable 
approach to control for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. In a further step, we 
have used simultaneous equations to explore possible impact pathways. Our results show 
that participation in HVM has a positive effect on household nutrition. Controlling for 
other factors, we show that participation in HVM increases calorie, iron and zinc 
consumption by 15-20% and vitamin A consumption by almost 100%. Further, we have 
analyzed impact pathways using simultaneous equation models and have shown that 
HVM participation affects household nutrition through three main pathways: income, 
crop production choices at the farm level and changes in gender roles within the 
household. We have shown that the overall positive effect of HVM participation on 
household nutrition occurs through increases in household income and specialization in 
vegetable production, but loss in female control over vegetable revenue has a negative 
effect on household nutrition. This essay contributes to the literature by bringing in a new 
aspect in the analysis of impacts of HVM participation. It also contributes conceptually to 
the recent debate on linkages between agriculture and nutrition.  




In the third essay, we have analyzed income effects of HVM participation using 
differencing techniques and instrumental variable approaches. In addition, we have used 
multinomial logit models to examine dynamics of HVM participation and the effects of 
the dynamics on household income. We show that participation in HVM is associated 
with a 59% increase in household income. On the other hand, dropping out of HVM leads 
to a significant decrease in household income. Finally, we found that the income growth 
for farmers who stay in HVM is higher than for those staying in TM, hence indicating 
that the inequality between farmers in the two channels may widen over time. This essay 
makes important contributions to the literature by reinforcing the positive effects of HVM 
participation and showing dynamics of HVM participation and their effects on household 
incomes.  
 
5.2 Policy Recommendations 
Overall, our study shows that the food system transformation and the modernization of 
supply chains in developing countries can contribute to economic development and 
important welfare benefits to farm households. Policy makers should support measures 
that allow smallholders to access and remain in HVM. For instance, informal information 
networks could be used in dissemination of market information, hence increasing HVM 
participation, but this should be done with care as targeting certain farmers only could 
lead to further marginalization of poor farmers.  
From the first essay, we find that farmers obtain market information from fellow 
farmers. However, only HVM farmers are likely to obtain information from each other 
and also from TM farmers. We find no evidence that TM farmers obtain market 
information from those supplying HVM. As the modern supply chains spread out, the gap 
between HVM farmers and TM farmers is likely to worsen due to unequal access to 
market information. To mitigate this risk, policy makers should promote measures that 
make market information accessible to all farmers irrespective of where they are 
supplying. Extension officers, for instance, could disseminate such information through 
small groups of farmers consisting of both HVM and TM supplying farmers.  
From the second essay, we have found that participation has a positive effect on 
household nutrition. This has important implications as smallholder farmers make up a 
large proportion of all undernourished people worldwide. There is need for policy support 
to link small farms to emerging supply chains and assist them to overcome constraints 




that would otherwise limit them from participation, such as poor infrastructure, lack of 
physical capital required to participate, and lack of market information among others.  
Further, the impact pathway analysis shows that a good understanding of agriculture-
nutrition linkages is needed to promote desirable outcomes. Our findings show that the 
role of women needs to be strengthened to further improve nutritional benefits. As 
modern supply chains expand, programs that work on linking smallholders to these 
markets should ensure that women are included as the main players in terms of 
production and marketing of the crops and playing a role in the decision making on the 
use of revenue that comes from those crops. Addressing challenges of HVM participation 
in such directions could increase participation by smallholders but also by women 
smallholders. This could consequently lead to improved dietary quality in the households 
hence reduction in levels of undernourishment and micronutrient deficiency. 
From the third essay, we have found that participation leads to large income gains 
for farm households. Those who stay in HVM have larger gains than those who stay in 
TM, indicating possibility of widening inequality between large and small farms. 
Furthermore, those who drop out of HVM experience a huge income loss. To tap the 
income benefits arising from HVM participation and avoid the negative consequences of 
dropping out, policy makers need to address constraints that bar smallholders from 
supplying HVM, for example poor infrastructure, inadequate physical capital, and 
missing or insufficient market information. If more smallholders are able to supply and 
remain in HVM, this could have positive effects on poverty reduction in developing 
countries. 
 
5.3 Limitation of the Study and Areas for Further Research  
Our study shows that obtaining market information from a farmer who has previously 
supplied HVM increases the farmer’s own probability of participation in HVM, which in 
turn leads to improved household dietary quality and income. However, there are several 
aspects that limit the scope of our findings.  
First, the analysis of effects of information network on HVM participation builds 
on cross-sectional data, where smallholders self-select into HVM. Even though we test 
for endogeneity in our analysis, it is still possible that some unobserved factors affect the 
results. Collecting panel data in combination with behavioral field experiments to capture 
unobserved endogeneity would be useful.  




Second, due to the small number of farmers from different strata that each 
respondent was matched with, we could only capture the information network as binary 
variable, hence missing out on the effect of the size of the information network on HVM 
participation. A future study should increase the number of farmers each respondent is 
matched with in each stratum so as to increase the probability of knowing farmers in 
different strata. 
Third, the analysis of impacts of HVM participation on household nutrition is also 
based on cross-section data, which is likely to suffer from farmers self-selecting into 
HVM. Even though we use a instrumental variable approach and perform validity tests of 
our instruments, a more rigorous analysis would be possible with panel data. With cross-
sectional data, there are several interesting questions that we are not able to analyze. For 
instance: what happens to household nutrition as the households continue supplying 
HVM over time? Does the dietary quality of households that drop out of HVM channels 
deteriorate or not? Does the dietary quality of the households that remain in TM 
deteriorate with time or not? Since such dynamics cannot be analyzed with cross-
sectional data, panel data would be helpful in better controlling for endogeneity and also 
in analyzing dynamics.  
Fourth, our analysis is based on seven-day recall consumption data. Such data can 
deliver good indicators of dietary quality but not precise measures for nutritional status. 
To fully understand impacts of HVM participation on nutritional status, better indicators 
of nutritional status such as anthropometric data need to be collected.  
Fifth, the results on impact pathways of HVM participation on household nutrition 
are specific to the Kenyan context and should not be generalized. Gender effects may 
differ with culture, and the effects of specialization will differ by the type of crop 
supplied to HVM. If the crop has no nutritive value, then the impact of the specialization 
pathway on household nutrition could differ. 
Sixth, the interpretability of our results in the third essay on dynamics of HVM 
participation and their income effects may be limited by the relatively small sample size 
of farmers that newly joined HVM in the second round. Follow-up study with larger 
sample sizes and more rounds of survey would be important to verify the results. The 
results of this essay are also specific to the area of study. Kiambu, the study area is 
relatively close to Nairobi the capital city, and therefore farmers may have better market 
access than those in remoter regions. Farmers in remoter regions of Kenya, or in other 




parts of Africa, may possibly face more participation constraints or get lower gains from 
HVM participation. Therefore, there is need for studies to be undertaken in other regions 
of Kenya and other developing countries in general, so as to make a within-country or 
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HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 2012 
 
UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN 
FOLLOW UP SURVEY ON ACCESS TO HIGH-VALUE AGRICULTURAL 
MARKETS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE 
OF VEGETABLE PRODUCTION IN CENTRAL KENYA. 
 
“We are students from Gottingen University-Germany, who are studying different aspects of agricultural development. 
We are currently doing a follow up survey on the study conducted by James Rao in 2008 about vegetable production in 
Kiambu area. The main purpose of this study is to understand more about farmers’ decisions about production and 
marketing of vegetables. Your participation in answering these questions is very much appreciated. Your responses will 
be COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL and will only be used for research purpose. Your responses will be added to 
those of 402 other households and analyzed together. If you indicate your voluntary consent by participating in this 
interview, may we begin? 
 
 
Household No:   HHID 
 ______________ 
                                                            Survey Date: (dd/mm/yyyy)   SURDATE    
____/____/ 2012 
     Start time (24 Hrs)  STIME______:_____ 
 
HH head Name (Full name)        __________________________________ 
 
Respondent’s name (Full name) ___________________________  RESMEM________                                       
 
Cell phone number   _____________________________________ 
 
(Enumerator Instruction:  Record the member number (RESMEM) of the Respondent from the 
Demography table on page 29 after the survey is completed.) 
 
Identifying Variables: 
Supervisor:  ____________________________  SNUM __________         
Enumerator:  ____________________________  ENUM __________     
District:  ____________________________  DIST ___________   
Division:  ____________________________  DIV ___________    
Location:   _______________________________  LOC ____________
   
Sub-Location:  ____________________________  SUBLOC _________    
Village:   ____________________________  VIL ____________ 
Supplier to HVC in 2008? (0=No;1=Yes directly;2=Indirectly) HVCSUPLR _______ 
 
GPS Co-ordinates (homestead): GPS No : ______      Waypoint No : _____ 
                    (1=North; 
2=South)  
     
                              
EAST=1   
 
          ELEVATION (M.A.S.L) 
 
Data entry clerk Name: _____________________________ DECODE__________ 
  
 
    .           
          
1    .      
          
      METRES 
Questionnaire number (HHID) ____________________ 
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1.0 GENERAL FARMING INFORMATION  
1.1 In total, what is the size of the land holding (area owned) by this household? 





1.2 For how long have you been farming (as an independent household)?  
a) Years: _______ b) Months: _______  
1.3 What was the size of the farm when you started cultivating it?   
a) Size:  __________  
b) Unit: ___________ (1= acres, 2= m2, 3=Ha, , 4=feet2) 
1.4 In the current season (March-August 2012), what crops do you grow on your farm 
and what size of your farm is allocated to each crop grown? 
   Total area under crop Area owned Area leased in 
Crop 
code 





Area (use the 
same unit code as 
for total area 
under crop) 
Area (use the 
unit code for as 
for total area 
under crop) 
1 All Vegetables 
b 
   
 
2 Potatoes (Irish)    
 
3 Sweet potatoes    
 
4 Maize    
 
5 Beans     
 
6 Yams    
 
7 Tea    
 
8 Coffee    
 
9 Bananas    
 
10 Fodder    
 
11 Other (Specify1____________)    
 
12 Other (Specify2____________)    
 
13 Other (Specify3____________)    
 
14 Other (Specify4____________)    
 
15 Other (Specify5____________)    
 
 
 Total area leased out    
 
  a 
UNIT CODE: 1= acres, 2= m
2
, 3=Ha, , 4=feet
2 
b 
Vegetables refers to all  vegetables including  tomatoes and onions 




1.5 Do you use irrigation on your farm? ______ (Yes =1; No =0) (If No, Go to Q1.9) 
1.6 If yes, how long have you been using irrigation? Years:  ______ Months: _______  
1.7 For the current season (March-August 2012), what size of your total cultivated area 
is irrigated?  
a) Size:  __________  b) Unit: __________ (1= acres, 2= m2, 3=Ha,, 4=feet2 
) 
1.8 If you irrigate part/whole of your farm, what special irrigation equipment do you 
have?  
Irrigation equipment/tool 1=YES; 0=NO 
1) Water pump  
2) Borehole  
3) Well  
4) Dam  
5) Water tank  
6) Drip irrigation system  
7) Special pipes  
8) Sprinkler  
9) Watering can  
10) Other (please specify) ________________  
1.9 What is the value of all vegetables sold and consumed from the farm for the last crop 
year (2011/2012)? (Please make sure that sales and consumption from the full year is included) 
Rainy season  
(March-May 2011 and  Nov-Dec 2011) 
Dry season   
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1.10  Please give the following production and revenue details for other crops grown during both long and short rains seasons last farming 
year (2011) –excluding vegetables 










(September 2011-January 2012) 




Crop name Quantity 
produced 





























































2 Potatoes (Irish)                
3 Sweet potatoes                
4 Dry Maize                
11 Green Maize                
5 Beans                 
6 Yams                
12 Other (Specify1 
____________) 
               
13 Other (Specify2 
____________) 
               
















     








2=5 Kg bag 
3=25 Kg 
bag 
4=50 kg bag 
5=90 kg bag 
6=Debe (18 kgs) 
7=Number/Unit 
8=Gorogoro (2.25 
kg tin)  
9=1/4 kg tin 







Questionnaire number (HHID) ____________________ 
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1.11For each crop mentioned above please give details of the cost of production for the crop year 2011. Details should be for all plots and the two 











Seeds Fertilizer Manure Pesticide 








































1 All Vegetables               
2 Potatoes (Irish)               
3 Sweet potatoes               
4 Maize               
5 Beans               
6 Yams               
7 Tea               
8 Coffee               
9 Bananas               
12 Other (specify1_______) 
(Specify1____________) 
              
13 Other (specify2_______)  
(Specify2____________) 
              
14 Other (specify3_______) 
(Specify3____________) 
              
15 Other (specify4_______)               
a 
Cost of total land rent for the whole year for each of the crop on rented land  
c
 If farmer used own manure, ask for the local value of the manure   
d 
If the farmer owns  








2=5 KG. BAG 
3=25 KG. BAG 
4=50 KG. BAG 
5=90 KG. BAG 
6=DEBE (18 kg) 
7=Number/Unit 
8=Gorogoro(2.25tin) 
9=1/4 kg tin 






16=2 kg Packet 
17=grams 
18=Wheelbarrow 
19= Cup (15) 20=Others(specify) ______________ 
Questionnaire number (HHID) ____________________ 
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1.12How many permanent farm workers did you have last year (January 2011-
December 2011) and what was their monthly salaries (for both crop & livestock)? 
Worker 
number 
Monthly salary (in 
Kshs) 
Length of employment 
Jan-Dec 2011 (In months) 
Type of work (1=only crops; 2=only 
livestock; 3= both) 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
1.13Besides permanent workers give the following details on labor use and cost for 
causal workers employed on your farm for crop production on a weekly basis for 
last year (January 2011-December 2011).  (Including both piece rate and daily 
wage rate) 
Peak season ( _________ months)  (To be specified by the respondent) 



















per day  
Average 



























          















































          
 
1.14 What is the average daily wage rate for men and women in this area?                                             
Men _______ Ksh/day  Women _______ Ksh/day 
1.15 What is the typical number of working hours per day? ____________ hours 
1.16 Currently, do you have any livestock on your farm? _______ (1=Yes; 0=No) 




1.17 For the whole of last year (January 2011-Decemeber 2011), please give details 
of revenue and cost of livestock production?  
 























       
Goat        
Sheep        
Chicken        
Donkeys        
Pigs        
Rabbits        
Ducks        
Other specify1 
____ 
       
Other specify2 
____ 
       
All animals 
listed above 
       
 
Animal product 




3. Price per unit (Ksh) 
Milk    
Eggs    
Hide    
Others specify_________    
a
UNIT CODE (1=litres, 2=mililitres, 3=Units/numbers,  4=Tray) 
 
 
2.0 GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT VEGETABLES  
PLEASE FIND OUT WHO IS IN CHARGE OF VEGETABLE PRODUCTION AND 
INTERVIEW THIS PERSON.  
2.1 Who makes decision about vegetable farming and marketing?  
Name of decision maker ________________________________        
OPMEM________ 
Relationship to household head ____  
 
(1=Household head; 2=Spouse; 3= Son/Daughter; 
4=Relative;  
     5=others (specify) _____________)        
Gender of decision maker _____; (0 = female; 1 = male)   




 (Enumerator Instruction:  Record the member number (OPMEM) of the decision maker from the 
Demography table on page 29 after the survey is completed.) 
2.2 How long have you been growing vegetables (as an independent household)? 
a) Years: _________ b) Months: __________ 
2.3 Since 2010, how much of the indigenous and exotic vegetables have you been 
growing? (Enumerator, ask the farmer to give the  average  area for each year, considering all 




Area cultivated in each year for each type (acres) 
 2012  2011  2010 








      
2)= Exotic vegetables       
 (African indigenous vegetables are e.g managu, terere, kunde, osuga, pumpkin leaves etc;  
Exotic vegetables are e.g spinach, sukuma wiki, lettuce, etc)  
AREA CODE
a






2.4 How many different vegetable plots did your household have in 2011 main season? _ 
2.5 Please tell me the sizes of these different vegetable plots (for 2011 main season), and 
who made the decisions about production, sales and revenue spending for each plot:  
IF MORE THAN 3 PLOT: PLEASE RANDOMLY SELECT 3 PLOTS BASED ON THE LAST 

















































this plot? (I.e.  
when, where, 
how much and 













this plot? (I.e. 
how much to 
sell, how much 
to use for home 
consumption 
where and 




















Plot1             
Plot2             
Plot3             
  





 VEGETABLE CODES b PROPORTION OF 
SALES CODE 
c 













 8= Dhania (Corriander), 
9= Brocolli,  







1= none at all;            
2= less than 25%;  
3= 25%;  
4= between 25 – 50%;  
5= 50%;   
6=between 50 – 75%;  
7=  75% ;   
8=  between 75-95%   
9=95% 
10=all 
1=Husband alone made the decisions,  
2=Husband was the major decision maker 
after consulting with wife,  
3=Wife alone made the decisions,  
4=Wife was the major decision maker 
after consulting with husband 
5=Someone else makes decision (specify 




2.6 What are the three ways in which most of the money from selling vegetables was 
used? (1=largest amount of money spent; 2=2nd largest amount of money spent; 3=3rd 

































            
 
2.7   For the present season (March-August 2012), how much of your vegetable area is 
irrigated? 




2.8 From where do you get information on production of vegetables such as information 
on production techniques, new seeds, pest control, input use etc.? (Rank three most 
important sources)(1=most important source, 2=2
nd
 most important, etc.) 
 Rank (1-3) 
1) Government extension (field days etc.)  
2) Agricultural cooperative   
3) NGO (Please specify) __________________  
4) Input dealer  
5)  Members of my farmers’ group  
6) Other farmers (e.g., neighbors, but non-group members)  
7) Public gathering (barazas)  
8) Public media (e.g., radio, newspaper, magazines)  
9) Traders  
10) Contracting retailer (supermarket, export companies, etc.)  
11)Agricultural seminars, workshops, group trainings  
12) Own experience  
13) Other (please specify):   




2.9 When it comes to obtaining new information about production of vegetables, would 
you say that it is very difficult, difficult, easy or very easy for you to obtain such 
information? 
 (1 = Very difficult; 2 = Difficult; 3 = Easy; 4 = Very easy )   __________________ 
2.10 What kind of production information do you feel you are lacking? 
 
Type of production information lacking 1=YES; 
0=NO 
1. New varieties  
2. Correct pesticide  
3. Production techniques  
4. Credit possibilities  
5. Selection of good seed  
6. Use of inorganic/ organic fertilizer  
7. Others (specify)______________________________  
 
3.0 INFORMATION ON MARKETING OF VEGETABLES  
3.1 Are you always able to sell all your vegetable that you wish to sell? _____ (1=YES, 0=NO) (IF YES; SKIP 
TO QN: 3.3)  




1. The price is unbearably low  
2. There is no willing buyer (lack of market)  
3. I have no means of transporting  
4. Too much supply on the market (flooded market)  
5. Some of the produce is rejected by the buyer because of quality   
6. Others (Specify1) _______________________________  
7. Others (specify2) _________________________________  
 
  




3.3 Whenever you want to sell your vegetables, where do you get information on possible market 
opportunities and market prices? (Rank three most important sources) 
(Ranks: 1=most important source; 2=2
nd
 most important source; 3=3
rd
 most important source.) 
Source of market information Rank (1–3) 
1. From fellow farmers’ group members  
2. Other farmers, who are not members of my group  
3. From cooperative society  
4. From agricultural extension staff  
5. From NGO (Specify) _______________________  
6. From public media (radio, television etc.)  
7. From public gatherings (chief’s baraza etc.)  
8. Agricultural seminars, workshops, group trainings  
9. From traders  
10. Others (specify)  
 
3.4 When it comes to obtaining new information about marketing opportunities and 
prices for vegetables, would you say that it is very difficult, difficult, easy or very 
easy for you to obtain such information? 
 (1 = Very difficult; 2 = Difficult; 3 = Easy; 4 = Very easy )   __________________ 
 
3.5 What kind of marketing information do you feel you are lacking? 
Type of marketing information lacking 1=Yes; 
0=No 
1. Market opportunities (where to sell)  
2. Prices  
3. Market requirements or standards  
4. Other (please specify)__________________________  




Please tell me details about marketing of vegetables produced during 2011 crop year 
(February 2011 to January 2012)   
 
3.6 During last 
crop year, to 
which buyers 







3.7 (If sells to supermarket, 
companies and institutions-
directly) 
During which other years 
have you been selling to this 
buyer? 
(Enumerator: If told 2002, 2003, 
2004 and 2009 please write 2002-
2004, 2009) 
3.8 How did you 
come in contact 
with the buyer 
before you 
supplied 







3.9 For the last crop year, 
to which 3 buyers did you 
sell most of your 
vegetables?  Please rank 
them in order of 
importance 
1= buyer that bought the largest 
share 
2= buyer that bought the second 
largest share 
3= buyer that bought third 
largest share 
    
    
    
    
    
 
a BUYER CODE 
 








To supermarket via specialized 
trader/broker 
5. Trader/broker to Uchumi 
6. Trader/broker to Nakumatt 
7. Trader/broker to Tuskys 





Companies and institutions 
9.  City park market 
10. Mugoya vegetables 
11. Exporting company 
12. Hotels 
13. Green groceries 
14. School 




16. Trader that sells to 
Companies or Institutions   
 
Traditional market 
17. Spot market  
18.  A specific independent  
middleman or broker 
19. Various independent brokers 
or middlemen 
20. Other  
(Specify) ______________ 
 
1. Via phone through other farmers who 
supplied the buyer 
 
2. Personally when he was in the village 
through other farmers who supplied the 
buyer; 
 
3. Personally at the wholesale market 
through other farmers who supplied the 
buyer; 
 
4. Personally at the wholesale market 
without knowing the buyer; 
 
5. The buyer contacted the farmer via 
phone; 
 
6. The buyer contacted the farmer 
personally when he was in the village 
 
7. Other specify_______________ 
 
 
Questionnaire number (HHID) ____________________ 
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Please tell me more details about your 3 most important buyers (listed in 3.9): 
 
PLEASE LIST THE THREE MOST 
IMPORTANT BUYERS RANKED IN 3.9 
3.10 For the last crop 
year, when did this 
buyer mainly pay you 
for your produce? 
 
1= The same day; 
2=Within 1 week; 
3=Within 2 weeks; 
 4=At the end of the 
month 



















you made any 
specific 
investments 

























     
  
 
     
  
 
     




3.16 Now we are interested in your reasons for selling to different buyers  
PLEASE FILL IN THE NAME OF THE 






1 = if reason is mentioned 










FILL IN ONLY 
IF farmer 
supplied to any 
supermarket but  
not ranked it 
No.1 




FILL IN ONLY 
IF farmer 
supplied to any 
company or 
institution but not 
ranked it No. 1 
Why did you 
sell vegetables 
to ------? 




Why did you sell 
vegetables to ----
--? 
1. The buyer offers a high price     
2. The buyer pays a stable price    
3. The buyer does not manipulate price (does not 
change price arbitrarily) 
   
4. I can negotiate price with the buyer    
5. The buyer pays promptly    
6. The buyer will always buy the produce (market 
assurance) 
   
7. The buyer is not strict on the quality of 
products, so I can sell all my produce 
   
8. I do not have to worry about 
breakages/spoilage after selling 
   
9. We have a long standing trading relationship    
10. The buyer  is well known in the village    
11. We are friends or relatives    
12. Welfare or financial support, e.g. advance 
payment 
   
13. The buyer provide me with knowledge about 
production methods  
   
14. I have no other alternative market (buyer)    
15. I cannot supply more to other buyers that I 
would rather sell to 
   
16. I have no means of transporting vegetables to 
other markets 
   
17. Other reasons (specify) 
_______________________ 
   
  




IF THE RESPONDENT SOLD AT LEAST SOME VEGETABLES TO SUPERMARKETS 
DURING THE LAST CROP YEAR: PLEASE GO TO QUESTION 3.21 
3.17 Do you know that you can sell vegetables to supermarkets?  _____________ 
 
(1=YES; 0=NO-> go to question 3.22) 
3.18 Why did you not supply your vegetables to supermarkets?  
Reasons:  
PLEASE FILL IN 
1 = if reason is mentioned 
0= if  reason is not mentioned 
     
   
1. Do not pay promptly  
2. Cheats on the timing of payment  
3. Too much variation in prices  
4. Cheats on price agreement  
5. Offers low price  
  
6. Demand too strict standards  
7. Rejects too much of my produce  
8. Cheats on quality agreement   
  
9. Farmer is unable to supply required quantity 
consistently 
 
10. Buys too small quantities  
11. Too much damages/breakages  
12. Cheating on damage/breakages  
  
13. Difficult to get the initial contract  
14. Require reliable means of transport  
15. Time consuming / labor demanding  
16. Capital intensive  
17. Others (specify 1) ________________________  
18. Others (specify 2) ________________________  
 
3.19 Have you ever supplied to supermarkets? _________________ (1=YES; 0=NO) IF NO 
SKIP TO 3.21 
 
3.20If yes, during which years? __________________________________________ 
(Enumerator: Please make sure that all years are included) 
 




3.21 Have you ever been rejected to supply to supermarkets? ______ (1=YES; 0=NO) 
3.22 When selling your vegetables to______ (buyer ranked one, supermarket or 
companies and institutions), when do you agree on…? 
PLEASE FILL IN THE NAME OF THE BUYER 




1=agreement on spot  
2 = agreement before supply,  
3= agreement before production,  











FILL IN ONLY 
IF farmer 
supplied to any 
supermarket but  
not ranked it 
No.1 




FILL IN ONLY 
IF farmer supplied 
to any company or 
institution but not 
ranked it No. 1 
Agreement on transaction (Transaction attributes) 
1. On type of vegetable    
2. On price    
3. On quantity    
4. To supply continuously (all year round)    
5. To deliver regularly (twice/week etc.)    
6. On production technique    
7. Mode of payment (e.g. cash/cheque/m-pesa)    
8. Specific plot to be used for production    
9. I should have a cell phone for receiving orders    
10. No side-selling    
11. Time of delivery    
12. Time of payment    
13. Other ( specify ______________    
Agreement of product attributes 
1. Vegetable should be harvested at certain age    
2. Deliver fresh produce (delivered within hours 
of harvesting) 
   
3. Vegetable should be cleaned before delivery     
4. Vegetable  should be free from pests    
5. Vegetable should be packed in certain quantity 
and ready for shelf 
   
6. Minimum pesticide use    
7. Others (specify ______________________    




3.23  Please give more details of the agreement and rejection rates (to be asked for all 
buyers except Spot market) 
PLEASE FILL IN THE NAME OF THE 











FILL IN ONLY 
IF farmer 
supplied to any 
supermarket but  







FILL IN ONLY 
IF farmer 
supplied to any 
company or 
institution but 
not ranked it 
No. 1 
1. If there was an agreement, was it oral or written? 
 
1= Oral, 2=Written 3=Partly oral and partly 
written 
   
2. If there was an agreement, what would have 
happened if you were unable to fulfill the 
agreement?  
 




         
3. If there was an agreement, how many times 
during last season were you unable to deliver upon 
request?   
 
IN NUMBER OF TIMES 
   
In general….    
4. During last season, how much of your 
product was rejected? 
IN PERCENT 
   
5. Did you agree on the rejection? 
1= YES; 0=NO 
   
6. How often has the buyer been to your farm 
in the last one year?  
 
(1= Never;    2= Once;     3= More than once) 
   
a 
CONSEQUENCE CODE 
1 = Nothing happens  
2 = I will immediately lose the opportunity to supply to the 
buyer  
3 = I will eventually lose the opportunity to supply to the buyer  
4 = I will have to pay a fee  
5 = I will have to pay back next season  
6 = It will be pressure from the buyer  
7 = It will be pressure from other 
farmers  
8=Other(specify)_________ 





3.24 Did you receive any other services or assistance from the buyers of your 
vegetables? 
PLEASE FILL IN THE NAME OF THE 
BUYERS BASED ON QUESTION 3.9  -> 
 
1 = if  service/assistance is mentioned 












FILL IN ONLY 
IF farmer 
supplied to any 
supermarket but  







FILL IN ONLY 
IF farmer 
supplied to any 
company or 
institution but 
not ranked it No. 
1 
                     
I received service or assistance on; 
  
1. Seeds supply     
2. Pesticide supply    
3. Fertilizer supply    
4. Information on production techniques 
(extension) 
   
5. Credit on output (welfare support)    
6. Loan guarantee    
7. Advances on crop production    
8. Market information (output)    
9. Market information (input)    
10. Harvest    
11. Transportation to market    
12. Other assistance 
(specify______________ 
   
 




3.25 Please list any problems or complaints/ dissatisfaction that you have about the top 
ranked buyers of vegetables in question 3.9? (Please rank your 
complaints/problems). 
PLEASE FILL IN THE NAME OF THE 
BUYERS ACCORING TO THE RANKING IN 
QUESTION 3.9   
 
1 = if reason is mentioned 










FILL IN ONLY 
IF farmer 
supplied to any 
supermarket but  


















1. Cheating on price agreement    
2. Cheating on quality agreement      
3. Cheating on time of  buying    
4. Cheating on the timing of payment    
5. Offers low price    
6. Cheating on damage/breakages    
7. Others (specify1) 
________________________ 
   
8. Others (specify2) 
________________________ 
   
 




3.26 For this season (March-August 2012), where do you sell/plan to sell your 
vegetables? (Please choose the three markets where you sell most quantities and 
rank them in order of importance) 
Market Channels 
RANK 








 highest quantity is sold/will be 
sold; 
  
1. The supermarkets  
2. Traders/brokers to supermarkets  
3. Companies and institutions  
              (City park market, Mogoya vegetables, 
exporting companies, hotels, green groceries) 
 
4. Independent middlemen or traders 
        (spot market, independent middlemen and 
brokers) 
 
5. Spot market  
6. Others (specify) _________________  
 
4.0 INPUT AND OUTPUT DATA FOR VEGETABLE PRODUCTION (FOR ONE  
PLOT)  
 The following questions relate to the present season (March-August 2012). 1. Farmers 
supplying supermarkets (direct or indirect) should give information for the main vegetable 
that they mostly supply to supermarket. 2. Farmers supplying to institutions and companies 
should give information on the main vegetable that they mostly supply to institutions and 
companies (unless they supply to supermarkets). 3. The rest of the farmers should give 
information about their main vegetable to the traditional market. 
 
4.1 Which is the main vegetable that you sell/will sell in highest volume to your most 


















 2= EXOTIC 
1) Managu   7) Spinach   
2) Sargeti   8) Dhania 
(Corriander) 
  











  11)Others________   
6) Cabbage      





Please identify one plot where the vegetable chosen in 4.1 above is grown and ask the following questions at the site of this plot. (I f more than one 
plot, please choose the plot based on the last digit of the HHID)  
 
4.2 Please give the following information for the chosen plot that contains the main vegetable sold to the most preferred market. 
Plot information Harvest information Sales ONLY if  not sale per 
plot 










































































13. Sales revenue per plot 
per harvesting round (Kshs) 
             
a 
Number of harvesting rounds before the plot is replanted   
 
Land unit codes:  Soil quality codes:  Soil type codes:  Slope codes:  
1= acres, 2= m2, 
3=Ha  
1= highly fertile, 2=medium 
fertile, 3= low fertile.   
1=black cotton soil, 2=clay soil, 3=loam soil, 4=sandy soil, 5= other 
specify_______________ 
1=steeply sloped plot, 2= gently 




4.3 If output is measured in bags, approximately how many bundles can one make from one bag of vegetables? ______ bundles 
4.4 How many leaves/stems of this vegetable make one bundle? _______________ 
 




4.5 For the identified plot of vegetable, please specify all inputs that you use during the 
entire crop cycle, their prices per unit, and the total amount of money spent on this 
plot? Please give information for one full plot planted at once. 




used each time 
























1. Seed        
Organic matter (specify)        
2. Own farm-yard manure        
3. Purchased farm-yard 
manure 
       
Pesticides        
4.Insecticide        
5.Fungicide        
6.Herbicide        
7. Electricity       KPLC 
8.Fuel for irrigation        
Fertilizers (Please 
specify) 
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Other inputs(Please 
specify) 
       
        
        
        

















9=1/4 kg tin 












 1= input dealer; 2= NGO; 
3= trader; 4= fellow 
farmers; 5 = informal 
market; 6 = others 
specify_________. 




4.7 For the identified plot, please specify how often the following operations were/are 
carried out for one complete growing cycle. Please give information for one full plot 
planted at once. 
 
Farm activities How 
many 
times? 











How many of those are 
usually hired laborers? 
Male Female Male Female 
1. Land preparation        
2. Planting        
3. Gap filling        
4. Manual weeding         
5. Irrigating        
6. Fertilizer application        
7. Pesticide application        
8. Other chemicals        
9. Harvesting        
10. Cleaning and packing        
11.Other, specify:_______        
 
4.8 In generally, what method of land preparation (plowing and harrowing) do you use? 
______    (0=None, 1 = Tractor 2 = Animal traction 3 = Manual/hand)  
4.9 If you use tractor or animal traction how much do you pay for this service? 
_________ (Ksh/acre). (If the farmer owns tractor or animals, what is the local rate 
for these services?) 
4.10 In general, how many times in a year do you grow this vegetable? _________ 
4.11 In general, how long is one full growing cycle? ____________ months 
________weeks 
 




5 INFORMATION ON CREDIT ACCESS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS 
5.1 Could you obtain credit if you need it for the purpose of operational expenses (e.g. 
buying fertilizer paying for labor etc.)? _________1=YES, 0=NO 
5.2 Could you obtain credit if you needed for the purpose of buying production assets 
(e.g. irrigation infrastructure)? _________1=YES, 0=NO 
5.3 During the last 12 months, have you or any other household member received any 
credit to buy inputs, or received inputs on credit, for production of 
vegetables?______1=YES, 0=NO 
5.4 If yes, what were the sources and how much did you receive? (Include the value of 
inputs if inputs are provided on credit) 
Source 
Number of times loan received Total amount (Ksh) 
1. Input dealer   
2. NGO.   
3. Bank/cooperative society.   
4. Friends/relatives   
5.  Moneylender.   
6.  Other (specify)_________   
 
5.5 Are you or any other household member currently a member of any group or 
association? ___________  (1=YES; 0=NO)  (If no please go to question 
5.8) 
5.6 If yes what type of group do you/ household members belong to?  
Type of group 
1=Yes; 0=No How long have 
you been a 
member of this 
group/association? 
(in Months) 
1. Producer group   
2. Farmers’ cooperative society   
3. SACCO   
4. Women group   
5. Youth group   
6. Community welfare group   
7. Other (specify) ________________   
 




5.7 What type of benefits/services do you receive from your group(s)? 
Benefits/Service 
1=YES; 0=NO 
1. Credit service  
2. Input access  
3. Training on crop production   
4. Training on marketing  
5. Marketing of farm produce  
6.  Welfare/social support  
7.  Other (specify):  
 
 
5.8 Are you currently participating in Farm Concern Internationals marketing 
activities?    (1=Yes; 0= No) _________ 
 
5.9 In the last 5 years, have you participated in “crop marketing days” organized by 
the district agricultural office? (1= Yes; 0= No)  _______________ 
5.10 (If the head of the household is a woman): Is the head of the household a member 
of any women group? (1= Yes; 0= No) ___________ 
(If the head of the household is a man): Is the spouse of the head of the household a 
member of any women group? (1= Yes; 0= No) ___________ 
 




5.11 We are now going to read the names of a number of vegetable farmers from this village and ________________________village. Please 
let us know if you know these persons and how you interact with them with respect to agricultural production. 
 1. Respondent 
name 



























7. Do you 
know to 
which buyers 






8. Have you 









9. Could you 
go to --- if 
you wanted 








you and -- 








Sample 1 (HVC=1 and 2) 
1.           
2.           
3.           
Sample 2 (HVC=0) 
4.           
5.           
Sample 3 (neighboring village; HVC=0, 1 and 2) 
6.           
7.           
 




The following questions refer to farmers other than those listed in the table above 
5.12 Do you know any vegetable farmers who are supplying vegetables to 
supermarkets?   (1=YES, 0=NO) _______  
(If no go to question 5.20) 
5.13 If yes, how many?  ______ 
5.14 Out of these farmers that you know supply to supermarkets, have you ever talked 
to any of them about marketing of vegetables? _______ (1=YES, 0=NO) 
(If no go to question 5.20) 
5.15If yes, how many? _____ 
5.16Out of these farmers (who supply to supermarkets and who you talk to about 
marketing of vegetables?), who do you think was the first farmer to start to supply to 
supermarket? _________________________________________ (NAME) 
5.17Approximately when do you think that________ (NAME FROM 5.16) started to 
supply to supermarkets? ______ (IN NUMBER OF YEARS AGO) 
5.18Did you know ___________ (NAME FROM 5.16) before he/she started to supply to 
supermarkets? _______ (1=YES, 0=NO) 
5.19What is the distance to _________ (NAME FROM 5.16) from your homestead? 
_________ (IN MINUTES WALKING)_____________(IN KILOMETERS) 
5.20Have you ever met a buyer/broker/middleman who buys vegetables for 
supermarkets? 
_______ (1=YES, 0=NO) 
5.21 Do you know any farmers who are supplying to Companies or Institutions? 
_______ (1=YES, 0=NO) 
(If no go to question 5.29) 
5.22If yes, how many?  ______ 




5.23 Out of the farmers that you know supplies to Companies or Institutions, have you 
ever talked to any of them about marketing of vegetables? _______ (1=YES, 0=NO) 
(If no go to question 5.29) 
5.24 If yes, how many? _____ 
5.25 Out of these farmers (who supplies to Companies or Institutions and who you talk to 
about marketing of vegetables), who do you think was the first farmer to start to 
supply to Companies or Institutions? __________________________________ 
(NAME) 
5.26 Approximately when do you think that________ (NAME FROM 5.25) started to 
supply to Companies or Institutions? ______ (IN NUMBER OF YEARS AGO) 
5.27 Did you know ___________ (NAME FROM 5.25) before he/she started to supply to 
Companies or Institutions? _______ (1=YES, 0=NO) 
5.28 What is the distance to _________ (NAME FROM 5.25) from your homestead? 
_________ (IN MINUTES WALKING)_____________(IN KILOMETERS) 
5.29 Have you ever met a buyer/broker/middleman from Companies or Institutions? 
_______ (1=YES, 0=NO) 
 
5.30 In your own opinion do you think farmers supplying vegetables to 
supermarket earn more, less or the same amount of income as they would 
have earned if they supplied to spot market? 
  (1=more income, 2=less income, 3=same income)  __________________




6 GENERAL HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 









Name of the HH member 
3 
Relationship 






































































          
2             
3             
4             
5             
6             
7             
8             
9             
10             
11            
 
12             


















8=Step children   







12 = House girl                                                       
13 =Farm laborers 
14 =Other Unrelated  
15= Other relative   
 
b
 Marital status   
1= Married   
2= Single 
3= Divorced/separated 
4= Widow/widower   
0= None 
1= Paid employment (civil servant, 
working in private company etc) 
2= Self-employed outside farm 
3= Working on household farm 
4= Wage labor (working on other 
peoples farms)      
5= Off-farm employment 
6=Student       
7= Other (Specify)______   
d
 Religion     
1=Catholic           2=Protestant 
3=Muslim            4=Traditionalist 
5=No religion      6=Others (specify) 
__________________ 














6.2 Kindly tell us the religion and tribe of the household head, spouse of the household head and the 
respondent (in case the respondent is not head or spouse to head) 
MEMID (from 
demog table 









 Household head   
 Spouse to household head   
 Respondent (Fill only if respondent is not one of 
the two above) 
  
 
6.3 What was your household’s income from the following sources during the past 12 months? (include 
the income of all household members listed in the table on page 29 exclude income already listed in 
the table on page 29) 
Income source Total Income  
in past 12 
months 
(Ksh) 
1 Income from hiring out machinery services to other farmers (ploughing etc.)  
2 Income from own non-agricultural businesses   
3 Pensions  
4 Remittances from family members/friends who do not live in the household  
5 Revenues from leasing out land  
6 Dividends  
7 Other sources (please specify ______________________________________)  
 




7 HOUSEHOLD ACCESS TO SOCIOECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE  
7.1 Please indicate whether the following facilities are available in the village and answer 
whether or not you have access to them. 
 




















used means of 
transportatio






used means of 
transportatio










1. Electricity    
(KPLC)                   
      
2. Piped water 
system                        
      
3. Bank                                    
4. Tarmac road                          
5. Matatu stage       
6. Public Transport 
system             
      
7. Agric. extension 
agent   
      
8. Agricultural 
input market                            
      
9. Agric. product 
market                             
      
10. Health center       
11. Supermarket 
retail outlet 
      
12. Local shopping 
center 
      
13. Nearest 
supermarket that 
buys fresh fruits 
and vegetables 
from farmers? 
      
14. Nearest place 
where you can 
sell vegetables? 
      
15. Nearest farmer 
that owns means 
of transportation 
for vegetables 
      
a 
Means of transport Codes 








8 HOUSEHOLD ASSETS (Prompt for each item as listed below) 
8.1 At present, how many/much of the following does this household own that are in 
usable/repairable condition? (Enumerator: For value per unit, ask for current value of items as they 
are in their current condition) 





not known Ask 






assets, write the 





QTY UVALUE TOTVAL 
 
1 Tractor     
2 Car/Van     
3 pickup)     
4 Trailer     
5 Motorcycle     
6 Bicycle     
7 Television     
8 Radio     
9 Mobile Phone     
10 Refrigerator     
11 Solar panels     
12 Generator     
13 Oxen     
14 Chaf cutter     
15 ploughs for tractor     
16 Animal traction plough     
17 Cart     
18 Vegetable packing shed     
19 Water pump     
20 Borehole     
21 Well     
22 Water tank     
23 Drip irrigation system     
24 Irrigation pipes     
25 Sprinkler     
      
 





9.1 Over the past four years, was your household negatively affected by any of the following events or 
developments? Please rank the 3 most severe problems experienced. 
 
 PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING 
QUESTIONS ACCORDINGLY 
 
The household was […] 























1 Drought    
2 Too much rain or flood    
3 Erosion and gully formation    
4 Frosts or hailstorm    
5 Pests or diseases that affected crops before they 
were harvested 
   
6 Pests or diseases that led to storage losses    
7 Theft of crops    
8 Loss of livestock (death, theft, illness)     
9 Fire    
10 Death of male household head    
11 Death of female  household head    
12 Death of other person    
13 Illness of male  household head    
14 Illness of female  household head    
15 Illness of other person    




10 CHARACTERISTICS OF MAIN HOUSE 
 
(ENUMERATOR: PLEASE OBSERVE AND ASK ABOUT THE FOLLOWING) 
10.1 What is the roofing material of the main house?   ROOF _________ 
 (1=grass /makuti        2=iron sheet      3=tiles        4=other, specify__________) 
10.2 What is the wall material of the main house?    WALL _________   
 (1=mud    2=bricks/stones  3=iron sheet    4=wood    5=plastered    6=other, specify__________) 
10.3 What is the floor material of the main house?   FLOOR ________   
 (1= earth        2=cement        3=wood       4=tiles         5=other, specify__________) 
10.4 What is the mode of ownership of the main house?    HSEOWN _______   
  
 (1= owned        2= rented        3= owned by relative        4=other, specify__________) 
10.5 What type of toilet do you use?   TOILET ________ 
  
(1= pit latrine         2= bush        3= flush toilet        4= other, specify__________) 
10.6 What is the main source of water for domestic use during the wet-season? 
        MAINWET ______ 
        Distance (minutes walking) _________ 
 (1=Pond        2=dam /sanddam        3=lake        4=stream/river        5=unprotected spring        6=protected 
spring  =well          8=borehole   9=piped into compound        10=piped outside compound        11=water tankers    
12=roof catchments        13=waterhawkers-cart /bodaboda        14= other, specify___________) 
10.7 What is the main source of water for domestic use during the dry-season?   
       MAINDRY _______ 
      Distance (minutes walking) _________ 
 
(1=Pond        2=dam /sanddam        3=lake        4=stream/river        5=unprotected spring        6=protected 
spring        7=well          8=borehole    9=piped into compound        10=piped outside compound        11=water 
tankers        12=roof catchments        13=waterhawkers-cart /bodaboda        14= other, specify___________)  
10.8 What is your main cooking fuel?    COOKFUEL _________   
  
(1=electricity        2=paraffin        3=firewood        4=gas        5=charcoal        6=solar power        7=other, 
specify____________) 
10.9 What is your main type of lighting?     LITFUEL_________             
(1=electricity        2=pressure lamp        3=tin lamp        4=fuel wood        5=lantern         6=solar 
power        7=other, specify__________) 
 




11. HOUSEHOLD NUTRITION KNOWLEDGE AND AWARENESS  
11.1 Has any member of this household ever been trained /received any information on the nutritive 
benefits of consuming different type foods? (1=Yes; 0=No) NTRAIN_____ 
11.2 If yes, what were they trained on/ got information on? 




11.3 What was the source of the training/information? 
      1= From a radio 
program 
      2= From a TV program 
      3=Church 
    4= Local leader 
    5=School 
    6=From Hospital 
7= From a neighbor 
8= From my group members 
9=From supermarket representative 
10=Others  (specify)___________________ 
 TSOURCE1_____ TSOURCE2_____ TSOURCE3_____ TSOURCE4___ 
 
 
11.4 Amongst the following foods, please tell me which foods provide Carbohydrates, Protein and 
Vitamins? 
 1= Beans, 2= Rice, 3=Sukumawiki (kales), 4= Ugali, 5= Chicken, 6=Mangoes  
(Enumerator: Please write down whatever the respondent says, whether correct or 
wrong. Write 99 for don’t know) 
1=Carbohydrate1 2=Carbohydrate2 3=Carbohydrate3 4=Carbohydrate4 5=Carbohydrate5 6=Carbohydrate6 
      
7=Protein1 8=Protein2 9=Protein3 10=Protein4 11=Protein5 12=Protein6 
      
13=Vitamin1 14=Vitamin2 15=Vitamin3 16=Vitamin4 17=Vitamin5 18=Vitamin6 
      
 
 
12. HOUSEHOLD FOOD CONSUMPTION IN THE LAST 7 DAYS (Enumerators: Please ask the 
following questions to the person who is mainly responsible for preparing food) 
12.1 In the past seven days indicate how much of the following food items your household consumed and 
the prices in Kshs (This is for all food consumed in the household, including own-produced, bought, 
gifts and from food aid program, by all the people listed on demographic table on page 29 before. 
INCLUDE food prepared at home but eaten outside. EXCLUDE meals prepared outside the home) 





Food Items consumed in the past 
7 DAYS 
How much in 










Total value of 
consumption in 
Kshs     
 
Food Items consumed in the 
past 7 DAYS 
How much in 
total did your 
household 
consume 







Total value of 
consumption in 
Kshs     
 
Staple foods        Vegetables    
1 Cassava Tuber       30 Okra    
2 Cassava flour       31 Tomato    
3 Cassava chips       32 Pepper    
4 Yam Tuber       33 Onion 
   
5 Yam flour       34 Carrot 
   6 Yam chips       35 Egg plant (biringanya) 
   
7 Orangefleshed sweet potato       36 Cabbage 
   
8 Other sweetpotato       37 Cucumber 
   
9 Sweet potato chips       38 Pumpkin 
   
10 Irish potato       39 Butternut 
   
11 Irish potato chips       40 Spinach    
12 Arrowroots       41 Kales (Sukuma wiki) 
   
13 Maize green       42 Amarantha leaves (terere) 
(Terere/Mchicha/Dodo) 
   
14 Maize grain       43 Pumpkin leaves 
   
15 Maize flour       44 Sweet potato leaves 
   
16 Sorghum grain       45 Black night shade 
(managu/suga) 
(managu(Managu/ Osuga|) 
   
17 Sorghum Flour       46 Cow pea leaves  
((((((rr(th(Kunde Thoroko) 
   
18 Millet grain       47 Stinging netle (thabai) 
   
19 Millet flour        Other vegetables (specify) 
   
20 Brown rice       48   
   
21 White rice       49   
   
22 Wheat grain       50   
   
23 Wheat flour brown        Nuts and Pulses 
   
24 Wheat flour white       51 Beans dry 
   
25 Cooking banana       52 Beans fresh 
   
 
Other staple foods       53 Black beans (Njahi) 
   
26         54 Green grams (Ndengu) 
   
27         55 Soybean 
   
28         56 Peas (incl cowpea, pigeon 
peas, green peas-minji) 
   
29         57 L ntils 
   
  
      58 Groundnut 
   
        59 Cashew nut (korosho)    





Food Items consumed in the past 
7 DAYS 
How much in 










Total value of 
consumption in 
Kshs     
 
Food Items consumed in the 
past 7 DAYS 
How much in 
total did your 
household 
consume 







Total value of 
consumption in 
Kshs     
60 Soya meat (e.g. Sossi)    89 Pork Sausage    
61 Soybean flour    90 Eggs (pieces) with yolk    
 Other pulses and nuts    91 Eggs without yolk    
62     92 Liver (from any animal)    
63     93 Offals (matumbo)    
 Fruits     Other meats    
64 Orange    94     
65 Ripe mango    95     
66 Ripe pawpaw    96     
67 Pineapple    97     
68 Apple     Dairy products    
69 Coconut    98 Milk (cow/goat milk)     
70 Guava    99 Powdered milk     
71 Ripe bananas    100 Sour milk (mala)     
72 Melon       101 Cheese   
  
73 Sugar cane       102 Yoghurt       
74 Avocado       103 Ice cream      
 
Other fruits         Other dairy product       
75         104       
76         105       
77         106     
 
 Meat and animal Products        Beverages       
78 Cow meat    107 Cocoa powder       
79 Goat/ Sheep meat       108 Tea (leaves)       
80 Pork       109 Coffee (powder)       
81 Chicken       110 Milo powder       
82 Bush meat (Game meat)       111 Soya powder       
83 Turkey (bata mzinga)       112 Drinking chocolate       
84 Fish         Other beverages       
85 Snail       113         
86 Crabs       114         
87 Chicken sausage       115         
88 Beef sausage       116        





Food Items consumed in the past 
7 DAYS 
How much in 










Total value of 
consumption in 
Kshs     
 
Food Items consumed in the 
past 7 DAYS 
How much in 
total did your 
household 
consume 







Total value of 
consumption in 
Kshs     
 
 
Drinks       145 Butter       
117 Soft drinks (coke/fanta/etc)       146 Margarine       
118 
 
Orange juice       147 Sunflower oil       
119 Apple juice       148 Cooking fat       
120 Pineapple juice       149 Other oil(specify)______ 
 
      
121 Other juice (concentrates) 
   
150       
122 Local beer 
   
151  
   
123 Bottled beer 
   
152  
   
124 Other beer 
   
153   
  
125 Wine 
   
 Snacks  
  
 Other drinks 
   
154 Bread  
  
126     155 Biscuit/cookies    
127     156 Popcorn    
128 
    
157 Cakes 
   
 Condiments and spices 
   
  Other snacks 
   
129 Salt 
   
158  
   
130 Curry 
   
159  
   
131 Ginger (tangawizi) 
   
160  
   
132 Ketchup, Tomato sauce 
   
  
   
 Other spices___________ 
   
  
   
133          
134  
   
  
   
135          
136   
   
  
   
 Sugar and sweets 
   
  
   
138 Sugar 
   
  
   
139 Chocolate 
   
  
   
140 Other sweet 
   
  
   
 Fat and Oil 
   
  
   
141 Red palm oil 
   
  
   
142 Groundnut oil 
   
  
   
143 Coconut oil 
   
  
   
144 Sheer butter oil 
   
  
   





1= LITER 3= KGS 5= 5 KG. BAG 












6= 25 KG. 
BAG 













12.2Food consumed by household members away from home in the last 7 days (eg in 
schools, in restaurants, during ceremony etc), Household members are the people 




















        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
Thank you for your time and patience! 
 
END TIME: _____:_____ 
 
